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ABSTRACT
Private equity and venture capital investments in emerging markets grew significantly
over the past five years (2003-2008), both in absolute and relative terms. In this study, we
examine the industry's role in emerging markets, in terms of key actors, business
processes, and impact on portfolio companies. We use a case study of private equity and
venture capital in Egypt, and the Middle East and North Africa region. We focus on two
key questions: (i) Why did private equity activities grow so much and so fast in Egypt?; (ii)
What is the impact of private equity firms on their portfolio companies? And what are the
broader economic development implications for the country?
In addition to a number of global and macroeconomic trends that created a positive
environment for private equity investments, we identify two key factors behind the
industry's success in Egypt: first, the industry is dominated by local firms that rely on a
mix of local knowledge and expatriate expertise, and have developed key competencies
that provided them with a strong competitive advantage and enabled their growth.
Second, these firms, while adopting global best practices in the industry, have adapted
their business model and practices to the local market needs.
In terms of their impact, we found that in most transactions, private equity firms acted
as a catalyst for initiating, consolidating, professionalizing, growing and globalizing their
portfolio companies, and in doing so, they increased their competitiveness and
expanded their operations in regional and global markets. Based on these findings, we
argue that private equity firms in emerging markets are providing a new type of
"financial entrepreneurship" that is increasingly playing a positive role in economic
development.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
Over the past five years, private equity and venture capital investments have
grown exponentially, both globally and in emerging markets. Morgan Stanley
estimates that in 2007, more than 2,700 private equity funds were active globally.
These funds executed around 25% of the global mergers and acquisitions
transactions and 33% of the initial public offerings (IPO's) (Jensen 2007). The
Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA) estimates that globally,
private equity funds raised $445 billion in 2008, more than three times the 2004
figure of $141.7 billion. Lerner and Gurung (2008) estimate the total value of
companies' acquired by private equity globally in leveraged buyout transactions
conducted between 2001 and 2007 to be more than $2.7 trillion.
In emerging markets, EMPEA (2009) estimates that in 2008, $66.5 billion were
raised by more than 210 private equity funds focusing on emerging markets,
compared to $6.5 billion in 2004. Private equity firms and funds are becoming
increasingly important actors in these countries: they act as a source of finance
for new enterprises or provide growth capital for existing ones; they act as
1 The total value of a company acquired by private equity, sometimes referred to the enterprise
value, includes both equity and debt (Lerner and Gurung 2008).
owners and managers of portfolio companies2; and they act as employers, both
for management and labor.
This incredible growth trajectory clearly begs an important question: Why did the
private equity activities grow so much and so fast in emerging markets over this time
period? Analysts (e.g., Lerner and Leamon 2008, Lerner and Gurung 2008, Jensen
1989) provide three types of explanations for this puzzle. The first explanation
focuses on changes in the global investment environment. This includes global
trends such as the increase in global liquidity, the globalization of the investment
banking and asset management industries, and the decline in growth and
investment opportunities in developed markets. The second explanation focuses
on the increasing opportunities in emerging markets. Many emerging economies
enjoy high levels of economic growth, stable macroeconomic environments, and
increasingly open and friendly investment climates. These favorable conditions,
both on the supply and demand side, support the increase in global private
equity investments (as well as other types of global investments such as FDI).
The third explanation goes beyond these environmental conditions to examine
the private equity investment model itself. We argue that private equity is
particularly well-suited for these types of markets, and that it is in fact surfacing
as a highly effective model for investing in emerging markets for institutional
investors and high-net-worth individuals. In his paper, "The Eclipse of the Public
Corporation," Jensen (1989) argues that the private equity leveraged buyout
model is a new and powerful model for general management because it provides
an efficient capital structure, strong corporate governance, concentrated and
2 We use the term "portfolio companies" to refer to companies that receive private equity
investments, and are hence part of the portfolio of companies owned (fully or partially) by the
private equity firm or fund.
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engaged investors, and strong management incentives (Stromberg 2008). While
his argument was and remains controversial for many reasons, private equity
transactions continue to grow, both in developed and emerging markets.
As more of the global economic growth shifts towards emerging markets,
institutional investors are seeking more exposure to these countries, and more
capital flows are seeking attractive investments within these countries. However,
the vehicles for these investments are limited. Capital markets in many emerging
economies are not broad or deep enough, may not have the liquidity to support
these inflows, and can quickly become overvalued due to speculative demands.
Private equity provides an alternative vehicle for these large investors. Private
equity managers seek opportunities that are not publicly traded yet; they provide
strong governance and accountability to their investors; they maintain an
efficient capital structure; and they can structure their funds to maintain
investors' tax privileges. For the same reasons, private equity is also an attractive
investment vehicle for the local or regional high-net-worth individuals and
family investors who need to diversify beyond their core business and want to
maintain their investments locally or within the region, a growing pattern in the
Middle East.
There is an extensive body of literature covering private equity in developed
countries, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, where the
industry has been historically most active. This literature provides a theoretical
and empirical understanding of private equity in terms of its business model,
governance, and financial performance. It also provides an assessment of private
equity firms' impact on portfolio companies in terms of labor, wages and
employment, productivity, and innovation, with the premise that ownership of
companies by private equity funds affects their behavior and performance. In
contrast, there is a very limited body of theoretical or empirical literature
covering private equity in emerging markets, primarily due to the industry's
short history, as well as its data limitations.
In this research, we provide a case study of the private equity industry in Egypt,
a prime example of an emerging economy with a strong and fast-growing
private equity industry. As of mid-2008, more than 36 private equity funds were
investing primarily in Egypt, with more than $6.4 billion in committed capital.
Additionally, 35 regional and global funds were investing in Egypt along with
other countries in the region. These funds executed more than 78 private equity
transactions in Egypt during the five year period between 2003/2004 and
2007/2008.
In our research, we focus on two key questions, using Egypt as a case study. Our
first research question is: Why did private equity activities grow so much and so
fast in Egypt? Moving beyond the macroeconomic and environmental factors,
we examine the key actors, focusing on the firms and their founders and partners.
We also analyze the private equity business model and practices throughout the
end-to-end investment cycle, and how they adapt to the conditions of operating
in an emerging market. Our second research question is: What is the impact of
private equity firms on their portfolio companies? And what are the broader
economic development implications for the country? By acquiring or investing in
their portfolio companies, private equity firms play a major role in transforming
these companies and increasing their value. In doing so, they may change their
governance, management, business processes, financial structure, or
employment. In our analysis, we examine the "value creation strategies" used by
i-"" -r-----^-r-^-~--i-p--rrrr*rr
private equity firms in Egypt, how they impact their portfolio companies, and
what the developmental implications for the whole country are.
In answering the first research question, why did private equity activities grow
so much and so fast in Egypt, we identified the top driving factors. In addition to
all the global and macroeconomic trends discussed earlier, we attribute the
growth of the private equity industry in Egypt to two key factors. First, the
industry is dominated by local firms that relied on a mix of local knowledge and
expatriate knowhow. These firms developed key competencies that provided
them with a strong competitive advantage and enabled their growth. Second,
these firms, while adopting global best practices in the industry, managed to
adapt their business model and practices to the local market needs.
The prevailing notion in the literature is that most of private equity activities in
emerging markets are conducted by global firms. Analysts (e.g., Lerner and
Leamon 2008) argue that emerging market private equity is primarily a result of
US and UK private equity firms seeking opportunities in emerging markets, as
opportunities diminish and become more competitive in developed countries.
However, our findings from the private equity industry in Egypt ran contrary to
this notion. While it may be true that US- and European-based private equity
firms are becoming increasingly interested in emerging markets, our analysis
shows that, in Egypt, there is a rapidly growing home-grown private equity
industry that is dominant. This industry is created by financial services veterans
with long experience in the United States, along with those with strong domestic
banking experience. In a way, this is similar to how the semiconductors industry
and the information technology offshoring industry got started in Taiwan and
India through their diaspora. These local firms developed several key
competencies that helped them perform and grow and provided them with a
competitive advantage: access to capital, access to deals, deal structuring
knowhow, business transformation and turnaround knowhow, and political
access. These five competencies were present in most of the private equity firms
that we examined.
In terms of their business model and practices, our overarching hypothesis was
that while the private equity model is transferable and useful in emerging
markets, private equity as an investment model is particularly well-suited to
emerging markets, and that private equity firms further adapt to the local
peculiarities of doing business in such countries. To understand these inherent
advantages, as well as-the differences and necessary adaptations in business
practices, we trace the end-to-end activities of private equity cycle, including
fund initiation and setup, investing, portfolio management and exit.
The second research question focuses on outcomes: What is the impact of
private equity firms on their portfolio companies? As they pursue their value
creation strategies, how specifically do they shape these companies that they
acquire or invest in? And how does that affect the overall economy? We found
that in most transactions, private equity firms acted as a catalyst for initiating,
consolidating, professionalizing, growing and globalizing their portfolio
companies. We found numerous examples of private equity funds consolidating
multiple small companies into larger, more competitive entities, especially in the
manufacturing and food industries. They professionalized their acquisitions by
hiring experienced management teams and installing proper corporate
governance procedures that align the incentives of these management teams with
the owners, and improving their management practices. They also grew these
companies and expanded their scope of operations from domestic markets to
regional or global markets. By consolidating, professionalizing, growing and
globalizing their acquisitions, we argue that they increased their competitiveness
in regional and global markets.
Based on these findings, we argue that private equity firms in emerging markets
are providing a new type of entrepreneurship that is emerging from the financial
sector, as opposed to the traditional entrepreneurship models emanating from
industry or technological circles. They are creating new green field companies in
capital-intensive industries such as oil and gas, cement, transportation
infrastructure and manufacturing. They are also providing capital for rapidly
growing companies which have limited access to finance from the banking
system. In this capacity, private equity funds are acting as a new breed of
"financial entrepreneurs," and in this capacity, are increasingly playing a positive
role in economic development. One of the explanations for their positive role is
the initial conditions and stage of development in Egypt, as well as most
emerging markets: most economic sectors are fragmented and could benefit from
consolidation strategies; companies are in need of growth capital; and medium
companies could benefit from professionalization and regional growth. By
playing the catalyst role for these types of transformations, private equity firms
contribute to economic development.
Why is this important? As private equity investments in emerging markets grow,
it is important to have a deeper understanding of their business practices and
impact on their portfolio companies. This increased understanding has the
potential to influence a number of government policies. If the belief prevailed
that private equity investments have a positive impact on the economy, then
more would argue for positive government policies to support and attract
private equity activities, similar to what many countries do to attract foreign
direct investments (FDI). If the belief prevailed that these firms have a negative
impact on the economy, then more would argue for stricter regulations to limit
their activities, similar to what many countries do to limit speculative "hot
money." Specifically, there are a number of policy issues relating to private
equity that need to be examined, including regulations, transparency and
taxation. We discuss these policy issues and implications in depth in the
concluding chapter.
In the rest of this chapter, we briefly define the private equity business model;
provide the theoretical foundation for the research; discuss the methodology and
data used in the analysis; and specify the research contribution. We conclude by
describing the structure of the dissertation.
1.2 Private Equity Defined
Private equity is an alternative investment class that provides investors, both
individual and institutional, with professionally managed investment vehicles
for equity investing in unregistered securities of private and publicly-traded
companies 3 (Fenn, Liang and Prowse 1995). Private equity firms invest in new or
3 Throughout this document, we use the following terminology in describing three different types
of company ownership: private, public and state. A private or privately-held company is owned
by private investors and whose shares are not available to the general public or traded in an open
market. A public, publicly-held, or publicly-traded company or corporation is primarily owned
by private investors, and whose shares are available for the public and are traded in an open
market. This is to be differentiated from a state-owned company, or state-owned enterprise (SOE)
which is primarily owned by the State.
existing enterprises with the purpose of increasing their value over the short or
medium run. Private equity funds invest in different situations, including
buyouts, where the fund invests in existing (often distressed) companies through
the acquisition of a significant or controlling stake; venture capital, where the
investments are in new or small companies, often based on technological
innovations; or growth capital, where they provide capital to fast-growing
companies (Fischbein 2005, Lerner and Leamon 2008). Private equity funds
maintain their investments for a limited period of time, typically 3-5 years.
During this period, the portfolio company, in the case of buyouts, undergoes
financial and operational restructuring or achieves its growth targets, or in the
case of new innovation, the startup matures. At the end of this period the private
equity fund exits the investment by selling the company through an initial public
offering (IPO) in the stock market, to other companies (trade sale), or to other
financial investors (secondary buyout) (Lerner and Leamon 2008, Fenn, Liang
and Prowse 1995). Private equity funds usually capture significant profits that
exceed the performance of publicly-traded companies; however, these returns
reflect higher risks and volatility, along with the illiquid nature of the
investments during the investment period.
1.3 Theoretical Foundation
The study of private equity is an emerging field of research in finance and
economics. A growing number of studies examine private equity from different
angles, including: business model and governance (Jensen 1989, Lerner 1995,
Walker 2007); performance as an investment vehicle (Long and Ravenscraft 1993,
Kaplan and Schoar 2003, Davis, Haltiwanger and Jarmin 2007, Taylor and Bryant
2007); and impact on portfolio companies, in terms of labor, wages and
employment (McGuckin and Nguyen 2001, EVCA 2005, Amess and Wright 2007,
Kearney 2007), productivity (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1987, Kaplan 1989,
Lichtenberg and Siegel 1989, Harris Siegel and Wright 2005), and innovation
(Hall 1990, Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990, Hall 1992, Hao and Jaffe 1993,
Himmerlberg and Petersen 1994). The overarching hypothesis in this type of
research is that private ownership of companies by private equity funds affects
their behavior and performance, compared to public ownership in the form of
publicly-traded corporations, and compared to family ownership.
In this research, we focus on private equity as an alternative form of ownership,
governance and financing for firms, compared to family businesses and public
corporations. Each of these three organizing models has its own distinct
characteristics (Wright and Robbie 1998). In table 1.1, we compare these three
organizing models. We examine how each ownership model provides a different
structure for the relationship between investors or owners; intermediaries, such
as private equity firms; boards of directors; and management.
-----^1 ~'"-; *~~" I~,r~Pr~.u-xn~~l;~l;
Table 1.1 Comparing private equity, family business and public corporations
Private Equity Family Business Public Corporation
Ownership * Concentrated (institutional * Concentrated (entrepreneurs, * Dispersed/ fragmented
investors, high-net-worth family, few partners)
individuals, family offices)
Financing * Access to equity by fund investors * Family financing and retained * Access to public equity and debt
e Access to debt financing; high earnings - organic growth markets; medium leverage
leverage (especially LBO's) * Limited access to debt markets and
conservative capital structure 4
low leverage
Governance * Investors - PE firm 4- Portfolio * Owners - Management * Shareholders - Board 4
company board - Management * Limited agency issues (except in Management
* Agency issues between investors the case of minority shareholders) * Agency issue (managed through
and PE firm (resolved through May move to board structure, management incentives; however,
profit sharing incentives and fund especially in the case of multi- remains an issue)
term limit) generation businesses
Sources: the author
From a theoretical perspective, these relationships can be analyzed in the context
of informational asymmetry and agency theory. Informational asymmetry is a
situation where two contracting parties in a transaction do not have the same
level of information about the situation, and where one party may have more or
better information than the other. The informational asymmetry may exist before
the contract occurs, which may lead to a moral hazard or adverse selection situation.
It may also take place after the contract occurs, which may lead to a principal-
agent problem (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995).
Moral hazard and adverse selection describe two situations of informational
asymmetry that were first identified in the insurance literature. An example of a
moral hazard is a situation where an insurance company is not able to observe if
the insured is exerting sufficient effort to avert a loss (the same effort he would
have exerted in absence of the insurance policy). An example of an adverse
selection situation is where the insured knows more than the insurance company
about the likelihood of an accident. In this situation, people with higher
probability of an accident are more likely to buy an insurance policy, while those
who are less likely to have an accident prefer not to purchase the policy. As a
result, the insurance company ends up with an "adverse selection" situation.
Moral hazard and adverse selection are two situations where the informational
asymmetries exist prior to the time of contracting (Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green 1995).
The principal-agent problem, or agency theory, describes the relationship
between a principal and an agent in a situation of informational asymmetry.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) "define an agency relationship as a contract under
which one or more person [the principal(s)] engage another person [the agent] to
~~-i-l~l ?-X~I---"-~"
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision
making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility
maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in
the best interests of the principal." This is the common situation in the context of
a public corporation, where there is separation between ownership and
management. The firm owner (the principal) hires a manager (the agent) to
perform a specific task. However, the owner may not be able to observe all the
manager's actions toward doing his job or may not know the same level of
information about the firm performance. Agency theory literature distinguishes
between two types of informational asymmetries: hidden actions and hidden
information. Hidden action is a situation where the principal is not able to observe
the actions of the agent. In this situation, the agent may be acting for his own self
interest rather than the principal's interest. Hidden information is a situation
where the agent has more intimate knowledge of the firm operations than the
principal. These situations may lead to moral hazard if the agent is acting to
maximize his own self interest rather than the principal's (Mas-Colell, Whinston
and Green 1995; Jensen and Meckling 1976).
From a firm governance perspective, the agency problem raises two issues. The
first issue is the alignment of interests between the principal and agent. The
design of the governance process and performance incentives for management
aims at aligning their interests and ensuring that the agents (management) are
acting in the interest of the principals (shareholders). The second issue is the
difference in risk tolerance, where the agent may be more risk averse or risk
seeking than the principal. In public corporations, management risk tolerance
should be observable based on their historical performance. However, in
situations of new management or changing market conditions, management
behavior may differ.
Agency issues in the context of the separation between ownership and
management in the corporation is a problem that is as old as modern Capitalism.
In 1776, Adam Smith (1979) identified this problem in The Wealth of Nations:
The directors of such [join-stock] companies, however, being the
managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well
be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch
over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider
attention to small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily
give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion
therefore must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the
affairs of such a company.
In this research, we use informational asymmetries and agency theory to provide
a theoretical framework to analyze private equity practices, and to understand
the differences between the three forms of ownership: family businesses, public
corporations and private equity as described in Table 1.1.
In the case of family businesses, the ownership is typically concentrated in the
entrepreneur(s), founder(s), or their families in later generations. The
concentration of ownership and direct involvement of the owner(s) in the
management of the company limits agency issues 4. However, this comes at the
4Two secondary points to make: first, in general, there is an inherent principal-agent problem in
any employer employee relationship, whether it is at the senior management level or throughout
the company; however, we focus here on agency issues between owners and management;
second, in a family business, agency issues exist in the case of minority shareholders. In this
expense of access to finance, be it in the form of equity or debt. Family businesses
are also characterized by being risk averse, focusing on the long term, and
putting a premium on maintaining the family ownership of the business. As a
result, family businesses typically grow organically through retained earnings,
and at a slower pace.
In the case of public corporations, ownership is typically dispersed or
fragmented among a large number of shareholders, and an extra layer, the Board
of Directors, is added to represent the interests of the shareholders. This is the
classic principal-agent problem, where the owners and the board try to set the
proper monitoring and reporting mechanisms to reduce the informational
asymmetry, and design performance incentives to align the interests of the
management with those of the shareholders. The results of these monitoring and
incentive-setting actions, as well as any residual losses to the principal from the
agent's actions, are considered the "agency costs" (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
In the case of private equity, the ownership is concentrated in the fund investors
- typically institutional investors, high-net-worth individuals and family offices.
Financing of private equity transactions takes place through the equity raised
from the fund investors, debt from banks and other lenders, and sometimes,
mezzanine financing5 . Private equity transactions make extensive use of debt
situation, the problem exists between the majority owner(s) (principal) and the minority owner(s)
(agent), with the danger of majority owners conducting non-arms-length transactions (Morck and
Yeung 2002).
5 Mezzanine financing is a hybrid of debt and equity financing. It is debt capital that gives the
lender the right to convert it to an ownership or equity interest in the case of default. It is
generally subordinate to debt provided by senior lenders such as banks, but is senior to
shareholders' equity. Mezzanine financing is typically used to finance the expansion of existing
companies, and is usually provided to the borrower very quickly with limited due diligence on
financing, especially in leveraged buyouts. In terms of governance and agency
issues, there are two levels of agency relationships. The first is between the
investors and the private equity firm. In this relationship, the investor and
private equity firm interests are aligned by providing generous profit sharing to
the fund managers, in the form of carried interest, typically around 20%, and also
by limiting the fund term (typically to seven years), which forces liquidation at
the end of that period. The second relationship is between the fund managers
and the portfolio company management. Private equity firms maintain the
boards as a governance structure; however, they appoint the members of the
board, who are typically fund management and trusted external experts. In this
situation, the concentration of ownership in the hands of the fund managers,
who are typically active in monitoring their portfolio companies, limits the
agency issues.
In his seminal paper "The Eclipse of the Public Corporation," Michael Jensen
(1989) predicted that the leveraged buyout (LBO) model used by private equity
would eventually emerge as the dominant form of corporate organization. Jensen
argued that the private equity LBO model provides concentrated ownership by
active investors, strong corporate governance, aligned management incentives
and efficient capital structure, and hence, it is a superior model to the public
corporation, with its weak governance structure and dispersed shareholders.
Because of these features, he argued that LBO ownership enables managers of
portfolio companies to operate without short-term market pressures and focus
on long-term investments and profitability (Lerner, Str6mberg and Sorensen
the part of the lender and little or no collateral on the part of the borrower. This type of financing
is aggressively priced with the lender seeking a higher return than secured or senior debt
(Investopedia 2009).
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2008). While this debate has not been resolved in developed countries, his ideas
may be just as relevant in the context of emerging markets.
In emerging markets, public corporations are not the predominant form of
ownership, where family businesses, large diversified business conglomerates,
and state-owned enterprises occupy the larger part of the economy. However,
private equity, as a form of ownership, has been rapidly growing, and the debate
about its efficiency as an ownership model or as an investment model is just
starting. One interesting observation, which we explore later, is that private
equity is serving as a catalyst for transforming family businesses into
corporations. A large portion of private equity acquisitions are family businesses,
which are restructured, later sold to large corporations or through the stock
market in an IPO.
Another theoretical issue resulting from informational asymmetries is the
transaction cost for investments. For investors seeking to invest in an emerging
economy, their choices are limited: they can invest directly by acquiring/creating
and managing a local company (foreign direct investments); they can invest by
buying shares of publicly listed corporations through the stock exchange; or they
can invest through private equity funds. While the option of creating or
acquiring a local subsidiary is available to multinational corporations, it may not
be a viable option for financial investors such as pension funds. Their options are
investing in either public or private equity. In such a situation, their two primary
concerns would be informational asymmetry, which may lead to exposure to
higher, unanticipated levels of risk; and transaction costs, which include costs
incurred for executing, monitoring and exiting the transaction.
This leads to a key question: Are foreign investors better off investing in public or
private equities in emerging markets? While this research does not examine
publicly-traded companies, we are able to gain insights on private equity
practices in emerging markets, and how these may influence foreign investors'
exposure to informational asymmetries, as well as their end-to-end transaction
costs. Lerner & Leamon (2008) argue that "perhaps most persuasively, the types
of environments where private equity funds have thrived in the United States are
quite similar to those in developing nations: the investors have specialized in
financing illiquid, difficult-to-value firms in environments with substantial
uncertainty and information asymmetries."
1.4 Research Design
1.4.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses
We focus our research on two key questions, using Egypt as a case study. The
first question is: Why did private equity activities grow so much and so fast in
Egypt? Answers to this question also lend insight to a related question: What can
a developing country do to attract private equity investments, based on this case
of Egypt? There are several explanations in the literature for the growth of the
private equity industry in emerging markets (Lerner and Leamon 2008, Lerner
and Gurung 2008, Jensen 1989), focusing on global and macroeconomic trends, as
well as the suitability of the private equity investment model for emerging
markets. However, in our research, we examine two additional hypotheses,
based on the case of Egypt. The first hypothesis is that the local "home-grown"
private equity firms enjoy a competitive advantage, and were able to develop
key competencies that enabled their success. These home-grown firms were
created by experienced professionals with long careers both in Egypt and in
global financial institutions. The second hypothesis is that private equity firms
have adapted their business model and practices to the local market needs and
the conditions of operating in an emerging market. We identify a number of
examples for how these firms have adapted to the local market needs. We expect
the same situation to exist in other emerging economies with strong private
equity industries; however, further research is required to confirm these
hypotheses in other countries.
The second research question is: What is the impact of private equity firms on
their portfolio companies? And what are the broader economic development
implications for the country? Our examination of numerous private equity
transactions executed in Egypt over the past 5-8 years shows a positive impact.
In most situations, private equity firms played a catalyst role in transforming
their portfolio companies to become larger, stronger, and more competitive. In
our research, we examine the "value creation strategies" used by private equity
firms in Egypt. Out hypothesis is that when private equity firms use value
creation strategies that are focused on growth and competitiveness, they have a
positive impact on their portfolio companies, and contribute to the broader
economic growth in the country. In our research, we identify five value creation
strategies used by private equity firms in Egypt: initiating new companies, and
consolidating, professionalizing, growing and globalizing existing companies.
These strategies are all focused on growth and competitiveness, and by following
them, private equity firms contribute in a positive way to the country's economic
development. We expect this hypothesis to apply to other emerging markets.
1.4.2 Methodology
In our research, we rely on qualitative research methods to build a case study of
private equity in Egypt. Throughout the case, we examine different units of
analysis, including: private equity firms, funds, transactions, and portfolio
companies. Within the case, we use different qualitative techniques including
process tracing, within-case analysis, and hypothesis testing (Yin 2002).
In Chapters 2 and 3, we establish a fact base for the private equity industry in
emerging markets, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and Egypt.
These two chapters focus on highlighting the demographics of the industry,
especially in terms of size and growth rate, at the level of emerging markets,
MENA region, and Egypt. However, the primary scope of the case study is
private equity in Egypt.
In Chapter 4, we perform a process tracing for the private equity cycle through the
four key stages: fund initiation and setup, investing, portfolio management and
exit. In each section, we identify the governing theoretical framework and
analyze the specific step within this framework. We also examine any specific
findings that contribute to the research questions and hypotheses.
In Chapter 5, we analyze all private equity transactions against the second
research question regarding the impact of private equity firms on their portfolio
companies. We classify all transactions based on their impact, and examine a
select number of transactions in detail. In this chapter, our unit of analysis is the
private equity transaction. For the tabular classification, we analyze all
transactions executed in Egypt since 1999 that have a public record. We do not
expect any selection bias because we analyzed the whole data set rather than a
sample selection.
1.4.3 Data
Our case analysis is based on multiple data sources, including: (i) survey and
interviews with ten private equity firms in Egypt; (ii) a data set on private equity
firms in Egypt compiled by the author from Zawya, MIT Emergis, as well as
other sources; (iii) a data set on private equity transactions in Egypt compiled by
the author from Zawya, Zephyr, as well as other sources; (iv) a number of tables
created by the author from publicly available data on the private equity firms'
websites and other data sources; and (v) other secondary information sources on
private equity firms, funds, and transactions. In the rest of this section, we
explain the details of each of these data sources.
First, we use a structured survey and interviews conducted with ten private
equity firms in Egypt (Table 1.2) over the period between July 2007 and October
2007. The ten private equity firms interviewed were selected based on access -
we interviewed firms where we had personal contacts or could get a contact
inside the firm. All the interviewed individuals were senior executives at the
partner or managing director level. The ten firms interviewed are managing
more than 80% of the private equity funds invested in Egypt. We have no reason
to believe that there is a systematic bias in the sample selection.
Table 1.2 Private equity firms interviewed
Private Equity Firm Firm Start Date in
Egypt
Actis
Beltone Financial
Carlyle Group
Citadel Capital
Concord International Investments
Group
EFG-Hermes Private Equity
Sphinx Capital/ Grandview
Haykala Investment Managers
IT investment
2002
2007
2007
2004
2000
1997
2005
2005
1999
Mansour & Maghraby Investment & 1996
Development (MMID)
Sources: The author, based on survey of private
Primary
Ownership/
Nationality
United Kingdom
Egypt
International
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
Person Interviewed
Investment Principal
Senior Management
Managing Director
Managing Director &
Cofounder
Senior Director
Partner
Managing Director
Executive Director
Associate Director
Chief Investment
Officer
Vice President
equity firms in Egypt
The interview questions examined issues at the fund level and at the portfolio
company level. At the fund level, we asked them about the fund background and
history, their investment focus, the investment process and the government
impact on their business. At the portfolio company level, we asked them
questions on one or more of their portfolio companies, including the transaction
background, their governance and performance management approach, their
restructuring and value adding strategies, and their exit strategy. The complete
interview questionnaire is included in Appendix I.
While interviewees provided a wealth of information on their private equity
firms and their transactions, they did not always adhere to the scripted questions.
Some included more anecdotes that were useful in getting a deeper
understanding of some of the questions.
Second, we use a data set on private equity firms in Egypt and MENA region.
We compiled this data set based on primary data from two sources: Zawya
(www.zawya.com), a specialized financial portal focusing on the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) region, and MIT Emergis (emergisglobal.com), a
startup project in the MIT media lab focusing on private equity and venture
capital data in emerging markets. This data set includes a complete list of all
private equity firms and funds publicly announced that operate in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region. By combining data from both sources, we
created a more comprehensive and complete data set about the region, with a
special focus on Egypt. However, it is important to note that only publicly
announced funds are included. Table 1.3 lists the data sources used to construct
this data set.
Table 1.3 Data sources used
Source Regional Coverage Number Number of Date
of Funds Transactions Downloaded
Zawya MENA region June 2008
- MENA 143 415
- Egypt 12 42
MIT Emergis Emerging Markets June 2008
- MENA 109 n/a
- Egypt 29 n/a
Zypher Global June 2008
- Egypt n/a 38
Notes:
List of funds downloaded includes some inactive or rumored funds.
Sources: The author
Third, we use a data set on the private equity transactions in Egypt. We compiled
this data set based on primary data from two sources: Zawya, and Zephyr 6, a
financial database for all global buyout transactions. This data set includes a
broad list of transactions (buys/sells) conducted by private equity firms in Egypt,
based on publicly announced information. It is important to note that the overlap
between the two datasets was limited. This indicates that the data collection
effort is far from being comprehensive; and that more transactions may exist, but
are unaccounted for in either data set.
6 Zephyr is a financial database that provides detailed information on business mergers,
acquisitions and venture capital transactions. It includes more than 500,000 transactions, with up
to 100,000 new transactions added each year. Zephyr's coverage goes back five years for
international transactions and back to 1997 for transactions involving European and American
companies.
Fourth, we create a number of tables from publicly available data on private
equity firms' websites and other data sources, including a database of all senior
executives in private equity firms in Egypt, covering their professional and
educational background.
Fifth, we use other secondary sources on private equity firms, including articles,
press releases, their websites, and other publicly available information. Some of
these are collected from specialized financial portals that monitor private equity
activities.
One important issue to highlight relates to data accuracy. During our analysis,
we compiled a detailed data set of funds and transaction covering the MENA
region for the period between 2003 and mid 2008, based on primary data from
multiple sources that track such funds and transactions. This data set shows the
actual size of private equity funds in the MENA region to be larger than the
figures reported by industry sources such as EMEA and Prequin. This under-
counting of the industry size is likely to be the same in other emerging markets.
1.5 Research Contribution
Up until recently, there were very limited private equity transactions in
emerging markets. For example, in 2002, all emerging markets private equity
funds combined raised $3.2 billion, a mere 3.1% of the $102 billion raised by the
private equity industry globally. In 2008, emerging markets private equity fund
raising reached a record $66.5 billion, growing more than 20 fold from 2002
despite the global financial crisis. This figure represented 15% of the $445 billion
raised by the private equity industry globally - a significant growth both in
absolute and relative terms from 2002 (EMPEA 2009). However, our knowledge
of how private equity transactions are conducted in emerging markets is limited.
There is a limited, albeit growing literature of empirical research and case studies
focusing on emerging markets private equity and venture capital. This
dissertation contributes to this body of knowledge by providing a case study of
private equity investments in Egypt. Through this case study, we make four
contributions: first, we document the industry demographics in Egypt in terms of
private equity firms, funds, investors, and transactions; second, we examine the
private equity investment cycle and how the different actors behave at each stage
of the cycle; third, we provide a qualitative assessment of the impact of private
equity on the portfolio companies in Egypt; and fourth, we provide numerous
detailed case examples of private equity transactions in Egypt, involving local,
regional and international private equity firms.
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into six chapters, including an introduction and a
concluding chapter. In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of the private equity
industry in emerging markets and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
region. In Chapter 3, we examine the increasing importance of the private equity
industry in Egypt by benchmarking it against domestic banking lending, foreign
direct investments, the national investment plan, and stock market capitalization.
We also examine at the evolution of the private equity industry in Egypt as a
home-grown financial services industry and at how private equity funds are
emerging as a new breed of "financial entrepreneurs." In Chapter 4, we analyze
the private equity cycle and business model and how private equity provides an
effective investment vehicle for emerging markets. In Chapter 5, we examine the
impact of private equity funds and how they initiate new businesses or
transform their portfolio companies by consolidating, professionalizing, growing
and globalizing them. In Chapter 6, we conclude by summarizing key research
findings, revisiting the research questions and hypotheses, discussing policy
issues and implications, and identifying ideas for future research.
* * *

CHAPTER 2: PRIVATE EQUITY IN EMERGING
MARKETS AND THE MENA REGION
In this Chapter we provide an overview of the private equity industry in
emerging markets, and then zoom in to the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region.
2.1 Emerging Markets
The term emerging markets or emerging economies refers to developing
countries that are undergoing rapid economic growth or industrialization. The
term is used in the financial sector literature extensively to denote countries that
represent the next wave of potential growth for the industry, especially as
growth rates in developed countries stagnate. For example, Morgan Stanley
Capital International (MSCI) tracks the performance of equity markets in 74
global markets. They group these markets into three categories: developed markets,
emerging markets, and frontier markets. Currently, they include 22 countries in the
emerging markets category; in the Americas: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, and Peru; in Asia: China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand; in Europe: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Russia, Turkey; in Africa and the Middle East: Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa.
MSCI has created an index to track the performance of equity markets in these
emerging markets. This MSCI emerging market index is designed to measure the
performance of equity markets in these emerging economies, based on a float-
adjusted market capitalization index, with a base value of 100 as of December 31,
1987. Currently (as of end of June 2009), these 22 emerging markets represent
24% of world's stock market capitalization, the highest since the creation of the
index (Bloomberg 2009).
Similarly, The FTSE Group, a UK-based data provider created as a joint venture
between the Financial Times and the London Stock Exchange Group, defines
emerging markets in two groups: advanced and secondary emerging markets,
based on their national income and the development of their market
infrastructure. FTSE defines advanced emerging markets to include: Brazil,
Hungary, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, and Taiwan; and defines secondary
emerging markets to include: Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and
Pakistan (Bloomberg 2009, Wikipedia 2009, Direxion Funds 2009, American
Funds 2009). These two indexes are used by institutional investors in making
their investment decisions in these emerging markets, and significantly influence
the capital flows to private equity funds investing in these markets.
From an investor perspective, investing in emerging markets has three key
characteristics. The first characteristic is the potential for higher returns.
Emerging markets have high rates of economic growth; industrializing economic
bases; growing middle classes with increasing purchasing power; and an
improving market infrastructure. The second characteristic is a higher level of
risk and market volatility, due to political, economic and currency risks. The
third characteristic is that their performance is generally less correlated with
developed countries, and hence, they can be used as a way to diversify an
investment portfolio and reduce the overall portfolio risk (Investopedia 2009).
The combined effect of these three characteristics is that large institutional
investors are becoming more interested in maintaining a portion, albeit a small
portion, of their investment portfolio in emerging markets. For some institutional
investors such US pension funds, their investments in emerging markets (or
other "alternative" assets such as private equity) are capped by law to a limited
amount, typically around 5% (Interview with US pension fund manager).
However, these limited amounts still represent a significant inflow of capital for
emerging markets.
2.2 Private Equity in Emerging Markets
Up until five years ago, private equity activities in emerging markets were very
limited in size compared to the global size of the industry, which was primarily
focused on developed markets in the United States and Europe7 . For example, in
2002, all emerging markets private equity funds combined raised $3.2 billion, a
mere 3.1% of the $102 billion raised by the private equity industry globally. In
2003 the figure was $3.5 billion, or 3.9% of the global industry.
Analysts (e.g., Gompers and Lerner 2001, Gurung and Lerner 2008, Lerner and
Leamon 2008) attribute this limited size and share to several factors, including (i)
the lack of sizable attractive opportunities in emerging markets, which were
dominated by informal sector, state-owned enterprises, family-owned businesses
or monopolistic conglomerates; (ii) limited investor guarantees due to
underdeveloped economic laws, lack of enforcement or corruption; (iii)
7 Lerner and Leamon (2008) refer to a first wave of private equity investments in emerging
markets, which took place during the 1990's. However, the growth in emerging markets private
equity in the 1990's is still very limited when compared to the past five years.
regulations that limit foreign ownerships of domestic companies or assets; (iv)
absence of active stock markets (or limited depth/ liquidity), which could
provide an exit strategy for private equity funds; (v) strict financial controls on
capital flows and expatriations of profits from foreign investments; and (vi)
limited availability of local experienced bankers and financial advisory firms to
support the industry.
However, over the last five years private equity activities in emerging markets
started to grow exponentially. For example, in 2008, emerging markets private
equity fund raising reached a record $66.5 billion, growing 19 fold from 2003,
despite the global financial crisis. This figure represents 15% of the $445 billion
raised by the private equity industry globally - a significant growth both in
absolute and relative terms from the 2003 levels (EMPEA 2009). Analysts (e.g.,
Gurung and Lerner 2008, Lerner and Leamon 2008, EMPEA 2009) attribute this
growth to a number of factors, including: (i) the globalization of the investments
industry and a significant increase in liquidity available for investment globally;
(ii) fierce competition and drying up of opportunities in developed economies;
(iii) the increasing availability of lucrative opportunities in emerging markets
due to economic liberalization, privatization programs, and rapidly growing
private economies; (ivi) increasing availability of active domestic stock markets
and domestic investors that provides for an exit strategy for private equity funds;
(v) better protections for investors, especially with the globalization of
investment laws, e.g., the impact of GATT and WTO on the harmonization of
laws, increasing protection for foreign investments, and governments
seeking/competing for FDI to increase investments in their economies; (vi)
loosening of restrictions on foreign investors in many emerging markets to allow
for partial or full ownership of assets and companies (e.g., Egypt, United Arab
Emirates) as well as allowances for repatriation of profits; and (iv) the growing
availability of Western-trained bankers and professionals returning to their
native countries such as India, China, Brazil or Egypt with strong expertise as
well as connections to financial centers. All of these factors contributed to the
creation of an environment that is conducive to the growth of the private equity
model in emerging markets.
Table 2.1 highlights the growth in private equity fund raising figures both
globally and in emerging markets from 2001 through 2008. However, the
importance of private equity investments is actually substantially higher than
these figures for two reasons. First, for most buyout transactions, which
constitute the majority of private equity activities, the transactions are typically
leveraged 1-4 times the base capital using debt or mezzanine financing, which
multiplies the size of the assets under management by the private equity funds
compared to the fund size (World Economic Forum 2008). The second issue
relates to data accuracy. During our analysis, we compiled a detailed funds and
transaction data set that covers the MENA region for the period of 2003 through
mid 2008, based on primary data from multiple sources that track such funds
and transactions. This data set shows the actual size of private equity funds in
the MENA region to be larger than the figures reported by industry sources such
as EMPEA and Prequin. This under-counting of the industry size is likely to be
the same in other emerging markets.
Table 2.1 Private equity fund raising, globally and in emerging markets (2001-
2008)
(Current US$ billions)
Private Equity Fundraising
Emerging Markets Global
66.5 445.0
59.2 508.2
33.2 399.6
25.8 265.4
6.5 141.7
3.5 90.5
3.2 102.4
6.6 154.0
Emerging Markets as Percent of
Global Fundraising
14.9%
11.6%
8.3%
9.7%
4.6%
3.9%
3.2%
4.3%
Sources: EMPEA 2009a
In terms of their sectoral focus, Table 2.2 shows that among the 204 funds with
closes in 2007, 118 funds were classified as "generalists," i.e., they are not focused
on a specific sector, but rather diversify their investments across multiple sectors.
These 118 funds were managing $39.1 billion, or 66.2% of the total capital raised.
This reflects the smaller size of emerging markets, where sector specialization is
harder than in developed countries. The fact that most funds prefer to be
diversified across multiple sectors may also suggest that the source of value-
creation in emerging markets is not deep sectoral knowledge, but rather generic
financial, management and turnaround skills that can be applied to any sector. A
smaller number of funds are sector focused, with 69 funds classified into nine
sectors, and managing $17.1 billion, or 28.9% of the total.
Year
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
Table 2.2 Sector focus among funds with closes in 2007
Sector Focus Number of Funds Total Value
Number Percent US$ Million Percent
Generalist Funds 118 57.8% 39,137 66.2%
Sector-Focused Funds 69 33.8% 17,071 28.9%
Technology 34 16.7% 7,595 12.8%
Infrastructure 8 3.9% 3,395 5.7%
Energy 6 2.9% 1,538 2.6%
Natural Resources 1 0.5% 1,300 2.2%
Financial Services 3 1.5% 1,020 1.7%
Industrial/ Manufacturing 5 2.5% 981 1.7%
Consumer 4 2.0% 624 1.1%
Agriculture/ Agribusiness 4 2.0% 356 0.6%
Environment 4 2.0% 262 0.4%
Other/ NA 17 8.3% 2,952 5.0%
TOTAL 204 100% 59,160 100%
Sources: Global Investment House (2008), based on EMPEA data
Among the specialized funds, technology-focused funds came in as the first
largest area, with 34 funds, managing $7.5 billion, representing 12.8% of the total
capital raised. This is mainly driven by a wave of offshoring of technology
services such as call centers and software development and support from the
United States and Europe to emerging markets countries, especially in India,
Philippines and Egypt.
Infrastructure-focused funds came in as the second biggest area, with eight funds
managing $3.4 billion, representing 5.7% of the total capital raised. This is
primarily driven by deregulation of infrastructure investments in many
developing countries and the introduction of creative public financing schemes
such as Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) and Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) (Hall
2006).
Energy focused funds represented the third largest sector, with six funds
managing $1.5 billion, representing 2.6% of the total capital raised. This is driven
by investment opportunities in the energy sector in the wake of the significant
increase in energy prices in 2007 and increase in local demand for energy in
emerging markets.
In general, over the long-term, private equity investments provide higher returns
than stock markets, reflecting higher investment risks as well as privileged access
to non-publicly-traded opportunities. Table 2.3 compares returns of private
equity, venture capital, and stock markets in different emerging markets and
developed markets by region over the previous one, three, five and ten year
periods, as of end of March 2008. These returns vary reflecting economic
cyclicality and specific country/region/sector booms and busts. For example, US
VC ten year returns of 32.8% are higher than the shorter periods (11.6%, 14.1%
and 11.6% for one, three and five year returns, respectively) because the 10 year
figures capture the huge returns during the technology boom in 1998-2000. Based
on these data, the performance of emerging markets private equity can be put in
perspective by comparing it to three major indices: (i) private equity in
developed countries, (ii) publicly traded equities in emerging markets, and (iii)
publicly traded equities in developed countries.
Table 2.3 Comparative returns of private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC)
funds in emerging markets by region, in comparison to major stock
indexes
Index Annualized Returns
One year Three years Five years Ten years
Emerging Markets PE & VC 28.5% 27.7% 25.8% 9.6%
Latin America & Caribbean PE 31.5% 26.1% 18.6% 1.1%
Asia (ex Japan) PE 25.7% 22.6% 21.2% 8.8%
CEE & Russia PE 66.9% 46.5% 47.3% 20.8%
MSCI Emerging Markets Index 21.7% 29.6% 36.0% 12.5%
US VC 11.6% 14.1% 11.6% 32.8%
US PE 11.2% 23.2% 24.1% 13.1%
Western Europe PE 37.1% 44.4% 38.0% 26.5%
S&P 500 Index -5.1% 5.9% 11.3% 3.5%
Notes:
Figures as of March 31st, 2008.
CEE is Central and Eastern Europe region.
MSCI Emerging Markets Index is an index created by Morgan Stanley Capital
International (MSCI). It is designed to measure the performance of equity market in
global emerging markets. The Emerging Markets Index is a float-adjusted market
capitalization index. As of May 2005, it consisted of indices in 26 emerging markets:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela (Direxion Funds
2009).
Standard & Poor's 500 Index (S&P 500) is an index consisting of 500 U.S. stocks chosen
for market size, liquidity and industry grouping, among other factors. The S&P 500 is
designed to be a leading indicator of U.S. equities and is meant to reflect the risk/ return
characteristics of the large-cap universe (Direxion Funds 2009).
Sources: Global Investment House (2008); based on data from Cambridge Associates,
LLC
First, comparing private equity returns 8 between emerging and developed
markets reflects the evolution of the industry in emerging markets. The ten year
returns of 13.1% in developed markets are higher than the 9.6% returns in
emerging markets, reflecting the very small size and infancy of the private equity
industry in developing countries. The five-year returns are almost similar: 24.1%
vs. 25.8%, reflecting the beginning of the private equity boom in emerging
markets. The three year returns (27.7% vs. 23.2%) and the one year returns (28.5%
vs. 11.2%) reflect the increasing potential in emerging markets.
Second, comparing emerging markets private equity returns against emerging
markets publicly-traded equity markets, measured by the MSCI index, shows a
mixed story. The ten-year (9.6% vs. 12.5%), five-year (25.8% vs. 36.0%), and three-
year (27.7% vs. 29.6%) returns show public equities over-performing private
equity, although by small numbers. Only the one-year returns show private
equity over-performing public equities (28.5% vs. 21.7%). One of the
explanations to this phenomenon, provided by a fund manager, is that the
performance of publicly traded and private equity funds in emerging markets is
very similar, because the companies that are publicly traded are also still in early
stages in terms of their management, financial controls, products or markets.
Third, aggregate long-term emerging markets private equity & venture capital
ten-year returns of 9.6% are 2.6 times higher than the 3.5% returns delivered by
the Standard & Poor S&P 500 index, which measures the performance of the
largest 500 companies listed in the United States stock markets, for the same
8 Private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) returns in emerging countries are lumped together.
However, VC figures in emerging countries are likely to be very small. Therefore, in the above
comparison, I compare it to the US PE returns, which does not include VC figures.
period. The one, three and five year returns show a higher disparity, with
emerging markets private equity and venture capital providing significantly
higher returns than the S&P 500. These higher returns explain why emerging
markets private equity is becoming attractive compared to United States equities.
Emerging markets private equity investments are deemed to have a higher risk
compared to other investments such as US equities. In addition to business risks,
investors account for other types of country risks. These risks include political
risk arising from unanticipated changes in government policy; exchange rate risk
arising from potential currency devaluation; and the cost of rent-seeking
behavior (Lerner and Leamon 2008). In a survey of private equity investors
(limited partners), EMPEA (2009) found that in 2008, they expected a 6.7% risk
premium on their investments 9, compared to similar developed markets private
equity funds.
2.3 Private Equity in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Region
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is defined in many ways,
depending on the context. For the purpose of this research, we define it to
include the following 17 countries: in the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman and Yemen; in the Levant: Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, and Jordan; and in North Africa: Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria
and Morocco. This region has a 2008 population of 335 million; with the most
9 2008 risk premium expectations in all emerging markets were, on average, 6-7%, except for
Eastern Europe, where it was 5%.
populous three countries being Egypt (83 million), Sudan (41 million) and
Morocco (35 million). It has a total GDP (in PPP Dollars) of $2,495 billion in 2008,
with the top three countries being Saudi Arabia ($583 billion), Egypt ($443
billion), and Algeria ($236 billion). In 2008, the region's oil production was more
than 28% of the total global oil production, primarily concentrated in Saudi
Arabia (9.2 million barrels/day representing 11% of the total global production),
United Arab Emirates (2.95 million barrels/day), and Kuwait (2.6 million
barrels/day) (World Fact Book 2009).
Despite the grouping as a region, MENA economies vary widely. For example,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Algeria and Libya are resource rich
and highly dependent on oil and gas revenues. Egypt, Syria and Morocco have
more diversified economies, with a mix of agriculture/agri-business,
manufacturing and services. However, they are also indirectly dependant on oil
prices through remittances of expatriate labor working in oil-exporting countries,
regional tourism, and FDI investments from oil-exporting countries (World Bank
2009). Economic regimes also vary. Countries like Egypt, Jordan and Morocco
have been through several rounds of economic liberalization and Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the 1990's and early 2000's, mostly driven by
internal financial crises and World Bank pressures. GCC countries are primarily
market economies; however, asset ownership and the ability to conduct business
are mostly limited to nationals. The rest of the countries in the region are in
varying earlier stages of economic and financial reforms.
Table 2.4 Private equity fund raising by region in emerging markets
(Current US$ million)
2007 2008
Region US$ millions Percent US$ millions Percent
Emerging Asia' 28,668 48.5% 39,660 59.6%
Central Europe, Russia & CIS 14,629 24.7% 5,559 8.4%
Latin America & the Caribbean 4,419 7.5% 4,461 6.7%
Middle East 5,027 8.5% 5,898 8.9%
Africa 2  2,340 4.0% 3,218 4.8%
Multi-region 4,077 6.9% 7,721 11.6%
TOTAL 59,160 100% 66,517 100%
Notes:
[1] Emerging Asia excludes Japan,
[2] Africa includes North Africa
Australia and New Zealand
Sources: EMPEA 2009c
Despite the growth in private equity activities in the MENA region, there is still
much room for growth. For example, private equity investments as a percentage
of GDP is -0.3% in the MENA region, compared to 3.2% in the United States and
0.8% in the European Union, and 0.5% in emerging markets in Asia10 (EMPEA
2009a).
MENA private equity funds are defined as the funds that include MENA region
countries within their geographical focus. These may include funds managed by
local/regional private equity firms or by global private equity firms. Within the
MENA region, funds vary in their geographic coverage. Our analysis show that
10 Emerging Asia excludes Japan, Australia and New Zealand
30% of the funds are regional funds (35 funds managing more than $6 billion)
focusing on the whole MENA region, or a subset of it such as the GCC countries
or North Africa. Some of these regional funds may include other neighboring
countries such as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan or Sub-Saharan Africa. 70% of the funds
(82 funds managing more than $10 billion) are focused on specific countries
within the MENA region. Among these country funds, the top three countries in
terms of attracting private equity investments are Egypt, United Arab Emirates,
and Saudi Arabia (Global Investment House 2008).
Table 2.5 Private Equity funds in the MENA region, by year of first closing"
(Current US$ million)
Year of first closing
Prior 2004 2005 2006 2007 N/A Total
Number of Funds 29 10 21 18 8 31 117
Total Committed Capital 1,745 1,242 5,192 2,997 2,112 3,033 16,321
Notes:
Data as of end of June 2008.
Year of first closing indicates the year during which the fund executed its first
transaction
N/A indicates year of first closing not available
Sources: Compiled by the author from Zawya, MIT Emergis, and individual funds data
11 Year of first closing indicates the year during which the fund executed its first transaction
i
However, MENA funds, as defined above, do not include funds managed by
local/regional private equity firms that are focusing their investments entirely
outside of the region (e.g., in the US, UK, or other regions). It is worth noting that
a significant portion of the private equity investments managed by regional
MENA private equity firms are directed towards developed markets, especially
the United States and the United Kingdom. Zawya estimates that in 2007/2008,
around 45% of the MENA region's private equity investments were directed
towards the United States and United Kingdom (Global Investment House 2008).
2.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we establish four key points regarding private equity in emerging
markets and the MENA region. First, over the past five years, private equity fund
raising in emerging markets has grown exponentially, both in absolute and
relative terms. In 2002, all emerging markets private equity funds combined
raised $3.2 billion, a mere 3.1% of the $102 billion raised by the private equity
industry globally; in 2003 the figure was $3.5 billion, or 3.9% of the global
industry. In 2008, emerging markets private equity fund raising reached a record
$66.5 billion, growing 19 fold from 2003, despite the global financial crisis. This
figure represented 15% of the $445 billion raised by the private equity industry
globally (EMPEA 2009).
The second point is that most private equity funds in emerging markets are
"generalists." Among the 204 funds with closes in 2007, 118 funds managing
$39.1 billion, or 66.2% of the total capital raised, did not have a sectoral focus.
The remaining 69 funds managing $17.1 billion, or 28.9% of the total, were
classified into 9 sectors, with technology, infrastructure and energy as the top
three areas. This reflects the smaller size of emerging markets, where sector
specialization is harder than in developed countries. The fact that most funds
prefer to be diversified across multiple sectors may also suggest that the source
of value-creation in emerging markets is not deep sectoral knowledge, but rather
generic financial, management and turnaround skills that can be applied to any
sector.
The third point relates to the emerging markets private equity returns. In terms
of three-year returns, emerging markets private equity returns are higher than
developed markets private equity; similar to emerging markets publicly-traded
equities; and significantly higher than developed markets publicly-traded
equities. While these returns show the high potential for emerging markets
private equity investments, they also reflect the risk premium expected by
investments in a higher risk asset.
The fourth point relates to private equity investments in the MENA region,
which are still small, despite the high growth in fund raising. For example, as a
percentage of GDP, private equity investments in the MENA region are ~0.3%,
compared to 3.2% in the United States and 0.8% in the European Union, and 0.5%
in emerging markets in Asia (EMPEA 2009a). Within the region, the top three
countries in terms of attracting private equity investments are Egypt, the United
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
*t * *
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CHAPTER 3: PRIVATE EQUITY IN EGYPT:
A GROWING INDUSTRY
In this chapter, we analyze the private equity industry in Egypt, in terms of its
size, structure, importance and ownership. We start by providing an overview of
the industry size, sources of funding, and number of transactions in Egypt. Then,
we compare private equity investments in Egypt 2, in terms of size and nature,
against four investment benchmarks: (i) Foreign Direct Investment; (ii) domestic
bank lending; (iii) national investment plan; and (iv) stock market capitalization.
While each of these four benchmarks differs in nature from private equity, the
comparison shows the increasing importance of private equity activities, and
highlights some of the differences between private equity and these benchmarks.
Then we analyze the history and ownership of a number private equity firms
operating in Egypt. We find that the industry is primarily "home grown."
3.1 Overview of the Private Equity Industry in Egypt
As of mid-20081 3, there were 13 private equity firms managing 36 private equity
funds focusing primarily on Egypt, with more than $6.4 billion in committed
capital14 (Table 3.1). While eight of these funds (with a total committed capital of
12 In our analysis, we use the available figures on private equity fund raising, rather than actual
investments, which may be realized over a longer period after the fund is initiated.
13 Data downloaded and compiled in July 2008.
14 Committed capital represents the amount of money that the fund investors commit to the fund
at the start. These funds are invested over the first 2-3 years of the fund's life as the fund
managers identify good target investments based on their investment strategies.
$420 million) started operating prior to 2004, the real boom in the private equity
investments began in 2004/05. In addition to the funds that are focused
exclusively on Egypt, there are 35 regional funds that target Egypt along with
other countries in the region.15 Capital committed to these regional funds that
include Egypt in its investment targets over the same period was around $6.1
billion. Of these, Egypt's share may be estimated to be at around 50% or $3.0
billion, bringing the total estimated private equity committed capital invested in
Egypt to around $9.4 billion, most of which has been invested over the past five
years.
The activities of these funds translated into an increase in the number and size of
individual transactions (buy/sell). In the five year period between 2003/2004 to
2007/2008, there were 78 recorded private equity transactions (Table 3.2). The
transaction value was available for only 37 of these transactions, totaling $8.0
billion, with an average transaction size of $215 million. If the remaining 41
transactions where values are not available have a similar average size, this
would indicate a total of -$16.8 billion of private equity transactions over the
past five years. Based on the fund and transaction calculations, we estimate
private equity investments in Egypt over the past five years to be in the range of
$9.4 to $16.8 billion, or $1.9 to $3.4 billion annually. Through the rest of our
analysis, we use the average of these two figures: $13.1 billion for the five-year
period, and $2.6 billion annually. This figure corresponds to 1.6% of Egypt's 2008
nominal GDP of $158.3 billion (World Fact Book 2009) - a level of private equity
investments that is significantly higher than the regional average and other
15 There are an additional 46 funds with more than $3.8 billion that focus on other countries in the
region, but do not cover Egypt.
emerging markets. For example, private equity investments as a percentage of
GDP are ~0.3% in the MENA region, compared to 3.2% in the US and 0.8% in the
European Union, and 0.5% in emerging markets in Asia (EMPEA 2009a).
Table 3.1 Private equity funds in Egypt and the MENA region
(Current US$ million)
Fund Geographic Focus Year of first closing
Prior 2004 2005 2006 2007 N/A Total
Egypt Funds:
Number of Funds 8 4 7 5 7 5 36
Fund Size/ Committed Capital ($M) 420 533 2,097 314 2,102 933 6,399
MENA Funds, covering Egypt:
Number of Funds 9 5 6 5 10 35
Fund Size/ Committed Capital ($M) 1,088 544 1,912 1,410 1,170 6,124
MENA Funds, not covering Egypt
Number of Funds 12 1 8 8 1 16 46
Fund Size/ Committed Capital ($M) 237 165 1,183 1,273 10 930 3,798
TOTAL MENA Region
Number of Funds 29 10 21 18 8 31 117
Fund Size/ Committed Capital ($M) 1,745 1,242 5,192 2,997 2,112 3,033 16,321
Notes:
N/A indicates year of first closing not available
Sources: Compiled by the author from Zawya, MIT's Emerging Markets Portal
(Emergis), and individual funds data; as of July 2008
Table 3.2 Private equity transactions in Egypt (2003-2008)
(Current US$ million)
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Number of transactions 3 7 17 21 16 14 78
Total value of transactions 17.5 13.7 484.3 1,299.9 3,396.0 2,754.7 7,966.1
Average transaction value 9 7 81 100 340 689 215
Notes:
Based on completed private equity transactions in Egypt during the five-year
period from mid-2003 to mid-2008
2003 figures are for the second half of the year; 2008 figures are for the first half
of the year
Average transaction value is based on 37 transactions with available values
Sources: The author, based on data from MIT Emergis and Zawya
3.2 How Big Is Private Equity in Egypt?
We estimate private equity investments in Egypt over the past five years to be
$2.6 billion annually on average, or 1.6% of Egypt's 2008 nominal GDP of $158.3
Billion (World Fact Book 2009). While this level of private equity investments is
significantly higher than the region and other emerging markets, it is important
to put it in perspective by comparing it with other benchmarks, such as foreign
direct investments, national investment plan, domestic bank lending and stock
market capitalization. In this section, we compare private equity figures to these
benchmarks.
3.2.1 Private Equity and Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is considered an indicator for economic growth
and a catalyst for industrial development (Markusen and Venables 1999). FDI is
important in three ways. First, foreign firms providing direct investments
complement domestic savings in increasing the investments. This in turn
translates into higher growth rates, capital formation and hence increased
productivity and/or employment. Second, FDI is often credited with positive
externalities in areas of technology transfer and labor/management training.
Third, FDI growth is now considered a positive market signal for the potential of
an emerging economy (Markusen and Venables 1999).
In the five year period between 2003/4 and 2007/8, FDI inflows to Egypt grew
significantly, from an average of 0.5 billion annually during the period between
2000 and 2004, to $13.2 billion in 2007/2008 (Table 3.3). This trend may be
attributed to two key factors: first, the increase in global and regional liquidity,
especially from oil revenues; and second, major policy reforms implemented by
the Egyptian government to liberalize the economy and attract foreign direct
investments (World Bank 2009).
Table 3.3 Net FDI inflows to Egypt (FY2000/01 - FY2007/08)
(Current US$ million)
Fiscal Year
Previous 10
2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08Years Average
Net FDI inflows 1,038.7 509.4 428.2 700.6 407.2 3,901.8 6,111.4 11,053.2 13,200.0
As a percent of GDP 1.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.9% 0.5% 4.4% 5.7% 8.5% 8.1%
Notes:
Figures include foreign direct investments in petroleum sector as from FY 2004/2005.
Sources: Central Bank of Egypt - Balance of Payment time series; Ministry of Investment
Over the same period (2003/04 - 2007/08), private equity investments in Egypt
grew at a similar rate to foreign direct investments. Prior to 2003/4 private equity
investments in Egypt were less than $50 million annually. During the five year
period of 2003/4 - 2007/8, private equity investments are estimated to have been
at $13.1 billion. This amounts to 37.8% of the $34.7 billion total FDI inflows
during the same period. It is important to note that FDI and private equity
figures are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Depending on the sources of the
fund and the structure of the transaction, some private equity funds may also be
included as foreign direct investments, especially in the case of offshore funds. It
is also important to highlight that private equity funds are often leveraged, using
loans from banks or other financial institutions. This helps increase their impact
in terms of total value of assets under management.
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How do foreign direct investments compare to private equity in terms of (i) the
source of the funds; (ii) the destination of the investments in terms of sectors and
industries; and (iii) spillover effects and externalities? In terms of the sources of
funds, foreign direct investments are direct transfers from multinational
corporations with the purpose of building domestic subsidiaries, sometimes
through acquisitions (Moran 1998, Chung 2001, Blomstrom and Kokko 2003).
These investments are often for the medium or long term. In the case of private
equity, the funds are either from domestic or foreign investors (breakdown data
not available), and often with a medium-term view.
In terms of the destinations of investments, in 2007/08, foreign direct
investments were primarily focused in three areas (Table 3.4): 54% were in
creating new establishments and expanding existing ones; 35% were in
investments in the oil and gas sector; 19% were in sale of assets to non-residents;
while investments in real estate were less than 0.2%.
In terms of spillovers and externalities, FDI is often credited with transferring
technology and management practices to their domestic subsidiary as well as to
the whole industry including competition. These positive externalities were used
as an argument for providing government incentives to attract FDI (Moran 1998,
Chung 2001, Blomstrom and Kokko 2003, Louis, El-Mahdy and Handoussa 2004).
In the case of private equity, the investors are not a multinational corporation
with industry-specific knowledge, but rather are financial investors. However,
the role of private equity firms in professionalizing management and business
practices may result in other types of positive externalities.
Table 3.4 Sectoral distribution of net FDI inflows in Egypt
(Current $ million)
Fiscal Year
Sector 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 Total Percent
New establishments & expansions 925.6 3,347.8 5,227.2 6,400.0 15,900.6 46.4%
Petroleum sector 2,540.2 1,832.2 3,014.8 4,100.0 11,487.2 33.6%
Sale of assets to non-residents 390.8 905.7 2,772.2 2,300.0 6,368.7 18.6%
Real estate 16.5 25.7 39.0 400.0 481.2 1.4%
Net FDI inflows 3,873.1 6,111.4 11,053.2 13,200.0 34,237.7 100%
Sources: Central Bank of Egypt; Ministry of Investment
3.2.2 Private Equity and the National Investment Plan
Despite its transition to a market economy, Egypt maintained the legacy of
creating five-year plans for national investments. These plans are produced by
the Ministry of Economic Development (formerly, the Ministry of Planning), and
describe the required investments by industry to reach the target levels of
economic growth. Starting in 1990, with the implementation of the Structural
Adjustment Program, the government started to break down the plan's target
investments among the different sectors: government, economic authorities,
state-owned companies (SOEs) and private companies. Since then, a growing
portion of these investments have been carried out by the private sector (62% in
2006/07 compared to 48% in 2002/03). The latest five-year plan for 2002/03-
2006/07 (Table 3.5) shows total required investments of $88.9 billion over the five
year period.
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Table 3.5 National investments broken down by source of investments
(FY2002/03 - FY2006/07)
(Current US$ million)
Fiscal Year
Source of Investments 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 Total
Government Sector 4,260 3,711 3,881 3,697 4,369 19,918
Economic Authorities 1,770 1,261 1,165 1,684 1,091 6,970
State-owned Companies 854 1,923 2,851 3,232 4,634 13,494
Private Sector 6,391 6,024 8,187 11,561 16,384 48,548
Total Investments 13,275 12,918 16,084 20,175 26,478 88,930
Sources: Central Bank of Egypt; converted from Egyptian Pound
annual official conversion rate (calculated from IMF GDP data)
(LE) to US Dollars using
During this period, private equity investments accounted for 14.8% of the total
investment target, and 27% of private sector investments'6 . It is important to note
that only a limited portion of private equity investments is directed towards new
establishments.
16 Comparison years do not match exactly. For private equity, we use figures from 2003/04 to
2007/08; and for investments, we use figures from 2002/03 to 2006/07. There is a one year
mismatch. However, we do not expect this to significantly change the percent of contribution of
private equity towards the investment plan.
3.2.3 Private Equity and Domestic Bank Lending
One of the key roles of banks is mobilizing domestic savings into investments in
new and existing companies by extending credit to these companies. However,
in many emerging markets banks are often unable to provide credit and
financing to the majority of companies due to restrictions in the credit process
and other issues. For example, in Egypt, only 21% of Egyptian companies are
able to secure long term bank credit.
Table 3.6 shows that in 2007, banks in Egypt had a total of $171 billion in total
assets and $118 billion in total deposits. They only extended $64 billion in loans
(38% of total assets, and 54% of total deposits). A smaller portion of these loans
($43 billion) were extended to private businesses (excluding consumers,
government, and public sector). This accounts for only 26% of their total assets
and 37% of their total deposits. These figures have been declining over the past
six years, indicating that banks are having increasing problems in extending
credit to private sector companies. For example, total loans to the domestic
private sector as a percent of the total bank assets declined from 39% in 2001 to
26% in 2007 - a 13 percentage points decline. In contrast, private equity
investments over the past five years represent ~6.8% 17 of the bank loans extended
to private sector companies in Egypt, which highlights the increasing role of
private equity firms as an alternate channel for providing financing for new and
growing companies.
17 Calculated based on $194 billion (LE 1,066 billion) in total loans extended to domestic private
sector during the five years period between 2003 and 2007 and $13.1 billion in estimated private
equity in Egypt over the same period.
Table 3.6 Bank loans, based on aggregate balance sheet for all Egyptian banks
(Current LE Billion)
Previous 10
Years
Fiscal Year, End of June Average 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total Assets = Total Liabilities 260 428 495 578 633 704 762 938
Total Deposits (liability) 172 291 341 403 462 520 569 650
Loans and Discounts (asset) 126 241 266 285 296 308 324 354
Total Loans/ Total Assets 46% 56% 54% 49% 47% 44% 43% 38%
Total Loans/ Total Deposits 70% 83% 78% 71% 64% 59% 57% 54%
Total Loans to Domestic Private Sector 71 165 185 200 206 206 215 239
Total Loans to Domestic Private Sector/ Total
Assets 25% 39% 37% 35% 32% 29% 28% 26%
Notes:
Total loans to domestic private sector excludes government, public sector,
household sector and foreign sector
As of 7/6/2009, 1 Egyptian pound was equal to 0.18 U.S. Dollars. The Egyptian
Pound was devalued in 2001/2003 by about 35%. In 2000, 1 Egyptian Pound was
equal to 0.29 U.S. Dollars (Wikipedia 2009).
Sources: Central Bank of Egypt; Banks Aggregate Balance Sheet
3.2.4 Private Equity and Stock Market Capitalization
As of the end of June 2008, the Egyptian Stock Exchange had 372 listed
companies and a market capitalization of $152 billion (World Federation of
Exchanges (WFE) 2008). This market capitalization represents 96% of Egypt's
2008 nominal GDP of $158.3 Billion 8 , which is a high figure compared to most
developing countries. However, in an interview with one of the private equity
firms, they indicated that the actual number of highly liquid investment grade
companies is around 30. These companies represent most of the market
capitalization and most of the trading activities. The rest of the 372 listed
companies are not very active. Over the past few years, The Egyptian Capital
Market Authority (CMA) delisted a number of these stocks that have limited
liquidity or trading (Beltone interview).
In comparison, cumulative private equity investments over the past five years
represent approximately 8.6% of the Egyptian Stock Exchange total market
capitalization. On an annual basis, private equity investments in Egypt represent
1.7% of the total market capitalization, compared to 0.85% globally 19 (including
all developed and developing countries). This figure confirms the high level of
private equity activity in Egypt, both in absolute and relative terms.
18 In October 2008, the Egyptian Stock Exchange market capitalization declined to $85.3 billion, a
44% decline. However, this decline was consistent with other stock markets in developed and
developing countries due to the global financial crisis. Later in 2009 the Egyptian Stock Exchange
market capitalization recovered partially.
19 Calculated based the following 2008 figures: global private equity fund raising of $445 billion
(EMPEA 2009); and global market capitalization for domestic equity markets of $52,827 billion
(WFE 2008).
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3.4 The Home-Grown Private Equity Industry
Lerner and Leamon (2008) argue that the rapid growth in emerging markets
private equity "[has] been fueled both by institutional investors based in
developed nations, particularly the United States but also Canada and the United
Kingdom, and by private equity firms." They argue that this is primarily driven
by diminishing opportunities for these funds in many developed nations, and
the growing and more visible potential in emerging markets. While it may be
true that US- and European-based private equity firms are becoming increasingly
interested in emerging markets, our analysis shows that, in Egypt, there is a
rapidly growing home-grown private equity industry that is dominant. Future
research is needed to confirm that the case of Egypt is not an anomaly; however,
we expect the same story to exist in other emerging markets that have
historically had a period of active financial markets, a strong domestic banking
sector, and several attempts at economic reform, such as Brazil, Argentina,
Turkey, South Africa or Malaysia.
It is important to highlight that while the private equity firms may be home-
grown, the funds come from diverse sources. Interviews with private equity
managers show that their sources of funding include domestic, GCC, and
international sources. Institutional investors and high-net worth individuals
(HNWI)20 from Egypt and Arab Gulf countries constitute the most significant
source of funding. In Chapter 4 we review the sources of funding in detail.
20 High net-worth individuals (HNWI) is "a classification used by the financial services industry
to denote an individual or a family with high net worth. Although there is no precise definition
of how rich somebody must be to fit into this category, high net worth is generally quoted in
terms of liquid assets over a certain figure (e.g., $1 million); the exact amount differs by financial
institution and region. These individuals often demand (and can justify) personalized services in
investment management, estate planning, and tax planning." (Investopedia 2009)
In this section, we examine the hypothesis that the private equity industry in
Egypt is primarily a home-grown industry. Private equity firms have adapted to
the local business environment by assembling a mix of competencies that enables
their success in a developing country context.
3.4.1 Key Actors: Private Equity Firms and Their Founders
Table 3.7 lists private equity firms with funds focusing on Egypt, or with major
transactions in Egypt. The majority of these firms are home-grown, in the sense
that they were created by Egyptian professionals, are incorporated in Egypt, or
have significant investments in Egypt. In the remainder of this section we review
some of these firms and their founders with two goals in mind: first, to establish
a fact base on the key actors in the industry; and second, to test the hypothesis
that the private equity industry in Egypt is a "home-grown" industry.
Table 3.7 Ownership of private equity firms with major transactions in Egypt
(Current US$ million)
Private Equity Firm Start Date Total Funds Under Primary Ownership/ Nationality
in Egypt Management
El-Mansour and El-Maghraby Investment and Development 1996 -1,100 Egypt
(MMID)
Capital Trust Group 1996 -250-300 International/ Arab
EFG-Hermes Private Equity 1997 -1,000 Egypt
IT Investment 1999 -110 Egypt
Concord International Investments Group 2000 154 Egypt
Actis 2001 3,000 (globally) United Kingdom
Amwal Al-Khaleej 2002 1,000 Saudi Arabia
Injazat Capital 2003 5 United Arab Emirates
Citadel Capital 2004 2,465 Egypt
Technology Development Fund 2004 350 Egypt (Government-backed)
Sphinx Capital/ Grandview 2005 180 Egypt
Haykala Investment Managers 2005 60 Egypt
Shuaa Partners 2005 465 United Arab Emirates (Dubai)
Ripplewood Holdings 2006 230 United States
Beltone Financial 2007 -160 Egypt
Carlyle Group 2007 750 - 1,000 (target) International
Sources: The author, based on private equity firms' websites and survey of private equity firms in Egypt
The first of these firms is El-Mansour and El-Maghraby Investment &
Development (MMID). MMID was established in 1996 by two family
conglomerates in Egypt and Saudi Arabia to act as their private equity
investment arm21. MMID has executed a number of private equity transactions in
Egypt, especially in the banking and insurance sectors (Mansour 2009).
The Egyptian Financial Group (EFG) was established in 1984 as the first local
investment banking firm in Egypt. In its early years, EFG was the key player in
creating, analyzing and managing the privatization program for the Government
of Egypt. In 1996, it merged with Hermes Financial, which had more regional
and international experience, to create EFG-Hermes. The company has grown to
be the largest investment bank in the Middle East with a strong regional
footprint, including Dubai, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Besides private equity, the
firm provides securities brokerage, asset management, investment banking, and
research. EFG-Hermes is listed on the Egyptian and London Stock exchanges and
as of June 2008 had a market capitalization exceeding US$ 3.5 billion. Currently,
EFG-Hermes employs over 880 professionals in 13 regional offices. In 2007, their
net profit was $160 million. EFG-Hermes' private equity investments started in
1997 with their first fund: Horus I. Since then, they have launched three other
private equity funds at different stages of investing. In July 2006, the Dubai-
based private equity firm Abraaj Capital bought a 24.62% stake in EFG-Hermes
for $505 million, with the objective of expanding the firm's reach in the Gulf
region. In December 2007, Abraaj Capital sold their stake to the Dubai Financial
Group (DFG), a Dubai-based diversified financial investment company focusing
21 MMID structure, investors, and portfolio companies are discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
on banking, investments and insurance regionally and globally, for $1.1 billion.
This transaction values EFG-Hermes at $4.47 billion (EFG-Hermes 2009).
IT Investments 22 is a private equity and venture capital firm incorporated in
Egypt and established in 1999. The firm was initiated by an MIT alumnus and
one of the IT industry veterans in Egypt, Dr. Hisham El-Sherif. During the 1990's,
E1-Sherif was one of the leaders in the government who worked on creating the
infrastructure for Egypt's IT and telecommunications industry. IT Investments is
focused on investing in low to medium risk, early stage, startup and turn around
companies in the telecommunications, information technology and high-tech
industries. The firm's private equity and venture capital fund closed in 1999 with
a subscribed capital of $110 million, primarily from Egyptian and regional
institutional investors and high-net-worth individuals. The firm currently has
investments in 14 portfolio companies at different stages of development.
Concord Investments International Group 23 was founded in 1988 as a US-based
SEC-registered investment management company, focusing on portfolio
management, investment strategy, corporate finance and strategic planning. The
group is based in New York, with offices in Cairo and Tokyo. Concord manages
investment portfolios and mutual funds of $2.3 billion worldwide, of which $1.2
billion are currently invested in Egyptian equities. Concord has executed and
exited a number of successful private equity transactions in Egypt. Concord
Group was founded by Mohamed Younis, one of the financial industry veterans.
22 IT Investments structure, investors, and portfolio companies are discussed in detail in Chapters
5 and 6.
23 Concord Group structure, investors, and portfolio companies are discussed in detail in
Chapters 5 and 6.
Younis graduated from Cairo University and later received his MBA from
Harvard Business School. He worked in New York in the financial industry for
more than 40 years, including 20 years as the founder and Chairman of the
Concord Group. He is currently the Chairman of the international advisory
board of the Egyptian Stock Exchange, and sits on a number of boards in Egypt
and the United States.
Citadel Capital 24 is the largest private equity firm in Egypt and one of the largest
in the region in terms of assets under management. The firm was established in
2004 by two veterans of the financial services industry in Egypt, and has since
grown exponentially through the execution of some of the largest and most
successful private equity transactions in Egypt and the region. Citadel Capital is
solely focused on private equity investments, and currently 25 has around $2.5
billion in committed equity under management, invested in 19 "opportunity-
specific Platform Companies with investments of more than $8.3 billion in 14
industries, including energy, mining, agri-foods, cement, transportation and
retail" (Citadel Capital 2008, 2009). Since it began operations in 2004, Citadel
Capital has raised and invested more than US$ 4.1 billion in equity, including
over $750 million of its own capital. During the same period, the firm has
generated more than $ 2.2 billion in cash proceeds from five successful exits,
more than any other private equity firm in the region (Citadel Capital 2009).
Citadel Capital was founded by two industry veterans with previous experience
in investment banking and private equity in Egypt: Ahmed Heikal and Hisham
El-Khazindar. Prior to founding the firm, Heikal was an executive board member
24 Citadel Capital structure, investors, and portfolio companies are discussed in detail in Chapters
5 and 6.
25 As of mid-2008.
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and Managing Director of EFG-Hermes Holding, where he has executed private
equity, mergers and acquisitions, and initial public offering transactions. Heikal
holds a Masters degree and a PhD in Industrial Engineering and Engineering
Management from Stanford University. Prior to co-founding Citadel Capital, El-
Khazindar, who holds an MBA from Harvard Business School, was an Executive
Director of Investment Banking at EFG-Hermes (Citadel Capital 2009).
Sphinx Capital is a specialized private equity firm established in 2005, and
owned by Citadel Capital and its own management. The firm manages
Grandview Investments, a $103 million private equity fund focused on investing
in mid-cap companies with an enterprise value of less than $25 million in Egypt
and the region. Sphinx Capital was founded by Marianne Ghali, an experienced
industry veteran who has executed a number of successful private equity
transactions in Egypt and has also managed university endowment funds.
Haykala Investment Managers, 26 an Egyptian private equity firm, was founded
in 2005 by the Commercial International Bank (CIB) and three members of
Haykala's management team. Haykala started when the fund managers were
working at CIB, where they conducted several turnaround transactions and then
decided to spinoff the operation into a separate fund with participation from the
bank, as well as other investors. CIB is the largest shareholder in the private
equity firm, with a 40% stake; the remaining 60% is owned by high-net-worth
individuals, institutional investors and the Haykala management team.
26 Haykala Investment Managers structure, investors, and portfolio companies are discussed in
detail in Chapters 5 and 6.
Haykala's founders, Hisham Abdel-Fattah, Ahmed Amin, and Mohamed Khairat,
have substantial experience in private equity, banking, and corporate finance.
Prior to co-founding Haykala, Abdel-Fattah worked in CIB for more than 25
years, focusing on risk management, investment banking and turnarounds. He
participated in more than 20 turnaround transactions in the food and beverages,
construction and textiles industry. Amin had 16 years of experience at CIB,
focusing on corporate and investment banking, restructuring and turnarounds.
He also executed three major initial public offerings and advised on a major
acquisition transaction. Khairat has 15 years of experience at CIB, focusing on
corporate banking, investment banking, restructuring and private equity. He
advised on large privatization transactions with the government. Khairat holds a
Masters of Finance degree from London Business School (Haykala 2009, CIB
2009).
Beltone Financial was established in 2002 and provides asset management,
investment banking, private equity, brokerage, and research services in the
Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). It is headquartered in Cairo with
more than 200 investment professionals in nine offices in the Middle East,
London and New York. Beltone Capital is one of the fastest growing financial
services firms in the region. For example, its asset management group has more
than $4 billion in assets under management; its investment banking group has
executed more than $4.9 billion in transactions; and its private equity group has
raised more than $430 million in capital. Beltone research covers 52 companies
across the region. The firm's co-founders, Aladdin Saba and Aly El-Tahry, had
significant experience on Wall Street, where they both worked as investment
bankers. In 1991, they moved to Cairo to establish a regional office for their US
firm, focusing on corporate finance and privatization. El-Tahry and Sabaa later
co-founded Hermes Financial, which grew to become one of Egypt's top financial
institutions. In 1996, Hermes merged with the Egyptian Financial Group (EFG) to
form one of the region's largest financial institutions. At EFG-Hermes, El-Tahry
managed the corporate finance and sales and trading divisions until he left in
1999; and Saba managed the asset management division, which he built from
scratch to become the largest asset management operation in Egypt, with assets
under management in excess of $500 million. In 2002, he left EFG-Hermes to
rejoin El-Tahri in founding Beltone Financial. El-Tahry received an MBA degree
from Purdue University in 1987, and has two degrees in physics and mechanical
engineering. Saba holds an MBA from Wharton and a Masters degree in
Biomedical Engineering. Saba also serves on the board of directors of the Central
Bank of Egypt (Beltone 2009).
In addition to these local firms, a number of international players operate in
Egypt; however, most of them operate through local offices that are staffed with
experienced local staff. For example, Actis, a United Kingdom-based
international private equity firm operating in emerging markets, initiated its
operations in Egypt through expatriate staff. However, they quickly decided to
change all of their local management team to nationals. "Previously they were all
foreigners, and they probably saw more risks than they saw opportunities; in
2005/06, the team has been restructured, and now, it includes mainly local
employees" (ACTIS interview). Similarly, The Carlyle Group, one of the largest
United States-based private equity firms, started its presence in Egypt through a
local office staffed by local professionals. They also established similar local
offices in Beirut, Istanbul and Dubai as part of their broader Middle East regional
strategy (Carlyle interview).
Through our review of private equity transactions executed in Egypt over the
past decade, we found that the majority of these transactions were executed by
local firms or regional/ international firms with a strong local presence. There
were some exceptions in specific situations; for example, in secondary buyouts,
where a local private equity firm sold to a regional one, such as the sale of the
Egyptian Fertilizers Company by Citadel Capital to the Dubai-based Abraaj
Capital. Another example is in the case of specialty transactions such as the case
of SEKEM, an environmentally and socially focused bio-agriculture and bio-
pharma company, which sought investments from a specialized European
"green fund."
3.4.2 Key Competencies
Through our review of the individual founders and managers of these private
equity firms, we found a mix of five key competencies or capabilities that existed
in most of these firms, namely: access to capital, access to deals, deal structuring
knowhow, business transformation and turnaround knowhow, and political
access. We hypothesize that these five competencies or capabilities are necessary
for the success of these firms, especially in emerging markets. These
competencies also support the different stages of the private equity cycle, as
discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
The first competency is access to capital. The majority of these private equity firms
are financed through institutional investors, high-net-worth individuals and
family offices from Egypt and the Gulf region. Most of these firms rely on the
personal and professional networks of their founders to gain such access. Access
to debt through the local banking system is also critical for leveraged buyouts.
The second competency is access to deals. A large number of private equity
transactions in Egypt are in family businesses and other proprietary
opportunities that are only accessible through the founders' personal and
professional networks. The third competency is deal structuring knowhow.
Structuring the private equity transaction requires deep financial, legal and
organizational knowledge and experience, typically acquired through training at
global investment banks. The fourth competency is business transformation and
turnaround knowhow. In many transactions, the private equity firm implements a
business transformation or turnaround program for their portfolio companies. A
number of private equity professionals have acquired this experience through
careers in management consulting, corporate restructuring or banking. The fifth
competency is political access. Political access is used to create opportunities or to
reduce exposure to political risks. Political access has been used to create
opportunities in cases such as privatization, gaining privileged information,
obtaining licenses, acquiring land allocations, or avoiding regulatory pressures.
Political risks represent a major risk factor in emerging markets such as Egypt.
They may emerge due to many factors such as changing government policies or
regulations, limited protections for property rights, or the lengthy and
cumbersome litigation process. Many private equity firms have or seek political
access in different ways.
These five competencies were present, in varying levels, in most of the private
equity firms reviewed. In Chapter 4, we review many of these competencies as
we analyze the private equity investment cycle in depth. However, further
research is needed to examine these capabilities in detail, and to assess how they
may provide private equity firms in emerging markets with competitive
advantage.
One of the possible explanations for the growth of the "home-grown" financial
services industry - private equity being one example - is the growing availability
of experienced professionals. A number of the founders of these firms had
successful careers in global institutions, and then moved to start entrepreneurial
firms in their home country. Others had careers in local or regional institutions
which gave them deep knowledge of the local market characteristics.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we establish two key points. The first point is that private equity
investments in Egypt are notably high compared to other emerging markets and
the region. We estimate private equity investments in Egypt over the past five
years to be $2.6 billion annually on average, or 1.6% of Egypt's 2008 nominal
GDP of $158.3 Billion (World Fact Book 2009). To understand the importance of
these investments, we compare them to a number of benchmarks. Based on the
average of the past five years, private equity investments in Egypt represent
around 37.8% of the total FDI inflows; 27% of the target private sector
investments in the national investment plan; and 6.8% of the bank credit
extended to private sector companies. They also represent 1.7% of the Egyptian
Stock Exchange market capitalization, compared to 0.85% globally in 2008,
including all developed and developing countries. These benchmarks show the
high level of private equity investments in Egypt, both in absolute and relative
terms.
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These high levels also raise two questions. First, why are private equity
investments in Egypt higher than the rest of the region as well as other emerging
markets? The second question is whether these higher figures make Egypt an
anomaly, and limit the scope of our findings to this case. These two questions
require more comparative analysis, which needs to be done in future research.
However, it is likely that the findings from this case study would provide good
hypotheses to test in other countries.
The second point in this chapter is that the majority of private equity activities in
Egypt are performed by "home-grown" private equity firms. Over the past 5-10
years, a number of local private equity firms emerged and quickly expanded.
They were mostly founded by experienced professionals, and have managed to
create a competitive advantage for themselves, both domestically and regionally.
These firms played the primary role in growing the industry over the past five
years and are now aggressively expanding regionally. One hypothesis that needs
to be tested in future research is whether the presence of these home-grown
firms is responsible for the high level of private equity activities compared to
other countries. Through our analysis of these firms, we also hypothesize about
five key competencies that contribute to their competitive advantage, namely:
access to capital, access to deals, deal structuring knowhow, business
transformation and turnaround knowhow, and political access. These five
competencies were present at varying levels in most of the private equity firms
that we examined. In Chapter 4, we review many of these competencies as we
analyze the private equity investment cycle in depth. However, further research
is needed to examine these capabilities in detail, and to assess how they may
provide private equity firms in emerging markets with competitive advantage.

CHAPTER 4: THE PRIVATE EQUITY CYCLE
The private equity business model in developed countries, especially in the
United States and the United Kingdom, is well established and documented (e.g.,
Fenn, Liang and Prowse 1995, Wright and Robbie 1998, Gomper and Lerner 2004,
Fischbein 2005). However, in emerging markets, private equity firms, especially
the home-grown ones, are learning and experimenting with different ways of
doing business to adapt to the realities of operating in developing countries and
to accommodate local market requirements in their respective countries and
regions (Lerner and Leamon 2008, Gurung and Lerner 2008). Some of these
differences are institutional, such as the legal systems, investor protections, and
contract enforcements; some have to do with the functioning of the market, such
as information asymmetry; and some have to do with the macroeconomic
environment, such as the fiscal policies, rate of economic growth, and
government incentives. In this chapter, we compare the private equity business
model between developed and developing countries to understand how private
equity firms are adapting to the local needs and conditions of developing
countries. To be able to compare the private equity business model in developing
countries against their more mature counterparts in developed countries, we
trace the end-to-end private equity cycle. Our overarching hypothesis is that
while the private equity model is transferable and useful in emerging markets,
private equity firms adapt to the local peculiarities of doing business in such
emerging markets.
4.1 Private Equity Business Model in Developed Countries
Private equity firms provide professionally managed investment vehicles for
equity investing in unregistered securities of private and publicly-traded
companies (Fenn, Liang and Prowse 1995). Private equity firms are often created
and managed by a small number of professional investment staff, often with
investment banking or management consulting backgrounds. They typically
organize their operations around funds, each with a specific investment strategy.
An investment strategy may focus on a specific industry (e.g., telecom,
manufacturing), stage of investment (e.g., venture capital, mature companies),
situation (e.g., distressed company turnaround, mergers and consolidations), or
geographic location (e.g., Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East and North
Africa). Some firms also operate on a deal-by-deal basis rather than organizing
around funds.
The typical private equity process or cycle takes place in four stages (Table 4.1).
The first stage includes the fund initiation and setup. During this stage, the
private equity firm identifies a specific investment opportunity; designs the fund
strategy, which includes the countries, industries, and types of investments that
the fund will focus on, as well as the targeted size for fund raising; and names
the fund management team. Once the setup is completed, the private equity firm
initiates fund raising, which may target individual or institutional investors.
Once the fund is established and funded, the investing process starts. The fund
management initiates their search for potential acquisition targets and manages
the "pipeline" of incoming opportunities. Potential opportunities are analyzed
against the fund strategy and based on negotiations with their owners. Detailed
due diligence is conducted for companies that are identified as good matches
with the fund strategy and have a potential for increasing value over the
short/medium term and generating acceptable return. The due diligence process
spans across a number of areas, including financial, accounting, legal, physical
assets, operations, intellectual property, management team, and risk. The private
equity firm negotiates the terms of the transactions and the price with the seller.
As the private equity firm assembles a portfolio of investments, it transitions to
the third stage: portfolio management. This stage often lasts for 3-7 years, during
which the private equity firm manages the acquired companies to increase their
value, based on their business plan. The fourth and last stage is the exit, where
the private equity firm looks for different options to liquidate its investment,
either through the stock market through an initial public offering (IPO), to
another company through a trade sale, or, sometimes, to another private equity
firm or investor group through a secondary buyout (Fenn, Liang and Prowse
1995, Fischbein 2005, Lerner and Leamon 2008).
Table 4.1 Key stages and activities in
Key Stages and Activities
1. Fund Initiation & Setup 1.1
2. Investing
3. Portfolio Management
the private equity investment cycle
Setting up the fund structure
Raising capital
Investment Strategy
Deal sourcing and due diligence
Structuring the transaction and pricing
Implementing value-creation strategy
Governance & monitoring
4. Exit 4.1 Exiting the investment
Sources: The author, adapted from Wright and Robbie (1998), Gomper and Lerner
(2004), and Lerner and Leamon (2008)
The distribution of funds within the MENA region among these different stages
of the private equity cycle shows that the industry is still in its early stages. As of
mid 2008 (based on data from Zawya Private Equity Monitor covering 2006
through mid 2008), 24% of the funds were still in the setup stage (either formally
announced or rumored) and 30% of the funds were in the fund raising stage - a
total of 54% of the funds in stage 1. Additionally, 45% of the funds were in stages
2 and 3, actively investing and managing their portfolio of investments. Only 1%
of the funds are in stage 4, engaging in exit or liquidation of their investments 27
(Global Investment House 2008).
27 This 1% estimate of funds in the exit stage is probably an underestimation. In Egypt alone,
there were several funds in the process of divesting their investments. It is likely that the Global
Investment House estimates are mostly focused on funds in the GCC countries, and may have
omitted other funds in the broader MENA region.
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Private equity firms use different strategies to increase the value of their
acquisitions. In financially distressed companies, they employ financial
engineering tools to restructure the company's balance sheet. In badly managed
companies, they change the management team and improve reporting and
accountability. In startup firms (venture capital), they provide seed capital, hire
experienced management teams, help provide direction and strategy for the new
firm, and open the doors for business partnerships and opportunities. We
discuss these value creation strategies in depth in the next chapter.
4.2 Research Approach
Initial observation from interviews with private equity firms in Egypt show that
the overall framework and process for conducting private equity activities are
similar to those used in developed countries; however, the differences occur in
the specific details and execution of each step. These variations include, for
example, the mix of sources of capital; incorporation and legal domicile; types
and demographics of investments; governance models; and exit strategies.
In this section, we identify and examine these differences in detail by performing
a process tracing of the end-to-end activities in the private equity cycle (Table 4.1).
For each activity in the private equity cycle, we go through the following set of
questions. First, what are the typical practices in developed countries? How do
private equity funds operate there? Second, based on economic theory and also
based on our understanding of the situation in Egypt and developing countries
in general, we hypothesize on what we would expect the practices to be in Egypt.
Then, we compare our hypothesis with empirical evidence from interviews with
private equity fund executives, our data on private equity funds and transactions,
and other publicly available data sources. We also examine alternative
explanations, as well as the strength and validity of the empirical evidence. We
conclude by discussing the implications of these findings with respect to the
private equity industry, as well as their overall impact on the economy and any
arising public policy issues. The limitation of this methodology is that there may
not be enough empirical evidence or data points to make theoretical assertions or
generalizations. However, this will provide the most insights based on the
available data, and may clarify a hypothesis that can be tested empirically in
future research.
Throughout this chapter, we draw data from a number of sources: our interviews
with private equity fund managers in Egypt; confidential information provided
by these fund managers; public information from their company websites and
other financial reporting sources; annual reports; and other documents.
4.3 Stage 1: Fund Initiation and Setup
The two key steps in the first stage of initiating and setting up the private equity
fund are setting up the fund's legal and governance structure and fundraising.
4.3.1 Setting up the Fund Structure
Setting up the legal and governance structure for a private equity fund is an
important initial step. From a theoretical point of view, there are two key issues
discussed in the literature involving private equity fund setup. The first issue is
agency: what is the fund structure that best provides adequate protections for the
investors, while providing performance incentives for fund managers acting on
behalf of the investors, along with sufficient decision making autonomy. The
second issue is adaptation: how and why this structure varies across different
countries, and what the implications of such variations may be.
Private equity funds in the United States and other developed markets are
typically set up as limited partnerships, with the financial investors as the limited
partners (LP) and the fund manager, be it a private equity firm or an individual
fund manager, as the general partner (GP). Limited partners provide most of the
invested capital, but do not play an active role in the fund management or
decision making process. General partners are responsible for the management
of the fund, including identifying and selecting potential investments,
conducting due diligence, structuring and executing transactions, managing and
monitoring portfolio companies, and eventually, exiting the investments. They
are compensated through a management fee and a profit share (called the carried
interest). The management fee typically ranges between 1.5% and 2.5% of the
capital under management. The carried interest is typically 20% of the profit,
provided that profits exceed a specific threshold, such as 12% (Lerner and
Leamon 2008, Citadel Capital 2008b). The GP/LP structure provides sufficient
protections for limited partners as well as a strong incentive structure for general
partners to perform. The GP/LP fund structure also provides both investors and
fund managers with preferential tax treatment. Most of the fund profits are
treated as pass-through capital gains, and are not taxed at the fund level, but
rather at the partner level. For general partners, this structure allows them to
benefit from any tax-exempt status that some investors, especially institutional
investors such as university endowments or pension funds, may enjoy (Lerner
and Leamon 2008). For the limited partners, these profits are treated as capital
gains rather than income, which in many countries, including the United States,
are taxed at lower rates than normal income28.
The GP/LP structure has historically worked well for private equity funds by
providing adequate protection for investors, performance incentives and
decision making autonomy for fund managers. However, this structure is not
available in many developing countries, including China and other Asian
countries, where private equity funds are often structured as corporations
(Lerner and Leamon 2008). In Egypt, the situation is similar, where the GP/LP
structure is not available. Some private equity firms chose to incorporate as an
Egyptian joint stock company (SAE); some chose to incorporate as an offshore
limited partnership; while others chose hybrid strategies. In the next section we
will review a number of case examples for each of these models.
The second issue is how this structure varies across different countries, and what
the implications of these variations may be. LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998)
demonstrate that the differences in legal origins between common law and civil
law countries influence investor behavior. They find that common law countries
provide better investor protections than civil law countries, and hence facilitate
financial development. Lerner and Schoar (2004) and Kaplan, Martel and
Str6mberg (2003) examine private equity contracts and transaction structure
empirically and similarly find that common law countries provide better investor
protections. By analyzing the transaction structure in 210 private equity
28 The preferential tax status for private equity general partners has been very controversial in the
US and UK over the past few years, where several private equity fund managers booked
significant profits from private equity transactions and were taxed as capital gains rather than
income, which reduced their tax liabilities significantly.
transactions in developing countries, Lerner and Schoar (2004) find that
variations in legal origin, judiciary efficiency and rule of law among the sample
countries influence the transaction structure, with private equity firms adapting
their contract structure to the local environment.
In Egypt, the legal system is mostly based on French civil law tradition, with
some local adaptation. Legal structures such as limited partnerships, which allow
for the GP/LP model, are not available, and laws are typically very prescriptive
and do not afford the contracting parties the flexibility to design the nature of
their relationship as common law countries do. Additionally, the judiciary
process is often cumbersome and lengthy. All these factors influence private
equity firms' incorporation and domicile decisions. In the next section, we review
a number of case examples and examine the decisions of private equity firms
operating in Egypt.
4.3.2 Case Examples of Private Equity Firms Operating in Egypt
Among the private equity firms operating in Egypt, several chose to incorporate
their funds locally, including IT Investments, as well as El Mansour and El
Maghraby Investment and Development Company (MMID). A second group of
private equity funds operating in Egypt chose to incorporate offshore, including
Concord, Actis, and Haykala. A third group of private equity firms operating in
Egypt chose a mixed domicile strategy, where some of their funds are
incorporated locally, and others are incorporated offshore; Citadel Capital is one
such firm.
IT Investments is incorporated in Egypt as a closed-end29 joint stock direct
investment company, with an authorized capital of LE 500 million and issued
and subscribed capital of LE 375 million (equivalent to $110 million at the closing
date in mid 1999). The company is privately held, with investors including local
Egyptian banks and institutional investors, Arab institutional investors, Arab
individual and family investors, and the fund management. These investors
include a number of local banks such as National Bank of Egypt, Al-Wattany
Bank of Egypt, and Misr Iran Development Bank; Egyptian institutional
investors such as Al-Ahram Investment Company, Banque Misr Investment
Account II, Egypt Investment Company, and the Egyptian Growth Investment
Company; Arab institutional investors such as The Arab Fund for Economic &
Social Development, and Kuwait Financial Center; Arab individual and family
investors such as Solid Investments Holding (a Lebanese holding company
owned by the Safadi group, a Lebanese family conglomerate), Choice Limited (a
Cayman Islands registered holding company owned by Saudi investors), or
Sheikh Mohamed Khalifa El-Seweidy from the United Arab Emirates; as well as
individual investors and the fund managers, including Dr. Hisham El-Sherif, the
founder and Chairman of IT Investments and Dr. Basel Hussein Roushdy, the
Chief Investment Officer of IT Investments (IT Investments 2009).
In this structure, IT Investments, as a holding company, owns a stake (minority
or majority) in its portfolio companies. One of the main differences between the
holding company structure and the limited partnership is that in the case of the
holding company, investors are not able to impose a specific duration after
29 A closed-end fund is a collective investment scheme with a fixed number of shares that are
offered during an initial subscription period. Unlike open-end mutual funds, closed-end funds
do not stand ready to issue and redeem shares on a continuous basis (Wikipedia 2009).
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which the fund will be dissolved (Lerner and Leamon 2008). The limited and pre-
specified fund duration (typically 7-10 years) introduces discipline and
accountability on the fund managers, who have to exit the investments, book the
results, and return to their investors for any additional requests for funds. In
absence of this discipline, fund managers can delay the liquidation of their
investments for a long period of time. In the case of IT Investments, most of the
transactions were conducted in the period between 1999 and 2001, and most of
these companies are still in the fund's portfolio.
El Mansour and El Maghraby Investment and Development Company (MMID)
is a second example of a private equity firm incorporated in Egypt. MMID was
established in 1996 as an Egyptian joint stock company (SAE) and is primarily
owned by two family conglomerates: Mansour Group, which owns around 60%
of the company, and the El-Maghraby Group. Mansour Group is an Egyptian
family conglomerate that operates in the automotive, manufacturing, retail
distribution and food services sectors. The company is an agent for a number of
international brands including General Motors, Chevrolet, Caterpillar, Phillip
Morris, and McDonalds, as well as the local supermarket chain Metro and other
businesses. The company is privately held and has an annual turnover exceeding
$1 billion (Mansour Group 2009). El-Maghraby Group is a privately-held Saudi
Arabian/ Egyptian family conglomerate with investments in medical care,
tourism, and agriculture (Mansour Group 2009). MMID's Board of Directors
includes seven members from both families. The company is also listed in the
Egyptian Stock Exchange; however, it has limited trading and liquidity in the
exchange. MMID acts as the private equity investment arm for the two family
conglomerates and owns a diverse investment portfolio, including private equity,
venture capital as well as stock market investment.
In this case, where the private equity fund has a concentrated ownership of a
small number of investors (the two family conglomerates), the agency problem is
limited, and the need for a GP/LP structure or other investor protection is not
required. However, for minority investors (such as those who bought the portion
of the company that is floated in the stock exchange), these minority shareholder
guarantees become crucial to protect them from non-arms-length transactions
(Morck and Yeung 2002).
A second group of private equity funds operating in Egypt chose to incorporate
their funds offshore, including Haykala, EFG-Hermes, Concord, and Actis.
Haykala Investment Managers is an Egyptian private equity firm founded in
2005 by the Commercial International Bank (CIB) and three members of
Haykala's management team. CIB is the largest shareholder in the private equity
firm, with a 40% stake; the remaining 60% is owned by high-net-worth
individuals, institutional investors and the Haykala management team. Among
the firm's lead investors are Mr. Samih Sawiris, who manages the real estate and
hotel business of Orascom, the largest Egyptian family conglomerate; and Al-
Futtaim Capital, one of the largest UAE family businesses. Haykala is managed
by a team of professionals with substantial experience in private equity, banking,
corporate finance, as well as oil and gas (Haykala 2009, CIB 2009).
In 2006, Haykala launched their first fund, Middle East Turnaround Investments
Limited, which is incorporated as an offshore company in the British Virgin
Islands (BVI). The fund, which is focused on turnaround of distressed assets,
successfully raised $60 million. During 2006 and 2007, the fund acquired five
investments, including two companies in the food and beverage industry (Enjoy
and Honeywell), two companies in the steel sector (SOLS and SOMICO), and one
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company in the oil field services sector (Premiere Casing Services). In 2008,
Haykala did not make any new investments, and focused on managing and
supporting the growth of its portfolio companies and preparing some of their
portfolio companies for possible divestment and exit (Haykala 2009, CIB 2009,
Haykala interview).
A second example of private equity firms operating in Egypt with offshore funds
is EFG-Hermes, which launched a number of private equity funds over the past
12 years, all incorporated offshore in the Cayman Islands. The first fund, Horus I,
was incorporated in 1997 with a committed capital of $54 million. The fund has
been fully invested in 19 companies, almost all of which have been exited, with
an aggregate IRR of 16% in US Dollars and 26% in Egyptian Pounds30 . The
second fund is Horus II, which was the largest general buyout fund focused on
Egypt at the time of closing in 2005. The $155 million fund is fully invested in six
companies and has already conducted two successful exits that have generated
an IRR of 82% in US Dollars. The third fund, Horus Food & Agribusiness fund,
was established in 2006 as the first private equity vehicle in Egypt focused on
food and agribusiness. The $46 million fund is managed by EFG-Hermes Private
Equity, in partnership with Rabo Bank, the biggest agricultural bank worldwide.
To date, the fund has invested 57% of its committed capital in four companies
and exited one of them at an IRR of 33% In US Dollars. The fourth EFG-Hermes
fund, Horus III, was launched in late 2007, and successfully raised $555 million
within two months of fund raising. The fund has expanded its scope from Egypt
to the whole MENA region, where it has made eight investments to date using
30 The difference between the fund IRR in Egyptian Pounds and US Dollars is due to the
devaluation of the Egyptian currency that took place during the fund life span. This is a specific
example of how international investors in emerging markets are exposed to currency risks.
45% of its committed capital and with a broad sector diversification (EFG-
Hermes 2009).
A third example of a private equity firm operating in Egypt but incorporated
offshore is Concord International Investments Group. Concord Group was
founded in 1988 and is based in New York, with offices in Cairo and Tokyo. The
company is registered with the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as an investment management company. Concord is one of
the largest fund managers of Egyptian securities in the world, with more than
$2.3 billion under management, half of which is invested in Egyptian equities.
Concord set up its first private equity fund, the Egyptian Direct Investment Fund,
in 2001. The $34 million fund is fully invested and has acquired controlling or
significant minority interests in a number of Egyptian companies in the
healthcare, financial leasing, food, and tourism sectors. In 2006, Concord
launched its second private equity fund, Coral Growth Investments Limited. The
$110 million is currently in the investment phase. Both are closed-ended funds
domiciled offshore in the Channel Islands Stock Exchange.
While the three private equity firms, EFG-Hermes, Haykala and Concord, chose
to domicile their funds offshore, they made different choices for the location of
the private equity firm (the management firm). In the case of Concord, it is
incorporated in the US and based in New York; in the case of EFG-Hermes and
Haykala, they are incorporated in Egypt. The fund domicile decision is based on
the interests of the investors, and their desire for legal flexibility, investor
protections and tax privileges. In contrast, the private equity firm domicile
decision is based on the management team's preference and where the founders
are located.
A third group of private equity firms operating in Egypt chose a mixed strategy,
where some of their funds are incorporated locally, and others are incorporated
offshore. Citadel Capital is the most prominent example. Citadel Capital is the
largest private equity firm in Egypt and among the largest in the region. Citadel
Capital was created in 2004 by two seasoned investment bankers with previous
private equity experience in Egypt and has since grown exponentially. As of mid
2008, the company managed $2.5 billion of committed capital, and managed 19
"opportunity-specific funds, controlling investments of more than $8.3 billion"
(Citadel Capital 2008a). Citadel Capital is incorporated in Egypt as a joint stock
company (SAE) and is primarily owned by its founders and partners. Under
Citadel Capital, a number of holding companies were created to invest in
different sectors, which Citadel calls "opportunity-specific platform companies."
Each of these platform companies has a specific investment strategy and acts in a
way similar to the traditional private equity funds. Each of these platform
companies is a result of a specific acquisition or green field investment that
Citadel Capital identifies on a "deal-by-deal" basis. Citadel Capital typically
seeds these companies with a minimum of 10% of their capital, and then seeks
funding from other investors to complete the target capital required for the
specific platform company. For each of these opportunities, Citadel Capital seeks
funding from a proprietary network of high-net worth investors in Egypt and the
Arab Gulf region, many of whom have participated in previous Citadel
transactions. From a legal perspective, a platform company is a holding company
that acts as a special purpose vehicle (SPV)31 that receives equity from Citadel
31 A special purpose vehicle (SPV) is legal entity created solely to fulfill a specific, narrow, and
often temporary objective or function, such as the facilitation of a transaction or the creation of a
financial instrument. SPV's are usually created as a limited partnership or limited company, and
Capital and other financial investors, and receives debt from banks or other
investors, and then conducts the acquisition of one or more companies. One such
example is the Regional Investment Holding, a platform company SPV created
by Citadel Capital to invest in Nile River transport. The company is 10% owned
by Citadel Capital and 90% owned by financial investors. The company created
and capitalized several subsidiaries to build and manage a fleet of river barges,
river ports, and other logistics services (Citadel Capital 2008a, 2008b).
This structure is created to simulate some of the features of the typical GP/LP
arrangement, such as the management fee and carried interest. It also provides
investors with sufficient protection, as they maintain direct ownership of the
platform companies and can influence its course if they so desire. However,
unlike the GP/LP model, this arrangement does not have a limited duration for
the fund. This arrangement is also not attractive for institutional investors from
the United States and other developed countries who would rather not be direct
owners in the platform companies due to the regulatory and tax limitations that
they operate under.
Another major difference between Citadel's model and the typical fund structure
is in the timing of the fundraising. In a typical fund structure, the capital is raised
before the investment opportunity is identified. Investors commit their
participation, and later, when the specific investments are identified, the fund
draws down the required capital from the investors. In the case of Citadel
Capital, they engage in fund raising after the specific investment opportunity has
often incorporated in offshore destinations. SPV's are typically used by individuals or companies
to isolate themselves from financial or third-party risks (Wikipedia 2009).
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been identified. This model provides the investors with more control over their
participation in each investment. However, it also provides them with a limited
period of time to make their investment decision, which has been a significant
issue for institutional investors with a longer decision making process.
To respond to these limitations, and enable institutional investors from the US,
UK and other developed markets to participate in Citadel's investments, the firm
decided to create a traditional private equity fund. The fund, called the Citadel
Capital Joint Investment Fund L.P., was created in mid 2008 to raise $500 million,
primarily from Western institutional investors, with $5 million minimum
commitment for limited partners. The fund is incorporated in the Cayman
Islands as a limited partnership, with Citadel Capital acting as the general
partner. The fund has a limited term of seven years from the final closing date,
and may be extended for two additional years. The fund would invest in each
and every platform company that Citadel Capital creates in a pre-specified
participation ratio. The fund has a management fee of 1% of the capital under
management, and a profit sharing (carried interest) of 20% as long as the fund
meets a 12% threshold; an additional 1% management fee is charged to the
platform company (Citadel Capital 2008b).
By using this hybrid model, Citadel Capital is able to mobilize funds from two
different types of investors. The first group is the high-net-worth individuals in
Egypt and the Arab Gulf countries who are able to make fast decisions on a
transaction by transaction basis, and are able to participate as direct owners in
the platform companies. The second group is large institutional investors,
primarily from the United States and United Kingdom, who require the legal
GP/LP structure for legal, governance and tax reasons to be able to participate,
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and who would also need a longer period to make investment decisions. The
evolution of the legal and governance arrangement also signals the rapid growth
of Citadel Capital as a private equity company that is evolving from a small
domestic or regional player to a global private equity firm that is able to attract
capital from different sources.
4.3.3 Raising Capital
Whether in developed countries or emerging markets, the sources of capital for
private equity are similar: either institutional investors such as pension funds,
investment funds, sovereign wealth funds; or high-net-worth individuals and
family offices. In both cases, these sources may be domestic or foreign (Gurung
and Lerner 2008). Additionally, banks and governments may also participate in
financing private equity funds in some situations. However, the distribution of
these sources varies from country to country, and between developed countries
and emerging markets. The key to understanding the dynamics of raising capital
in emerging markets private equity is understanding why each of these sources
of capital decide to invest in emerging markets private equity rather than other
traditional investment vehicles, such as the US stock market or domestic stock
markets.
From an investor perspective, the first question is why invest in an emerging
market rather than a developed market. There are two complementary
explanations around this growing trend (Lerner and Leamon 2008). First,
emerging markets are becoming much more attractive to investments due to
higher growth rates, growing populations, economic and institutional reforms
and privatization, and loosening of restrictions on foreign investments. At the
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same time, developed markets are becoming less attractive for investments due
to slow growth rates, unfavorable demographics, and higher valuations. While
China and India have been on the forefront of this growing trend, Egypt has
emerged as one of the leading markets in the Middle East and North Africa
region for the same reasons mentioned above. The country has the largest
population in the region, high economic growth rates, and has implemented an
impressive package of economic reforms over the past years. These reforms have
removed obstacles to doing business, improved investor protections, and created
more opportunities for private sector investments.
In terms of the breakdown of capital invested in private equity funds operating
in Egypt, anecdotal information from interviews shows that the majority of the
capital comes from local and regional sources (Arab GCC countries), be it
institutional or family/ individual sources. For example, one of the funds was
created as a private equity investment arm for two wealthy families in Egypt and
Saudi Arabia; another fund specializing in large transactions mentioned that they
primarily raise capital through a proprietary network of 150 high-net-worth
individuals and institutional investors in the Gulf region and Egypt; several
private equity firms opened satellite offices in Dubai or Saudi Arabia, with an
emphasis on fund raising, e.g., Beltone Capital and EFG-Hermes. All private
equity firms interviewed mentioned this as a primary source of capital for their
funds. The obvious reason for the increase in GCC investments in Egypt as well
as other countries in the region is the increase of oil revenues over the past five
years. Unlike previous oil revenue surges during the eighties and nineties, where
most of the oil windfalls were invested in the United States and other developed
markets, this time more of these surpluses are staying in the region or moving to
other emerging markets in Asia. This is primarily due to the perception of
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"political risks" among Arab investors in the aftermath of 9/11 - an issue that
became more evident after the 2006 "Dubai Ports World" episode.
A second source of funding for several private equity firms operating in Egypt is
domestic banks. For example, Haykala Investment Managers was created in
partnership with the Commercial International Bank, the largest non-
government owned bank operating in Egypt; and IT Investments received capital
from three local banks, including the National Bank of Egypt, which is the largest
government-owned bank in Egypt.
A third source of funding for some private equity firms is government. For the
past five decades, governments in the United States and Europe have been
heavily involved in the financing of early-stage companies, particularly in high-
technology areas. For example, the United States government provided more
than $3 billion to emerging firms through the Small Business Investment
Company (SBIC) program between 1958 and 1969 - more than three times the
total private venture capital investments during the same period; and $900
million in 1995 through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program.
Similar programs in Germany accounted for more than 50% of their investments
in high-technology firms (Lerner 1997). Lerner (1997) finds that companies that
received SBIR funding grew significantly faster than a comparable set of firms
did over a period of ten years. Many emerging countries are following a similar
path to provide finance to private enterprise, especially in areas of small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) and technology-intensive companies (IMC 2007).
Several private equity firms in the US and UK were created by their respective
governments as a way to provide financing for small and medium enterprises,
and many similar programs continue to date. For example, Actis, one of the
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funds operating in Egypt, is 40% owned by the United Kingdom government,
with the objective of investing in former British colonies. Similarly, the
Technology Development Fund was created by the Government of Egyptian,
represented by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, in
partnership with EFG-Hermes, a private equity firm, and Ideavelopers, a venture
capital incubator (Ideavelopers 2009, MCIT 2009), with the purpose of
supporting the growth of the technology sector in Egypt.
While there are examples of banks32 and government funding private equity
activities, the case examples reviewed and our interviews with private equity
firms indicate that their participation remains limited compared to other sources
of capital.
One category of private equity funding that is conspicuously limited is large US-
and EU-based institutional investors, who typically constitute the largest source
of finance for private equity. While these investors are present through some of
the global private equity firms such as Actis or the Carlyle Group, their
participation in local or regional funds remains limited. This may be attributed to
four factors. First, global private equity firms rank the Middle East region at the
bottom of emerging markets in terms of perceived attractiveness for investments,
especially compared to other Asian countries (EMPEA 2009); second, many of
the countries in the region have high political risk, and hence investors demand a
high risk premium; third, many of the funds are not structured, legally or
32 By bank participation in private equity financing we mean equity financing. Banks do
participate in providing debt financing for leveraged buyouts, and in that role they heavily
participate in financing private equity activities in Egypt. In fact, there is anecdotal evidence that
banks are more open to provide debt financing to private equity transactions than they are to
industry investors.
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organizationally, in a way that is attractive to Western institutional investors;
and fourth, local private equity firms are relatively new and have not established
a solid track record yet. However, as the local and regional private equity firms
grow and mature in their operations they are starting to target and increasingly
attract this type of capital. For example, the two largest Egyptian firms initiated
this process in 2008. Citadel Capital launched its Joint Investment Fund, a $500
million fund structured as a limited partnership (GP/LP) and domiciled in the
Cayman Islands. The fund is primarily targeted towards Western institutional
investors. Similarly, EFG-Hermes launched Horus III fund, a $555 million fund
that is also structured as a limited partnership and domiciled in the Cayman
Islands. It is likely that more of these funds will be created in the future, as the
local and regional private equity firms establish their track record.
4.4 Stage 2: Investing
Once the private equity fund is established, the next step is to invest. To
understand the investment stage, we examine three key questions. First: what do
the private equity firms invest in, both in terms of the types of investments and
sectors? Second: what is their investment process? How do they identify and
source their potential investments? How do they perform the due diligence
process? Third: how do they structure and price these transactions33 ? In this
section, we examine the current practices in Egypt, and compare them to other
practices in developed countries as well as other emerging markets.
33 Transaction structure and pricing are key part of the investment process; however, our
interviews did not gather transaction level data, so we do not cover this stage of the private
equity cycle.
106
---- --- 
4.4.1 Types of Investments
In developed markets, private equity investments typically fall into three
category types: venture capital, growth capital, and buyouts. Venture capital
focuses on investing in early stage high risk businesses with innovative
technologies or new business models that have not been proven yet. Growth
capital focuses on companies in need of significant capital injections to support
investment in new plant and equipment or other capital intensive operations.
Buyouts focus on acquiring a controlling stake in distressed companies with the
goal of turning them around through financial, management and operational
restructuring.
In developing countries, the types of investment undertaken are different. Lerner
and Leamon (2008) identify five areas where private equity firms in emerging
markets are active: privatization, corporate restructuring, growth equity,
strategic alliances and infrastructure funds. Privatization involves acquiring and
restructuring recently privatized state-owned enterprises, which are often in
need of significant investments and management restructuring. Corporate
restructuring focuses on management and operational improvements, or on
consolidating smaller companies to create larger entities. Growth equity focuses
on companies with limited access to finance through the banking system, and in
need of capital to grow their domestic or regional operations. Strategic alliances
involve situations where multinational corporations have made acquisitions,
joint ventures, or alliances in emerging markets, with limited knowledge of the
local business environment. These corporations have sometimes welcomed
partnerships with private equity firms that can provide local knowledge as well
as monitoring for their local partnerships. Infrastructure funds focus on large
capital intensive infrastructure projects in emerging countries, where
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governments have created private sector financing schemes such as Build-Own-
Transfer (BOT) (Lerner and Leamon 2008).
Our review of private equity transactions in Egypt showed the types of private
equity investments to primarily fall under the categories of privatization, growth
capital, turnarounds and consolidations. However, there were also occurrences
of other types of investments not mentioned in the literature, such as family
businesses or green field investments. In the rest of this section, we will review
examples in each of these areas.
Privatization: In the 1990s and early 2000's, the Government of Egypt
implemented a large-scale privatization program where the state withdrew from
most sectors identified as non-strategic (Canara 2002, Abdel-Shahid 2002). The
first phase of this program took place between 1994 and 1999, where state owned
enterprises were organized into 27 sector/industry-specific holding companies.
The program aimed at privatizing 314 state owned companies with approximate
assets of LE 104 billion and more than one million employees, while excluding 85
companies from this phase of the privatization program (Carana 2002). As of mid
2002, 190 of the 314 state-owned enterprises were successfully privatized through
various means. Of these, 54 companies were sold through initial public offerings
and 28 were sold to anchor investors. After a period of economic slowdown, the
privatization program picked up again in 2004, with an expanded scope to
include industries such as insurance, banking and telecommunication. Between
2002 and mid 2007, an additional 120 state owned enterprises were privatized
(Egyptian Ministry of Investments 2007).
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Within the private equity transactions conducted in the past five years, few were
recently-privatized companies. The most prominent recent example is the
acquisition of the Egyptian Fertilizers Company by Citadel Capital in 200534. In
interviews with private equity fund managers, most highlighted that they shy
away from privatization transactions. Since its inception in 1994, the
privatization program in Egypt has attracted strong political and public
opposition, and many transactions have become lightning rods for political
battles, especially around two key issues: valuation and labor. Valuation of state
owned enterprises in privatization transactions has attracted a lot of criticism,
especially in transactions where privatized companies were sold to an anchor
investor rather than through IPOs. Opponents of the program claimed that SOE's
were under-valued and that the transactions were fraught with corruption. Many
of these criticisms were justified, especially during the early years of the program
where the privatization process was opaque and fraught with conflict of interest
among the different parties involved. However, in the second wave of
privatization that started in 2002/03, many of the companies offered for
privatization were overvalued and did not provide an attractive opportunity for
private equity firms. The second contentious issue is labor. Many of the state-
owned enterprises had a bloated and under-trained labor force that was also
heavily unionized and politically vocal, especially in the spinning, weaving and
textiles industry. Despite their losses, the government continued to subsidize
them for years to avoid political confrontations. One of the fund managers
specializing in turnarounds specifically mentioned that "we stay away from
socially and politically sensitive sectors or companies such as large textile and
34 This case is discussed in depth in Chapter 5.
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weaving companies" (Interview). We have not identified any cases of private
equity investments in such companies.
On the other hand, the privatized companies that were of interest for private
equity are those in capital intensive areas, such as cement or fertilizers, e.g., the
Egyptian Fertilizers Company. In these industries, labor is limited and the
private equity strategy is more focused on growth. Most of these companies were
profitable, but required significant capital injection to invest in additional plant
and equipment. Private equity firms quickly restructured the company's balance
sheet, injected additional capital, signed agreements to build additional
production facilities and to increase their capacity, and strengthened
management and financial controls. Through these actions, the value of the
company increased significantly, and they were able to exit the transactions with
significant profits.
Family businesses: A large number of private equity transactions in Egypt
included family businesses in a variety of situations. In some transactions,
private equity firms provided growth capital and acquired only a minority stake
in the company. Examples include Actis, a private equity firm investing in
Mo'men, a retail food chain35 in 2008; and Triodos Bank and GLS Bank, investing
in SEKEM, a bio-pharmaceutical and organic food producer. In these situations,
the family owners continue to maintain control of their business and use the
capital to implement their growth plans.
35 The Mo'men case is reviewed in detail in Chapter 6.
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In other transactions, private equity firms acquired a controlling stake in the
family business. For example, Citadel Capital acquired Rashidi-El-Mizan, a
confectionary food producer, to consolidate it with other food producers into
Gozour3 6, a platform company for food and agri-businesses. Similarly, Haykala
Investment Managers' acquired a controlling stake in the Sixth of October Light
Sections Company (SOLS), which was established in 1988 by the Faltas family, to
consolidate it with another similar company 37. In these situations, the family was
usually seeking to exit the business, and the private equity firm provided a
suitable exit. Private equity funds represent a good buyer for family businesses
because they are experienced in the process of professionalizing the management
and creating a board governance structure that enables this business to be later
sold through an IPO or another trade sale.
Growth capital: Limited access to finance is recognized as an obstacle for the
growth of small and medium domestic companies in most developing countries.
Egypt is no exception. For example, only 21% of the Egyptian companies have
access to long-term bank credit compared to 79% that do not have access. Among
the former, larger firms are more likely to have access (41.5%), compared to
medium size (19.1%) and smaller (13.7%) firms38 . In absence of long-term bank
credit, most companies resort to personal savings of the founders or retained
earnings to finance their growth. This type of organic growth limits the potential
for these companies. Most of these limitations are not due to lack of capital, as
most of the national banks are dealing with extra liquidity. However, it is
36 The Gozour case is reviewed in detail in Chapter 5.
37 The SOLS case is reviewed in detail in Chapter 5.
38 Based on our analysis of a 2003 World Bank survey of a random sample of 1,000 Egyptian
companies.
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primarily due to bureaucratic lending procedures and regulations that increase
the risks of bank loans (World Bank Egypt ICA report 2004). Specifically, there
are no bankruptcy laws in Egypt that provide the business owner(s) with limited
liability. In most situations, business owners need to provide personal collateral
for any bank loans, and they are held personally liable for these loans, with the
threat of criminal litigation in the case of default. Similarly, bank loan officers are
often held personally liable for the performance of their loan portfolios, with a
number of high profile litigation cases. These two factors have significantly
contributed to the narrowing of long-term credit markets in Egypt. In such a
market, private equity becomes a possible alternative source of growth capital in
some situations.
Many of the private equity transactions reviewed in Egypt were cases of growth
capital. Examples include the acquisition of a controlling stake in Al-Borg
medical laboratory by Abraaj Capital with the objective of growing its operations
to other countries in the MENA region; the acquisition of a minority stake by
Actis in Mo'men, a food retail chain39 with the objective of expanding its
vertically integrated supply chain and growing its geographic footprint; and the
acquisition of Contact Car Company by Amwal Al-Khaleej fund, with the goal of
expanding their car financing business to include used cars and insurance. In
Chapter 5, we analyze a number of growth capital transactions in detail.
Turnaround: Acquiring and turning around distressed companies through
leveraged buyout transactions is the traditional business model for private equity
in developed economies. While most turnaround transactions in developed
39 Both transactions are reviewed in detail in Chapter 5.
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countries focus on downsizing by aggressively cutting cost and reducing labor,
the nature of turnaround in private equity transactions in emerging markets is
different. These turnarounds are more focused on changing or strengthening
management, instituting governance processes, implementing financial and
accounting controls, and changing the capital structure of the company.
The most prominent private equity turnaround case implemented in Egypt is for
ASEC, a company that was acquired by Citadel Capital in 2005. In 2005, Haykala
Investment Managers launched the first private equity fund focusing on
turnarounds in Egypt, with $60 million in capital. During its first two years the
fund made five acquisitions. Both cases are reviewed in detail in Chapter 5.
These examples highlight the different nature of turnaround transactions in
emerging markets, where the funds are more focused on changing or
strengthening management, instituting governance processes, implementing
financial and accounting controls, and changing the capital structure of the
company. In chapter 5, we review additional case examples where private equity
helped "professionalize" the operations of their portfolio companies.
Consolidation: Many industries in Egypt are highly fragmented, with a large
number of small and medium companies and no large players; agri-industries
and retail distribution are two examples.
In Egypt, many of the private equity transactions were consolidations of several
small companies into a larger, more competitive entity. For example, Citadel
Capital's Gozour was created as a platform company for consolidating several
food producers, and has successfully acquired several family businesses.
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Another example is Haykala Investment Managers' acquisition of two steel
manufacturers, SOLS and SOMICO. Haykala further injected capital into the
consolidated company to expand its production capacity and to create a larger
entity with more economies of scale. A third example is Citadel Capital's
platform company, GlassWork, which was created to acquire and expand glass
manufacturers in Egypt. In Chapter 5, we review several consolidation
transactions in detail, demonstrating how consolidation is one of the most
effective private equity value creation strategies in emerging markets.
Startups: The role of private equity in initiating new companies often takes place
under the banner of venture capital, which invests in high-risk new businesses,
based on innovative technologies or business models. However, private equity in
emerging markets has shown two other unique models for initiating new
companies. The first is in capital intensive green field investments, and the
second is in joint ventures with other companies.
In Egypt, there are several case examples of the three models: venture capital,
green field investments and joint ventures. For example, two venture capital
funds supported more than 30 new startups. Most of these startups are focused
on building technology services companies, such as IT offshoring services,
software engineering and Internet portals. In doing so, they are introducing
mature technologies and business models from developed markets to the local
and regional market, rather than inventing new technologies or business models.
Capital intensive green field investments include several oil and gas,
transportation and infrastructure companies created by Citadel Capital. Joint
ventures include the joint venture between Orascom Hotels Holding and Rotana
Hotel Management Corporation in 2008 to create a new business-focused hotel
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chain in Egypt. In Chapter 5, we examine each of these three models and review
several case examples in detail.
4.4.2 Investments Demographics: Sectors and Company Size
The second piece to answering the question "What do private equity firms invest in ?"
is examining the industry focus and the company size distribution of their
investments. Table 4.2 highlights the distribution of private equity transactions in
Egypt during the five year period between mid-2003 to mid-2008 by industry.
Table 4.3 shows the average transaction size in sectors with more than three
transactions. Table 4.4 lists all the private equity transactions executed in Egypt
over the past six years, by industry and by year.
The biggest industry by far in terms of number of transactions is
telecommunications and information technology; however, most of these
transactions are venture capital investments in startups or small companies.
There are no large transactions in the telecommunications sector because the
number of players is limited and the sector is highly regulated. Most of the
companies in these investments are service-oriented IT companies, with limited
need for large capital.
The next sector in terms of the number of transactions is basic materials, which
includes cement, fertilizers, steel and other heavy industries. This sector also has
the largest average transaction size by far - more than $1 billion per transaction
on average. These transactions include the acquisition, turnaround and sale of
ASEC Cement Holding and the Egyptian Fertilizers Company, both transactions
executed by Citadel Capital, and considered the largest in the MENA region.
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The third sector in terms of the number of transactions and average transaction
size is financial services, which includes several large banking acquisitions and
consolidation transactions, with an average transaction size of more than $350
million. The next two sectors are oil and gas, and pharmaceuticals and healthcare
- both in terms of number of transactions and transaction size. This distribution
of transactions shows that the majority of the private equity money is geared
towards capital intensive sectors, namely: basic materials, financial services, oil
and gas, and healthcare and pharmaceuticals. All of these sectors are highly
regulated with high barriers to entry. In many of these transactions, private
equity firms acquire companies that have operating licenses in these regulated
areas and invest in expanding their capacity and scope of operations.
Many of these transactions are also driven by global or local regulatory changes.
For example, the cement industry in the southern Mediterranean countries grew
tremendously over the past five years because of the increased demand from
Europe. As the European Union tightened its environmental regulatory regimes,
many of the polluting industries immigrated to its southern neighbors, especially
Egypt, Algeria and Syria - a movement that benefits from "pollution arbitrage."
Some of the European cement companies, such as Italicimenti, made acquisitions
of cement companies in Egypt, where they acquired Suez Cement, which later
acquired ASEC Cement Company from Citadel Capital. Additionally, cement
exports from south to north of the Mediterranean exploded. Similarly, in
financial services transactions, some acquisitions were driven by the Government
of Egypt's push to consolidate the banking sector, especially the small privately-
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owned banks. Some of these consolidations, such as Credit Agricole's acquisition
of several small banks in Egypt, were facilitated by private equity firms40 .
40 The Credit Agricole case is reviewed in detail in Chapter 5.
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Table 4.2 Sector-focus of private equity firms in Egypt, based on actual
transactions (2003-2008)
(Current US$ million)
Sector
Telecoms and IT
Agriculture and Food
Basic Materials
Oil and Gas
Financial Services
Healthcare and Pharmaceutical
Infrastructure and Transport
Travel and Tourism
Consumer Goods
Industrial Manufacturing
Media
Construction
Total
Number of Transactions
Average Transaction
Value
9.5
17.8
1,006.6
44.3
357.2
95.1
n/a
n/a
53.7
37.3
n/a
26.0
215.3
Notes:
Based on completed private equity transactions in
period from mid-2003 to mid-2008
Egypt during the five-year
Sources: The author, based on data from MIT Emergis and Zawya
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Table 4.3 Average transaction value by sector (2003-2008)
(Current US$ million)
Average Transaction Based on
Sector Value (Number of transactions)
Telecoms and IT 9.55 5
Agriculture and Food 17.79 5
Basic Materials 1,006.63 5
Oil and Gas 44.34 7
Financial Services 357.15 5
Healthcare and Pharmaceutical 95.14 5
Consumer Goods 53.67 3
Total 215.3 37
Notes:
Based on completed private equity transactions in Egypt during the five-year
period from mid-2003 to mid-2008; only sectors with 3 or more data points are
listed; total includes all transactions
Sources: The author, based on data from MIT Emergis and Zawya
119
Table 4.4 List of companies receiving private equity investments in Egypt
Number of Transactions
Sector Target Company 1995-03 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Basic Materials ASEC Cement Company 1 1
Egyptian Fertilizers Company 1 2 1 4
National Port Said Steel (NPSS) 1 1
National Printing Company 1 1
Sinai Holding for Marble & Investments 1 1
Six of October for Metallurgical Industries
Company 1 1
Six of October Light Sections Company 1 1
Financial Services Arab Amwal Holding Company 1 1
Commercial International Bank (Egypt) 1 1
Contact Car Trading Company 1 1 2
EFG - Hermes 1 1 2
Egyptian American Bank 1 1
Egyptian Investment Company 1 1
Sudanese-Egyptian Bank 1 1
Healthcare and Pharmaceuticals Amoun Pharmaceuticals Industries Company 2 2
Cairo Medical Tower Laboratory 1 2 3
Minapharm Pharmaceuticals 1 1
Undisclosed Company 1 1
Consumer Goods Amwal Al Arabia Holding Company 2 1 3
Oil and Gas East Mediterranean Gas Company 1 2 1 4
Egyptian Propylene and Polypropylene Company 1 1 2
Egyptian Refining Company 1 1
Greenfield Refinery Company in Greater Cairo 1 1
National Petroleum Company 1 1
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Sector
Industrial Manufacturing
Construction
Telecoms and IT
Number of Transactions
1995-03 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
1 1
1 1
1 1
Target Company
Modem Nile Cotton Company
Premiere Casing Services
Undisclosed Company
Advanced Smart Cards Company (Applications)
Advanced Smart Cards Company (Manufacturer)
Allied
COLTEC
EngNet
IT Worx
OpenCraft
Orascom Telecom Holding
Orascom Telecom WIMAX Limited
OstazOnline
Raya Holding for Technology and Communications
RDI
Smart Wireless Systems
EBCTA
LADIS
CIT Group
Nile Online
Arab Internet Company
Telcomedia
TIBA-CITE Group
PT Trust
El Rowad
E-Knowledge
1
1
1
1
1
1 1 2
1
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
121
1
1 1
Number of Transactions
Sector Target Company 1995-03 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Travel and Tourism Club Ras Soma Hotel Company 1 1
Orascom Hotel Holdings JV 1 1
Soma Bay Hotel Company 1 1
Agriculture and Food Al Nouran Holding 1 1
Egyptian Food Company 1 1
El Rashidi El Mizan Confectionery Factories 1 1
SEKEM Group 1 1
Wadi Holdings Company 1 1
Rashidi El-Mizan 1 1 2
Enjoy 1 1
HoneyWell 1 1
Gozour 1 1
Mo'men (Fast Food Chain) 1 1
Infrastructure and Transport Alexandria International Container Terminals 2 2
Metito Water Treatment 1 1
Sokhna Port Development Company 1 1
National River Transportation Company 1 1
National River Port Management Company 1 1
Media Tanweer (Publishing) 1 1
Total 13 7 17 21 16 14 88
Notes:
2003 figures are for the second half of the year
2008 figures are for the first half of the year
Sources: Compiled by the author from multiple data sources, including MIT Emergis, Zawya, and private equity websites
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Either noticeably absent or scarcely present from private sector transactions are
sectors like textiles, construction, tourism, and retail distribution. The textiles
industry is one that could significantly benefit from private equity both in terms
of capital and restructuring experience. The sector is still one of the largest
employers in Egypt and one where the country used to enjoy a strong
competitive advantage. However, in several interviews, private equity executives
specifically mentioned that they shied away from textiles companies due to labor
and political issues. Most textiles companies are still state-owned enterprises that
the government has struggled to privatize over the past years. First, most of the
physical assets of these companies are depreciated and antiquated because the
government has not invested in them since the sixties. However, if they were
sold for low valuations, the sales would face strong political opposition. Second,
these companies are overstaffed and have strong labor unions. Any potential
acquirer would have to deal with these issues, and would likely face strong labor
opposition in any restructuring process.
Construction is another large sector that has not seen significant private equity
activities. We hypothesize that this is because of the sector structure, which lacks
the medium size companies that could draw private equity investors. The sector
is dominated by a small number of very large state-owned companies that focus
on implementing government infrastructure and utilities projects (e.g., Arab
Contractors - Osman Ahmed Osman; Nasr General Contracting - Hassan Allam).
Beyond these large players, the rest of the construction sector is highly
fragmented, especially in the residential construction area, which is dominated
by a large number of informal contractors.
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The small number of private equity investments in tourism does not match the
sector's importance or high rate of growth. The sector also has a large number of
medium size companies that could present potential acquisition targets. One
possible explanation of this dearth of private equity investment is the high level
of volatility in the sector's performance due to geo-political risks. Despite its
attractiveness as a touristic destination, Egypt's tourism demand is highly
volatile and is influenced by any local or regional event. Still, we believe that
there is high potential for private equity participation in touristic real estate
projects.
Another sector that is visibly absent from private equity transactions is retail - be
it food or clothing. This is likely due to the sector structure. Most of the large
retail chains are state-owned 41 and have attracted political controversies during
several privatization attempts. A small number of international players
attempted to enter the market in Egypt with varying levels of success. The British
chain Sainsbury had a highly visible failure in Egypt in the 1990's; however, the
French chain, Carrefour, has been very successful in its market entry. A number
of local chains have started to emerge over the past ten years and have been
steadily growing; however, the majority of the market is still fragmented and
informal.
These sectors may present potential opportunities for private equity investments
in the near future, especially as more consolidation of small and medium
enterprises takes place.
41 State ownership of retail companies dates back to the 1960's, where most of the local
department store chains were nationalized. Prior to that, these chains were primarily owned by
foreign or local minorities.
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4.4.3 Deal Sourcing and Due Diligence
"Deal sourcing" is the industry term for private equity firms' ability to identify
opportunities for potential investment that satisfy their investment strategy (e.g.,
sector, investment size, value creation strategy) and risk appetite. For each
transaction executed, a private equity firm examines and evaluates a number of
potential transactions. A big part of the success of a private equity firm depends
on its ability to generate a "deal flow" that will lead to profitable transactions. As
the private equity firm examines the incoming opportunities, it conducts
different levels of due diligence, where it assesses the company's financials,
operations, assets, liabilities, management team, legal status, and any other
factors that may influence the value of the company. The ability of the private
equity firm to reach an accurate assessment of these variables as well as any risk
factors is critical to the investment decision and company valuation.
Some private equity opportunities, especially the larger ones, are sourced
through competitive bidding in public tenders, as in the case of The Nile
Company for Food Industries "Enjoy", or the Egyptian Fertilizers Company.
However, the majority of transactions are sourced through private opportunities
that may be available only to one firm. The ability of a private equity firm to
secure such "proprietary deal flow" is a major competitive advantage. Some
analysts argue that local private equity firms enjoy such advantage due to their
local knowledge and networks.
In developed countries, the private equity deal sourcing process depends mostly
on personal and professional networks and contacts. The professional network
includes professional services firms such as accounting firms, law firms and
investment banks. These firms are often well connected and know first when
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their clients are interested in selling their business or are in need of growth
capital. They often connect their clients with private equity firms that they have
existing relationships with. This introduction process is usually based on the
trust between the client; their accountant, lawyer, or banker; and the private
equity firm. On the personal network side, private equity partners often have a
broad professional network that they continuously probe for such opportunities.
While the deal sources remain similar in emerging markets, the importance of
the personal and professional networks are amplified. For example, private
equity firms in Egypt identify personal and professional networks as the most
common source for potential opportunities (Table 4.5), with all ten firms that we
interviewed citing it. Next to that, they mention three different sources of leads:
professional service firms that they work with, which include investment banks,
accounting and law firms; "people knocking on our door;" and their own
internal market research. Professional service firms and "people knocking on our
door" are also part of the private equity firm's network. This highlights the
importance of having deep connections in the business community for this
industry.
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Table 4.5 Deal sourcing: How private equity firms identify potential target
companies
Deal Source PE Firms Citing This Source Number of
Firms
Personal or professional network; fund ACTIS, Beltone, Citadel, EFG-Hermes, 10
shareholders Haykala, IT Investments, MMID, Sphinx,
Concord, Carlyle
Professional services firms (investment banks, Carlyle, Citadel, MMID, Sphinx 4
accounting and law firms)
People approaching the PE firm MMID, Sphinx, Beltone, IT Investment 4
Market research Haykala, Concord, Sphinx, Carlyle 4
Privatization Concord, Citadel Capital 2
Conferences and events IT Investments 1
Sources: The author, based on survey of private equity firms in Egypt
Market research as a source of deals is used in different ways. Sometimes private
equity firms scan publicly-traded companies to identify companies that may be
looking for expansion while lacking capital or facing other obstacles. These
companies are prime targets for private equity to help them in their rapid growth
phase. However, when it comes to identifying family-owned companies, some
private equity firms take unconventional routes. One of the interviewees
mentioned that "sometimes we have someone drive around and look at factories
and see who is in an expansion phase; we go and talk to them, tell them what we
can do to help them and we build our relationship with them. For example, we
met someone in the management of a marble company and only six months later,
we started talking with them about a deal" (Actis interview).
The importance of the personal and professional network becomes clear when
we examine the senior management teams in the private equity firms. An
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analysis of all the founders, partners and managing directors in Egyptian private
equity firms shows that all of them are Egyptian, even in international private
equity firms operating in Egypt. Each firm's senior management team includes a
mix of long-time managers from national banks, along with few who have
worked in multi-national banks either in Egypt or abroad.
For this reason, most international private equity firms actively operating in
Egypt maintains a domestic presence. For example, ACTIS, a UK-based
international private equity firm operating in emerging markets, decided to
change all of their local management team to nationals (ACTIS interview).
Similarly, The Carlyle Group, one of the largest US-based private equity funds,
started its presence in Egypt through a local office, staffed by locals. They also
established similar local offices in Beirut, Istanbul and Dubai as part of a broader
Middle East region strategy (Carlyle interview). Concord Investments, a US-
based private equity firm (although founded by Egyptians) also maintains a local
office, primarily for research and deal identification (Concord interview). In all
these situations, most of the local private equity staff has strong international
experience and education, but they also have the advantage of knowing the
culture and business community. This pattern supports the argument that it is
hard to conduct private equity transactions "remotely," i.e., through remote
offices and brief business trips. International private equity firms that are serious
about doing business in an emerging market need to have a strong local presence
and local staff with knowledge of the country, from a business, legal, political
and cultural perspective. Some examples of secondary buyouts by foreign firms
with no local presence from local firms may support this hypothesis, as firms
with strong local presence are able to identify lucrative opportunities before
firms operating remotely. Abraaj Capital's acquisition of the Egyptian Fertilizers
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Group from Citadel Capital and Cairo Medical Tower Laboratory from Concord
Group are two examples.
The argument for the need for strong local presence is also emphasized through
the due diligence process. During any private equity transaction, there is
informational asymmetry between the company owners, who know all the
details of their business, and the private equity investors, who need to conduct a
detailed due diligence to ensure that they are aware of all the facts about the
business, including all the financial, legal, operational, and managerial details.
However, this informational asymmetry is exacerbated in the cases of non-local
private equity firms. For example, an investment principal in one of the foreign
private equity firms operating in Egypt mentioned that their foreign counterparts
were not able to properly assess the risks: "They probably saw more risks than
they saw opportunities;" and hence, they were reluctant to proceed with any
investments. This limited ability to assess the risk exposure in a private equity
opportunity is detrimental to any firm; if they are too conservative and see too
much risk, they may end up with no transactions, and if they are too aggressive,
they may end up with fatal mistakes.
A second key point on the due diligence process in Egypt relates to the nature of
process. In developed countries, the typical due diligence process is about
confirming the facts, uncovering any missing information, and assessing the risk.
However, in some of the case examples examined in Egypt, the due diligence
process also included a "transformation" component. Many of the private equity
acquisition targets, especially in the case of family businesses, operate in an
informal way, especially with regards to accounting, reporting and taxation; or
maintain a legal structure that is not adequate for private equity investment,
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such as partnerships. For example, in the case of Actis' investment in Mo'men, a
local food retailer, Mo'men had to go through a "total legal restructuring of the
group," where they had to create a new holding company; re-establish some of
the companies that were registered as partnerships; and transfer the ownership
of all the subsidiaries to the new holding company. This transformation had
numerous tax implications that had to be settled (Schurgott 2008).
A third insight that we gained from the interviews is in comparing the due
diligence process between private equity transactions to investments in publicly
traded equity. One of the implicit assumptions in private equity investments is
that there is additional effort that is required to identify and assess the
opportunities, and to conduct due diligence and valuation. This is one of the
justifications behind the high management fees and carried interest that is
charged by the private equity firm; typically a 2% management fee and 20%
carried interest. However, one of the equity fund managers highlighted the fact
that the fees charged by publicly-traded equity funds in the MENA region are
similar. For example, the Beltone MENA Equity Fund charges 1.75%
management fee and 15% performance fee. The justification behind these fees is
that selecting and conducting due diligence for publicly-traded equities in Egypt
requires a level of effort that is close to private equity. The implication of such a
statement is that there is limited transparency with even publicly-traded
companies, to the point that such a high level of due diligence is warranted. An
alternate explanation for these extremely high fees is that the market is still in its
infancy stage and there is limited competition, and that once the number of
funds increase, these fees will decline significantly.
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4.5 Stage 3: Portfolio Management
Once the fund has completed its first investment, it moves into the portfolio
management stage, where the private equity firms manage their portfolio
companies with the objective of increasing their value, and in preparation for
their eventual exit. During this stage, there are two key issues that we examine.
First, what is their "mode of engagement" with their portfolio companies in
terms of governance and management? And secondly, what value creation
strategies do they deploy?
4.5.1 Governance and Management
Private equity firms in developed countries are typically actively engaged with
their portfolio companies, especially in buyouts, turnarounds and venture capital
situations. For example, they appoint board members, change management
teams, alter the capital structure, dispose of assets or business units, merge the
company with other entities, or consolidate operations.
In contrast, in the transactions that we reviewed in Egypt, the level of
engagement of private equity firms with their portfolio companies varied widely,
ranging from being passive investors, to playing supportive roles to the
management, to taking active leading roles.
In earlier private equity transactions (for example, prior to 2004), a large number
were passive investments, where the private equity firm played the role of an
asset manager, similar to investing in publicly-traded equities. In many of these
situations, the role of the private equity firm was selecting investments with a
high success and growth potential, acquiring a stake (often, a minority stake),
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and holding the investment for several years before the exit. Most of the
investments of EFG-Hermes's first fund, Horus I, were of this type. Horus I Fund
was created in 1997 as one of the very first private equity funds investing in
Egypt, with $54 in committed capital. The fund made investments in 19
companies; most of them have exited by now. These investments include a 3%
stake in Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals Company (SIDPEC) in 1997; 5% stake in
NATGAS in 1998, which distributes natural gas to residential industrial and
commercial properties; a 40% stake in SODIC in 2002, a real estate development
company; a 40% stake in Orascom Hotels and Development in 1996; and a 49%
stake in ACE-CIIC, a general insurance company (EGF-Hermes Private Equity
2009). In these transactions, the fund acquired a minority stake in well managed
companies, mostly providing growth capital. The fund appointed members to
the board of directors to monitor the investment, but maintained a passive role in
the company's management.
Most of the private equity transactions conducted in Egypt during these early
stages of industry development were similar in nature. However, since 2004, the
private equity landscape changed, with the creation of a number of new private
equity firms with a more aggressive and hands-on approach. Citadel Capital was
among the first and most visible. The firm started with the vision that there was a
need for more active private equity roles in restructuring distressed companies
and creating new green field companies. Haykala, a private equity firm focusing
on turnaround buyouts, was created in 2005. Other regional players, such as the
Dubai-based Abraaj Capital, also became active in Egypt, with a similar
approach.
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As a result of this changed landscape and a rapid growth in the number of
private equity transactions over the past five years, the level of engagement of
private equity has varied across the spectrum, from passive, to supportive, to
active.
A number of private equity funds continued with passive investments. In most
of these situations, the private equity firm acquires a minority stake in a well
managed company, mostly for growth equity. They appoint board member(s) to
represent them in monitoring the portfolio company performance, but do not
engage in much beyond that. For example, EFG-Hermes acquired a 10% minority
stake in the Watany Bank of Egypt in 2006; 8% in Maridive Oil Services in 2007;
and 14.3% in Sahara North Bahariya in 2008. Additional examples include
MMID's 20% investment in Credit Agricole Egypt4 2; SHUAA Partners'
investment in the joint venture between Orascom Hotels Holding and Rotana
Hotel Management Corporation 43 in 2008 to create a new business-focused hotel
chain in Egypt; and Triodos Bank and GLS Bank's investment in SEKEM in 2007,
a bio-pharmaceutical and organic food producer seeking domestic and regional
growth.
A second mode of engagement is when the private equity firm plays an active
supportive role for the management of their portfolio company. These situations
may be minority or majority investment in a company with strong management
that enjoys the trust and support of the private equity firm. The private equity
firm may strengthen the management team and help them in developing new
42 The Credit Agricole case is reviewed in detail in Chapter 5.
43 The Rotana/Orascom case is reviewed in detail in Chapter 5.
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markets, products or services, but does not engage in active restructuring of the
company. Examples include Actis' investment in a 28% minority stake in
Mo'men, a domestic food retailer, to provide the company with growth capital to
expand its vertically integrated operations and grow regionally (Schurgott 2008,
Actis 2009); and the acquisition of a 79% majority stake in ITWorx by a financial
consortium led by the EuroMena Fund to provide growth capital. In both
situations, the private equity firm had trust in and strong support for the
management team. Their mode of engagement was focused on supporting them
in filling management gaps, especially in financial management and reporting;
opening new regional markets; and professionalizing their operations. In
Chapter 5, we review both cases in detail, honing in how the private equity firm
engaged in "professionalizing" these portfolio companies.
The third mode of engagement is when the private equity firm takes an active
and leading role in restructuring their acquisition, typically in turnaround
situations of distressed assets, consolidations, or initiations of green field
investments. Citadel Capital is one of the active private equity firms that often
assume this role in their investments. For example, in their first acquisition of
ASEC Holding, a financially distressed cement company in 2004, they changed
the management team, restructured the company financially and operationally,
and spun off some of its assets as separate companies. Similarly, they took a
similarly active role in several of their consolidation platform companies, such as
Gozour, where they acquired and consolidated multiple food and agri-
businesses. They also assumed the same active role in initiating several green
field companies to invest in capital intensive industries such as the Nile River
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transportation and port management companies.44 In all of these cases, the
private equity firm appointed the management team, worked with them to set
the business strategy, restructured the company's capital structure, and
instituted governance processes and management incentives.
These three models (passive, supportive and active) show how private equity
firms engage with their portfolio companies. One hypothesis, based on these
three models, is that private equity firms that are more actively engaged with
their portfolio firms are able to realize higher returns. While there is not
sufficient empirical evidence to prove this hypothesis, there are some anecdotal
case examples that may support it. A number of turnaround acquisitions by
Citadel Capital have resulted in superior financial results, specifically the
turnaround case of ASEC Holding, a cement producer, and the Egyptian
Fertilizers Company. On the other hand, a number of passive minority
investments by other funds have not resulted in comparable performance. It is
not clear if these differences are due to the specific level of engagement by the
private equity firm, or due to differences in the competency levels of individual
funds. Future research in the exploration of these differences using a large
empirical data set may be useful.
4.5.2 Value Creation Strategies
One of the key concepts behind private equity transactions is that they take place
over a limited time duration, where the portfolio company is facing an unusual
situation, and where the intercession of the private equity firm would create
44 All of these cases (ASEC, Gozour, and Nile River Transportation and Ports) are reviewed in
detail in Chapter 5.
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significant economic value - value that exceeds "business as usual" and that also
includes significant risks. In each transaction, the private equity firm identifies a
clear "investment rationale," or "investment thesis", i.e., an argument on why
and how the firm will be able to generate significant economic value by entering
into a transaction. For example, many early private equity transactions in
developed countries during the late 1970's and 1980's targeted large
conglomerates that were trading below their net asset value. In these situations,
the investment thesis was that breaking up the conglomerate and selling the
individual business units separately would unlock value quickly (Baker and
Smith 1998).
In emerging markets, investment theses are typically different, and more focused
on growth. Table 4.6 highlights examples of value creation strategies used by
private equity firms in Egypt, as recorded in the interviews conducted. From the
case examples reviewed in Egypt and interviews with private equity firms, we
identified a number of common investment theses that private equity firms
identified as their value creation strategies, including initiating, consolidating,
professionalizing, growing and globalizing companies. For example, in creating a
new consolidation platform company for food and agri-business, Citadel Capital
cites their investment rationale as the following: "Industry fragmentation across
MENA and a lack of large scale investments have opened up multiple
opportunities in the foods sector" (Citadel Capital 2008a). In Chapter 5, we
develop each of these value creation strategies in detail, including detailed cases
of private equity transactions in each strategy.
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Table 4.6 Examples of value-creation strategies used by private equity firms
Private Equity Firm
Actis
Beltone
Carlyle
Citadel Capital
Concord
EFG-Hermes
Sphinx/ GrandView
Haykala
IT investment
MMID
Examples of Value Creation Strategies Utilized
Corporate governance; board empowerment; financial and
managerial restructuring
Management empowerment and financial restructuring;
growth
Growth; expansion of expertise; financial restructuring;
corporate governance
Turnarounds; consolidations; green field; financial
engineering; growth capital
Management change; new investments; marketing for
growth
Management change; financial engineering; Greenfield
Board involvement; corporate governance; financial
restructuring; growth; regional expansion; consolidation
Financial restructuring; new investments; operational
turnarounds; management change; growth
Involvement in management; growth; mergers; greenfield
Management expansion; new investment financing; regional
growth; marketing campaign expansion
Sources: The author, based on survey of private equity firms in Egypt
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4.6 Stage 4: Exit
One of the key characteristics of private equity investments is the limited
investment period. Private equity funds acquire or invest in their portfolio
companies, with the intent to divest this investment in a short period of time,
typically 3-7 years, during which they pursue a specific value creation strategy.
The industry term for divesting the investment at the end of this period is "exit."
This divestment is important for private equity investors because during the
holding period, their investments are highly illiquid (Wright and Robbie 1998).
There are different ways through which a private equity fund may typically
divest its investments, including: trade sale, sale to another financial investor
through a secondary buyout, initial public offering (IPO), and share buy-back.
The fund may also write off a bad investment (Wright and Robbie 1998).
In Egypt, all of these exit strategies are available to and used by private equity
funds. Table 4.7 highlights the exit strategies mentioned by private equity firms
interviewed. Trade sale, initial public offering and secondary buyouts were
equally mentioned by the firms interviewed. However, they also mentioned two
additional exit strategies. The first is selling through the Egyptian SME exchange,
Nilex. Nilex was created in 2008 as an alternate exchange for small and medium
enterprises, with the objective of providing access to capital to these companies
based on a flexible regulatory and reporting framework and without the
cumbersome requirements of the Egyptian Stock Exchange. Nilex listed its first
two companies in 2008 and has attracted more companies since then. Nilex was
mentioned as an option by IT Investments, which is a venture capital firm with a
number of investments in small and medium startups that may benefit from this
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exit strategy. The other exit strategy mentioned as an option by one of the firms
is "asset sale." In this exit strategy, the private equity firm may be interested in
selling some of the assets of the portfolio company independently, such as in the
case of a real estate property that may be underutilized by the portfolio company.
This strategy was mentioned by Haykala Investment Managers, a private equity
firm specializing in turnaround operations. Asset sale may be particularly useful
in distressed companies with significant financial liabilities. Asset sale may also
refer to situations where the private equity firm divides the company into
smaller entities (especially in the case of conglomerates) and sells them
separately. There are very few examples of this exit strategy. The case of ASEC
and Citadel Capital is one of the few and is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
As the private equity industry is still in its early stages, most of the funds are in
the investing or portfolio management stages and a small number of transactions
have already been exited. Table 4.8 lists examples of exits executed to date. In the
rest of this section we review the exit strategies and examples of exited
transactions.
A trade sale is a sale of the portfolio company to another company, typically in
the same business, such as a peer, competitor, conglomerate, or a company in an
adjacent part of the value chain. This type of exit strategy is sometimes called a
mergers-and-acquisitions exit (Povaly 2006). The European Venture Capital and
Private Equity Association (EVCA) (2009) lists trade sales as the most common
exit strategy used by private equity and venture capital firms in Europe in 2008,
used in 40% of the exit transactions. Similarly, in the exit cases reviewed in Egypt,
trade sale was the most common exit strategy. The sale of the Helwan Portland
Cement Company by Citadel Capital to the Suez Cement Company 2005 at an
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IRR of 287% is a typical example. Suez Cement Company is a subsidiary of
Italcementi, one of the largest cement manufacturers worldwide. This exit is part
of an industry consolidation, and also a reflection of the "pollution arbitrage"
trend that is growing with stricter environmental regulations in Europe. The
value of a business to a strategic investor is usually higher when strategic and
operational synergies exist between the two businesses, which is demonstrated
in this case. Synergies between Italcementi and Helwan Portland Cement include
the ability to transfer technology to the Egyptian subsidiary and export its
cement to European markets. These synergies make it possible for Italcementi to
pay a higher premium on its acquisition than other potential bidders.
An initial public offering (IPO) is a sale of all or some of the company's shares to
public investors, often through listing in a stock exchange. By listing in a stock
exchange, the company's shares become highly liquid and investors can easily
liquidate their investments. Exits through IPO's are cumbersome and costly to
execute because listing the company in a public exchange requires significant
due diligence and regulatory procedures. It provides the company, as well as the
private equity firm, with increased visibility in the market; however, this comes
at the price of additional reporting and scrutiny for the listed portfolio company.
While many of the private equity executives interviewed mentioned IPO as a
potential exit strategy, there is only one case identified where this took place.
Raya Holding is a technology company that operates both in the technology
retail sales as well as software development and IT services. The company went
public in 2005, supported by Injazat Technology Fund, in the first private equity-
backed IPO transaction in Egypt. However, the private equity fund owned only
6.79% of the company, and exited right before the IPO, rather than after the IPO.
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A secondary buyout is a sale of a portfolio company by a private equity firm to
another financial investor, such as another private equity firm. Typically, the
second financial investor or private equity firm will have a different value
creation strategy than the first. There are two large cases of secondary buyouts in
Egypt. The first was the sale of Rashidi El-Mizan from Actis to Citadel Capital.
Rashidi El-Mizan (REM) is a leading producer of sesame-based sweet (halawa)
and sesame paste (tehina) in Egypt. Since 2000, the company went through a
series of acquisitions and restructuring. First, it was acquired by Best Foods and
Unilever, two multinational firms that had alternately held stakes in the
company until 2003, when Unilever sold its stake to Actis, a UK-based private
equity firm with operations in Egypt. Actis worked with REM's management
team to transform the company from a small, three-generation-old family
business into a regional player. In 2008, and after a successful transformation,
Actis sold REM to Citadel Capital's Gozour, a consolidation platform company
focusing on the food and agri-businesses. For Gozour, the investment rationale
was not to turnaround REM, but rather to create a large integrated food
production and distribution company. To execute this strategy, they acquired a
number of companies across the value chain, REM being one of them.45
The second large case of secondary buyout is the sale of the Egyptian Fertilizers
Company by Citadel Capital to Abraaj Capital in the largest secondary buyout
transaction ever in the region. Citadel Capital, along with other regional
investors, acquired the Egyptian Fertilizers Company in 2005. In the following
three years the company went through a rapid expansion program that doubled
its production capacity and increased its geographic footprint. In 2007, Abraaj
45 The case of Rashidi El-Mizan acquisition by Citadel Capital is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
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Capital came in with a lucrative offer that was attractive to Citadel Capital and
the other investors. Abraaj Capital continued the growth strategy for the
Egyptian Fertilizers Company, but ended up selling it through a trade sale to a
strategic investor, making additional profits 46. There were also other cases such
as the sale of Cairo Medical Tower Laboratory by Concord Group to Abraaj
Capital in 2008.
A share buy-back is a sale of the private equity or venture capital investment
back to the company or entrepreneur that they initially acquired the shares from.
This is typical in situations where the private equity or venture capital firm
acquires a minority stake in a company or startup, and then decides to exit the
investment, possibly due to underperformance. Typically, the company or
entrepreneur would finance the buy-back using debt, which would increase the
company's debt liabilities. One of the few examples of share buy-backs in Egypt
is the case of Raya and Injazat Technology Fund, mentioned earlier. In this case,
the venture capital fund sold its minority shares back to the company right
before the IPO, possibly due to the lack of confidence in the results of the IPO.
46 The case of the Egyptian Fertilizers Company, Citadel Capital and Abraaj Capital is discussed
in detail in Chapter 5.
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Table 4.7 Exit strategies used by private equity firms
Number of
Exit Strategy PE Firms Citing this Strategy Firms
Trade sale ACTIS, Concord, EFG-Hermes, 4
Haykala
Initial public offering (IPO) MMID, ACTIS, Citadel, Concord 4
Secondary buyout (sale to Citadel Capital, Concord, Sphinx,
financial investor) IT Investments 4
SME exchange (NILEX) IT Investments 1
Asset sales ACTIS 1
Share buyback EFG-Hermes 1
Notes:
Nilex is the Egyptian Exchange market for growing medium and small
companies (including family-owned businesses), offering a clear access to capital
and the benefits of being traded, based on a flexible regulatory framework, for
both companies & investors, and a streamlined admission process (Nilex 2009).
Sources: The author, based on survey of private equity firms in Egypt
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Table 4.8 Examples of private equity exits in Egypt
Company
Egyptian Cement Company (ECC)
Sheraton Gezira
NatGas
Vodafone Egypt
Arafa Group
ACE - CIIC
Lecico
Raya Holding (IT services)
Helwan Portland Cement Company
Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals Company (SIDPEC)
Egyptian Fertilizer Company
ASCOM Geology & Mining
Sixth October for Development and Investment
(SODIC)
Egyptian Fertilizer Company
Rashidi El-Mizan
Table 4.8 Examples of private equity xits 
Egypt
PE Firm/ Fund
EFG - Hermes
EFG - Hermes
EFG - Hermes
EFG - Hermes
EFG - Hermes
EFG - Hermes
EFG - Hermes
Injazat Technology
Fund
Citadel Capital
EFG - Hermes
Citadel Capital
Citadel Capital
EFG - Hermes
Abraaj Capital
Actis
Year
2000
2002
2003
2003
2003
2004
2004
2005
2005
2005
2007
2007
2007
2008 Sold to Orascom Construction for $US 2.7
Billion, a 2x investment multiple
2008 Sold to Citadel Capital's Gozour for LE 335
Million
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Sources: Compiled by the author based on private equity firms' websites, annual reports, industry reports, and financial
news websites
Exit Description
Sold to partners for 34% IRR
Sold to France's Accor; IRR of 32%
IRR of 65%
IPO with a US$ IRR of 37%
Sold in a Management Buyout; IRR of 43%
Sold to ACE with 36% IRR
IRR of 28%
40% ROI, first venture backed IPO in Egypt
Sale to Suez Cement Company; IRR of 287%
IRR of 40%
Sold to Abraaj Capital for $1.4 Billion, a 3.6x
investment multiple
Partial exit in 2007; IRR of 972%
Sold through capital markets; IRR of 59%
Type
MBO
Trade Sale
Private Placement
IPO
MBO
Trade Sale
Trade Sale
IPO
Trade Sale
IPO
Secondary Buyout
Trade Sale
IPO
Trade Sale
Trade Sale
4.7 Conclusions
In emerging markets, private equity firms, especially the home-grown ones, are
learning and experimenting, as they adapt their business model to the realities of
doing business in developing countries and the local market requirements in
their respective countries and regions. Some of the differences that they face are
institutional, such as the different legal systems, investor protections, or contract
enforcement; some have to do with the functioning of the market, such as
information asymmetry; and some have to do with the macroeconomic
environment, such as the fiscal policies, rate of economic growth, or government
incentives. In this chapter, we traced the end-to-end activities of the private
equity cycle, including fund initiation and setup, investing, portfolio
management and exit. At each step, we compared the private equity business
model between developed and developing countries to understand how private
equity firms are adapting to the local needs and conditions of developing
countries. Our over-arching hypothesis was that while the private equity model
is transferable and useful in emerging countries, private equity firms adapt to the
local peculiarities of doing business in such emerging markets.
The first phase in the private equity cycle is fund initiation and setup, starting
with setting up the fund legal and governance structure. From a theoretical point
of view, the key issue discussed in the literature involving private equity fund
setup is agency: what is the fund structure that best provides adequate
protections for investors, while providing performance incentives for fund
managers acting on behalf of the investors, along with sufficient decision making
autonomy. In developed markets, private equity funds are setup as limited
partnerships (GP/LP model). However, limited partnerships, as legal entities, are
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not available in Egypt and many other emerging markets, especially those with
legal systems based on French civil law. A large number of private equity funds
in Egypt are domiciled offshore, which provides investors and fund managers
with more flexibility in designing the fund structure. However, a number of
funds are also incorporated domestically in the form of joint stock companies. In
these situations, they try to contract around some of the legal limitations of joint
stock companies by designing their contracts to simulate some of the features of
the GP/LP fund, such as the management fees. However, one critical limitation of
the joint stock or holding company is that it does not provide for term limits for
the fund, a feature that provides significant protection for investors and a
discipline mechanism for fund managers.
Raising capital is the next step in the fund initiation. In Egypt, anecdotal
evidence from interviews indicates that the majority of private equity capital
comes from local and regional (Arab GCC countries) sources, be they
institutional or family/ individual sources. Additionally, there are some
examples of banks financing private equity firms, and also one case of a
government-sponsored venture capital firm to develop the information
technology industry. However, the participation of large US- and EU-based
institutional investors remains limited.
The second phase in the private equity cycle is investing. In terms of the types of
investments, private equity firms in Egypt are investing heavily in family
businesses. In some transactions, they provide growth capital and acquire a
minority stake in the company, where the family owners continue to maintain
control of their business and use the capital to implement their growth plans; in
other transactions, they acquire a controlling stake in the family business and
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implement a turnaround or consolidation program. Private equity firms are also
investing in consolidations, where they are acquiring a number of small and
medium companies and consolidating them to create larger more competitive
entities. There are also some examples of investing in turnarounds and
privatization. In the case of a turnaround, the focus is usually on improving
management, financial controls and accounting practices. In the case of
privatization, private equity firms are more inclined to invest in large capital
intensive companies in sectors like cement or fertilizers, but shy away from labor
intensive industries such as textiles.
In terms of the sectoral focus of private equity firms in Egypt, the biggest
industry by far in terms of number of transactions is telecommunications and
information technology; however, most of these transactions are venture capital
investments in startups or small companies, with limited capital. In terms of
transaction size, the biggest industry is basic materials, which includes cement,
fertilizers, steel and other similar heavy industries. This sector has the second
largest number of transactions and an average transaction size of more than $1
billion. These transactions include the acquisition, turnaround and sale of ASEC
Cement Holding and the Egyptian Fertilizers Company, both transactions
executed by Citadel Capital, and considered the largest in the MENA region.
Other sectors with large private equity transactions are financial services, oil and
gas, healthcare and pharmaceuticals. This distribution of transactions shows that
the majority of the private equity money is geared towards capital intensive and
highly regulated sectors, with high barriers to entry. In many of these
transactions, private equity firms acquire companies that have operating licenses
in these regulated areas and invest in expanding their capacity and scope of
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operations. Noticeably absent from private sector transactions are sectors like
textiles, construction, tourism and retail distribution.
In terms of deal sourcing, private equity firms in Egypt identify personal and
professional networks as the most common source of potential opportunities,
followed by professional service firms that they work with, which include
investment banks, accounting firms and law firms. For this reason, most
international private equity firms actively operating in Egypt, such as Actis or
the Carlyle Group, maintain a domestic presence. This pattern supports the
argument that it is hard to conduct private equity transactions through remote
offices and brief business trips. International private equity firms that are serious
about doing business in an emerging market need to have a strong local presence
and local staff with knowledge of the country, from a business, legal, political
and culture perspective. This argument is also emphasized through the due
diligence process, which inherently is a situation of informational asymmetry
between the company owners and the private equity investors. This
informational asymmetry is exacerbated in the cases of a non-local private equity
firm. In some case examples examined in Egypt, especially in family businesses,
the due diligence process also included a "transformational" component. The
target company needed to restructure its corporate and legal structure, to
improve its accounting and financial controls, and to settle any outstanding tax
liabilities.
The third stage of the private equity cycle is portfolio management. In terms of
governance, the level of engagement of private equity firms with their portfolio
companies varied widely. In earlier transactions (for example, prior to 2004), a
large number of private equity firms were passive investments, playing the role
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of asset managers, similar to investing in publicly traded equities. However, in
the more recent transactions that we reviewed in Egypt (after 2004), the level of
engagement of private equity firms with their portfolio companies varied,
ranging from being passive investors, to playing supportive roles to the
management, to taking active leading roles. A number of private equity firms
continued with passive investments, mostly providing growth capital to
companies with good management. In some transactions, private equity firms
played an active supportive role, where they helped the portfolio companies
strengthen their management teams or enter new markets. In a third type of
transactions, typically turnarounds or green field investments, they assumed a
leading role in creating and executing the business strategy. One hypothesis,
based on these three models, is that private equity firms that are more actively
engaged with their portfolio firms are able to realize higher returns. While there
is no strong empirical evidence to prove this hypothesis, there are some
anecdotal case examples that may support it. Future research comparing these
three models of engagement using large sets of empirical data may be useful.
In terms of value creation strategies, we identified a number of common
investment theses that private equity firms in Egypt identified as their value
creation strategies, including initiating, consolidating, professionalizing, growing
and globalizing companies. These value creation strategies are analyzed in depth
in Chapter 5.
The fourth and last stage in the private equity cycle is exit, which may be
conducted through a trade sale, secondary buyout, initial public offering (IPO),
or share buy-back. In Egypt, all of these exit strategies were available to and used
by private equity funds. However, we found that trade sale was the most
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common strategy, but there were also cases of secondary buybacks and initial
public offerings.
* * *
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CHAPTER 5: IMPACT OF PRIVATE EQUITY
ON PORTFOLIO COMPANIES
The impact of private equity funds on their portfolio companies has been studied
in the literature from several angles, including the impact on employment, wages,
productivity, performance, growth, innovation, and governance. Most of these
studies focus on private equity transactions in developed countries, especially in
the United States and the United Kingdom, using empirical studies of completed
and exited transactions. Similar large-scale empirical studies are hard to replicate
in emerging markets due to data limitations and the fact that most transactions
are recent and have not exited yet. However, by contrasting the differences
between the private equity approach and value creation strategies in developed
countries vs. emerging markets, we would hypothesize that the impact of private
equity firms on portfolio companies in emerging markets is substantially
different, and likely to be positive, by producing larger, more professional and
competitive local companies with a broader employment base. In this chapter,
our research approach focuses on understanding these private equity value
creation strategies in emerging markets, and how they impact the portfolio
companies. Specifically, we hypothesize that private equity firms have a positive
impact on the companies that they acquire in developing economies because they
act as catalysts for initiating, consolidating, professionalizing, growing and
globalizing their portfolio companies.
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5.1 What do we know from the Literature?
The impact of private equity on the portfolio companies that they acquire has
been studied in the literature from several angles, including impact on labor,
wages and employment (McGuckin and Nguyen 2001, EVCA 2005, Amess and
Wright 2007, Kearney 2007), productivity (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1987, Kaplan
1989, Lichtenberg and Siegel 1989, Harris Siegel and Wright 2005), performance
and growth (Long and Ravenscraft 1993, Kaplan and Schoar 2003, Davis,
Haltiwanger and Jarmin 2007, Taylor and Bryant 2007), innovation, in the form
of investments in research and development (Hall 1990, Lichtenberg and Siegel
1990, Hall 1992, Hao and Jaffe 1993, Himmerlberg and Petersen 1994), and
governance (Jensen 1989, Lerner 1995, Walker 2007). The overarching hypothesis
in this type of research is that private ownership of companies by private equity
funds affects their behavior and performance, compared to public ownership in
the form of publicly-traded corporations. Historically, this research has been
motivated by a vigorous debate in developed countries with a long history of
private equity transactions on whether private equity ownership, especially in
leveraged buyout (LBO) situations, has a positive or negative impact on the
portfolio companies. On the one hand, proponents argue that private equity
ownership improves the governance and increases the productivity and
profitability of otherwise distressed or low-performing companies. Rappaport
(1990) argues that private equity ownership provides a short-term "shock
therapy" that improves the performance and governance of distressed or low-
performing companies. Jensen (1989) argues that the concentrated ownership of
private equity firms in LBO situations provides a superior ownership and
governance structure over the long term, compared to the public corporation
model. On the other hand, opponents argue that private equity firms capture
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significant financial profits by taking a short-term approach by aggressively
cutting costs, reducing employment through layoffs, and reducing investments
in the future of the company (e.g., research and development). The most
comprehensive look at the impact of private equity on portfolio companies came
in a recent set of working papers on the globalization of alternative investments
and the global economic impact of private equity, published by the World
Economic Forum (2008), which examined these effects through several large-
scale econometric studies using a data set of global private equity transactions
executed over the past three decades, and through six case studies of private
equity transactions in Europe, China and India.
In the first of these large-scale analytical studies, Lerner, Str6mberg and Sorensen
(2008) examined the impact of private equity on long-term investments in
research and development, demonstrated through their patenting behavior. They
constructed and analyzed a large data set of 495 firms that received private
equity funding between 1983 and 2005, and had one or more successful patent
filings during the three year period prior to the transaction or the five year
period after the transaction. They found that the quantity and quality of research
and development does not change: companies continue their research in
fundamental areas, and produce similar volumes of patents. However, the focus
of the research and development changes, as firms "pursue more economically
important innovations": their research is focused on areas of core business, and
their patents receive more citations (Lerner, Str6mberg and Sorensen 2008).
In the second of these large-scale empirical studies, Davis et al. (2008) examined
the private equity impact on employment, using a data set of 5,000 companies
that received private equity investments during the period from 1980 to 2005,
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and 300,000 United States establishments owned by these companies. They
compared the employment patterns in these companies during the two-year
period after the acquisition to a control group of companies with similar
demographics that have not received private equity funding. They found that in
the manufacturing sector (about a quarter of these companies), there is virtually
no difference in the employment patterns between the private-equity backed
companies and the control group. However, in other industries, especially in
finance, insurance, real estate, retail trade and services, there is a rapid fall in
existing jobs in private-equity backed companies - 7% greater than the control
group, or a slower growth of 4% less than the control group. This pattern may
indicate that private equity firms are reducing white-collar jobs rather than blue-
collar jobs in these companies, an observation that is confirmed by Lichtenberg
and Siegel (1990) in another paper. Another finding for Davis el al. (2008) is that
private equity-backed companies create substantially more new green field jobs
in their establishments (15% new jobs), compared to the control group (9% new
jobs) during the two years after the acquisition.
In the third of these large-scale empirical studies, Cornelli and Karakas (2008)
examine the private equity impact on governance, focusing on changes in board
size, composition and role. Boards provide a critical role in the governance of
publicly-traded companies, especially those with fragmented ownership, by
appointing, setting compensation for and monitoring management, making
strategic decisions such as mergers and acquisitions, and representing the long-
term interests of the owners. While the shift from dispersed ownership based in
public companies to a concentrated ownership in private equity may reduce the
need for a board, private equity firms usually maintain the board as the main
governance mechanism, while altering its size and composition. Cornelli and
156
it
Karakas (2008) analyze 88 private equity transactions in the United Kingdom
during the period between 1998 and 2003 to understand the change in board
structure after the change of ownership from public to private. They find that the
new boards are smaller in size, have a different composition, and are more active
and adaptive. The new boards are primarily composed of management and
private equity firm employees (only the former in the case of management
buyouts). Outside/ independent directors are reduced, and often replaced with
employees of the private equity firms. The new boards are actively involved in
complex and challenging situations. Private equity firms adjust their board
representation based on the complexity of the transformation and the anticipated
challenges (Cornelli and Karakas 2008). After the execution of the private equity
transaction, and during the restructuring process, the CEO and board members'
turnover is higher than comparable companies (or the same company prior to the
transaction); this raises questions about private equity firms' long-term
commitments.
5.2 Research Approach
While this body of empirical literature provides an understanding of the impact
of private equity on portfolio companies, these findings are primarily based on
transactions data from developed countries, and it is not clear if they can be
extended to emerging markets. Most of these studies are based on transactions in
the United States and the United Kingdom (e.g. Cornelli and Karakas 2008; Davis
et al. 2008), and even when the data set includes global transactions (e.g., Lerner,
Str6mberg and Sorensen 2008), the majority of these transactions are still in
developed countries. These large-scale empirical studies cannot be replicated for
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emerging countries' private equity in the near future because of the limited
number of transactions and the fact that most of these transactions were initiated
over the past few years and have not yet been exited. From a theoretical point of
view, we expect the outcomes of these studies to differ between developed
countries and emerging countries due to several factors. Among these factors are
the different market conditions and stages of development; the different value
creation strategies used by the private equity firms; and the difference in the
companies acquired in terms of their size, business challenges, governance, and
management capabilities.
However, observations from private equity transactions in emerging markets
highlight that the value creation strategies that private equity firms implement
are different. On the one hand, the typical business model for private equity
funds in developed countries, especially in leveraged buyout transactions, is to
acquire companies that are suffering from financial, operational or management
problems, and restructure them to become more profitable and hence, increase
their value. The restructuring process, more often than not, is associated with
replacing management, changing the financial structure to include higher
leverage, aggressively cutting costs and reducing labor, downsizing or closing
less profitable business units, and sometimes, breaking up the company into
smaller entities that may be more valuable separately, or divestment of some
assets, especially real-estate assets that maybe of high cash value on their own.
On the other hand, our observations from private equity transactions in
emerging markets show different value creation strategies, focusing on growth.
For example, changes in management are focused on strengthening and
professionalizing the management team; changes in governance are focused on
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establishing a board where it did not exist (especially in recently privatized state-
owned enterprises, or family-owned businesses) or adding stronger members to
existing boards; changes in financial structure, while still benefiting from high
leverage, are focused on providing capital for new investments in new facilities
or on regional/ global growth. In their review of two private equity transactions
in India, Fang and Leeds (2008d) support this argument:
Like most private equity transactions in India, as well as other emerging
markets, it is noteworthy that these cases do not fit the profile of US and
European buyouts - both involved minority investments rather than
control, leverage was not a factor, and although major financial and
operational restructuring was extremely important, neither transaction
involved disruptive layoffs, management changes or other features that
have been targeted by critics of Western buyouts. On the contrary, the
cases illustrate that for economies like India that are in the midst of major
structural changes, there are ample opportunities for more traditional
"growth capital" investments in companies that are expanding rapidly,
especially in sectors like retail and telecoms that are undergoing
consolidation.
By contrasting the differences between the private equity value creation
strategies in developed countries vs. emerging markets, we hypothesize that the
impact on the portfolio companies is substantially different, and likely to be
positive, by producing larger, more professional and competitive local
companies, with a broader employment base.
In this chapter, our research approach focuses on understanding these private
equity value creation strategies in emerging markets and how they impact the
portfolio companies. Specifically, we hypothesize that private equity firms have
a positive impact on the companies that they acquire in developing economies
because they act as catalysts for initiating, consolidating, professionalizing,
growing and globalizing portfolio companies. In other words, when private
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equity firms adopt these growth-oriented value creation strategies, they are
likely to create positive outcome for their portfolio companies as well as the
broader economic development.
Private equity funds initiate new companies either through green field
investments, venture capital investments, or by financing new joint ventures;
they consolidate multiple small companies into larger more competitive entities;
they professionalize their acquisitions by hiring experienced management teams
and installing proper corporate governance procedures that align the incentives
of these management teams with the owners; they grow these companies by
investing in new operations, manufacturing facilities, or systems; and they
expand their scope of operations from domestic markets to regional and global
markets. By initiating new companies, and by consolidating, professionalizing,
growing and globalizing existing companies, they increase their competitiveness
in regional and global markets. In this context, private equity firms play the role
of a Schumpeterian entrepreneur (Schumpeter 1950, 1961).
5.3 Private Equity Value Creation Strategies and Impact on
Portfolio Companies
In the remainder of this chapter, we examine each of these five private equity
value creation strategies (initiating, consolidating, professionalizing, growing
and globalizing) in Egypt and identify specific examples where they are applied.
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5.3.1 Initiating New Companies
Schumpeter (1950, 1961) puts the entrepreneur at the core of economic growth, as
the innovator of new ideas, the risk taker, the agent of change, and the creator of
new businesses. While initiating new ventures has often been in the realm of
individual entrepreneurs, an analysis of private equity transactions in Egypt
(Table 5.1) shows that private equity firms are actively engaged in initiating new
companies as well as in supporting local entrepreneurs. There are three different
business models used by private equity firms to initiate new companies: venture
capital, green field investments, and joint ventures.
Venture Capital: Venture capital (VC)4 7 is the typical business model used in
developed countries to invest in startup companies. Venture capital firms
undertake risky investment in unlisted startups or companies with high growth
potential. Venture capital can be broadly classified based on the stage of
development of the venture: seed capital is used by startups to finance the early
stages of product innovation and company building; second round financing is
used by young companies to further develop or expand the range of products;
and development financing is used by established companies to develop
alternative products or expand through acquisitions. The venture capital
business model is based on a portfolio approach, where the fund invests small
amounts of money in a large number of startups, with the expectation that many
of them would fail or have limited success, and the hope that one of them would
become a blockbuster success that would provide significant profits on exit.
Startups supported by venture capital are usually based on innovative business
47 Venture capital funds are a special case of private equity, but are often treated separately in
literature because their business model differs from the typical leveraged-buyout (LBO) model
used by private equity firms.
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models or new technologies, where the market potential has not been proven or
sized yet. They are usually risky and carry a high potential for failure. Large
private equity buyout funds rarely invest in early-stage ventures that have not
yet proven their success.
Most of the venture capital-backed startups in Egypt were supported by two
venture capital funds. The first fund, IT Investments, was initiated in 1999 by one
of the IT industry veterans in Egypt, Dr. Hisham El-Sherif, an MIT alumnus. The
fund had a subscribed capital of $110 million at closing in 1999, and is focused on
investing in low-to-medium risk early stage, startup and turnaround companies
in the telecommunications, information technology and high-tech industries.
Currently, the fund has 14 portfolio companies at different stages of
development. In the 1990's, El-Sherif was one of the leaders in the government
who worked on creating the basic infrastructure for Egypt's IT and
communications industry. In doing so, he created several governmental agencies,
training institutes, nonprofits, and public-private partnerships in this area. Many
of these organizations were later consolidated into a newly created Ministry of
Communications and Information Technology (MCIT). As he transitioned from
the government to the private sector, El-Sherif created IT Investments and
continued to fund and support some of these initiatives as new startups. Table
5.1 highlights ten startup ventures that were funded by IT Investments between
1999 and 2001.
The second venture capital fund that is active in Egypt is the Technology
Development Fund, which is a public-private partnership initiated by the
Government of Egypt in 2004. The fund is sponsored by the Ministry of
Communication and Information Technology (MCIT) and managed by EFG-
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Hermes, one of the largest private equity firms in Egypt and the region. The fund
is also advised by Ideavelopers, an incubation and venture capital advisory firm
that is also initiated by MCIT and EFG-Hermes to support the fund-backed
companies. The fund is focused on investing in startup companies in the
communications and information technology space (EFG-Hermes Private Equity
2009, Ideavelopers 2009, MCIT 2009).
The Technology Development Fund is part of a government-supported "national
innovation system" (Nelson and Rosenberg 1993, Lundvall and Johnson 1994,
Kim and Nelson 2000, Nelson 2000, Stern, Porter and Furman 2000) aimed at
growing the infant telecommunication and information technology industry in
Egypt. Other components in this national innovation system include: Nile
University, which is focused on providing graduate education in business and
technology; the Information Technology Industry Development Agency (ITIDA),
a quasi-governmental agency focused on developing, growing and promoting
the industry, especially as a destination for IT and business process outsourcing
and offshoring (BPO) activities; the Information Technology Institute (ITI),
which provides specialized training programs in software development to fresh
graduates, as well as professional and IT training programs to government
employees; the National Telecom Institute (NTI), a center of excellence for
applied research, graduate education and training in telecommunications
engineering; and Smart Villages Company, a public-private-partnership to
develop a series of technology and business parks to accommodate the industry
office space and technology infrastructure needs (MCIT 2009).
Since its inception, the Technology Development Fund has backed more than 14
startups in communication and information technology (Table 5.1). While the
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level of success of these companies is still to be judged, this will become more
transparent as the fund starts to exit these investments. However, the results of
the whole eco-system are starting to payoff: a new business report (Tholons 2008)
ranks Cairo at the seventh position in the "Top 50 Emerging Global Outsourcing
Cities," and the government is projecting that local IT outsourcing and
offshoring companies will reach a milestone of more than $1 billion in revenues
by 2010 - four times their 2005 revenues (Marson and Blodgett 2008).
There are very few examples of venture capital-backed companies that went
public. One of these examples is Raya Holding, the largest IT holding company
in Egypt, with gross revenues of $400 million in 2008. Raya was established in
1999 as a result of the merger of seven companies, and operates different
business units, including software development and IT services, contact centers,
mobile phone retail distribution, and commercial real estate and technology
parks. In 2003, Injazat Technology Fund invested $5 million in Raya Holding for
a 6.79% stake in the company, to fund Raya's domestic and regional growth in
the Internet service provider (ISP) business, mobile phone distribution business,
and IT integration and services business. Two years later, the fund sold its stake
in the company for a 40% return. Later in the year, Raya Holding went public in
an initial public offering (IPO) in the Egyptian Stock Exchange. (Raya Holding
2009)
Green Field Investments: Another business model that some of the large private
equity firms in Egypt have adopted is initiating large "green field" companies in
capital-intensive industries such as transportation or oil and gas. These are
industries where the private equity firm identifies an attractive opportunity;
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however, there are no existing companies operating in this area that they can
acquire and grow, so they proceed to initiate a new business.
Citadel Capital has been a leader in initiating "green field" companies in capital
intensive industries. Table 5.1 highlights the five green field companies they
initiated since 2005, in the transportation and logistics, oil refining, commercial
real estate, and glass manufacturing industries. The National River
Transportation Company (NRTC) and The National River Port Management
Company (NRPMC) are two examples of green field companies initiated by
Citadel Capital in 2006 to capitalize on Egypt's underdeveloped and
underutilized Nile river transportation and logistics network. In the 1960's, more
than 20 million tons per annum were transported on the Nile River; today, this
number has significantly fallen to less than 1.5 million tons, less than 1% of the
total goods moved every year. This is primarily due to the underdeveloped river
transportation infrastructure (Citadel Capital 2008a).
The first of these two companies, The National River Transportation Company
(NRTC), was created in 2006 with committed equity of $80 million from Citadel
Capital. NRTC will be building a fleet of state-of-the-art, fuel-efficient,
environmentally friendly river barges to transport heavy industrial products
across the Nile River. The planned fleet will be capable of transporting up to 9.12
million tons per annum by 2012 (Citadel Capital 2008a).
On the one hand, the continuous rise in fuel costs and reduction in fuel subsidies
(to date and anticipated) are increasing the transportation cost for industries that
rely on heavy bulk products and are significantly influencing their economics.
This is particularly critical for industries such as cement, fertilizers, steel and
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other industrial manufacturing industries. On the other hand, river
transportation offers a low-cost efficient alternative to long-distance trucking,
especially because the Nile River connects most large industrial cities in Egypt
with large population centers and export ports. River transport will also reduce
the burden on the road network which is currently supporting more than 95% of
all goods transported in Egypt, but which is barely able to keep up with the
rapid growth and demand (Citadel Capital 2008a).
NTRC began operations in May 2008 with a small fleet of refurbished barges. The
company has also commissioned the building of 30 new barges to the Alexandria
Shipyard and 32 new barges to the Arab Contractors Shipyard in Helwan. The
first batch of these new barges will be operational in 2009. The first client for
NTRC will be Al-Nasr Company for Coke & Chemicals, which contracted NTRC
for one year to transport 750 thousand tons of coal and coke to its factories for
$3.6 million (Citadel Capital 2008a).
The second of these two companies, The National River Port Management
Company (NRPMC), was created in 2006 with committed equity of $32 million
from Citadel Capital. NRPMC will build, own and operate a series of state-of-
the-art river ports and logistics hubs along the Nile River that will handle bulk
and container cargo. The port management company will operate in synergy
with its sister company, NRTC, which operates the river barge fleet to provide
high-quality door-to-door transportation and logistics services to the industrial
and agricultural sector in Egypt (Citadel Capital 2008a).
The company has already started working on three ports on the Nile River and
other navigable waterways. The first port is in Tebbin, 15 kilometers south of
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Cairo, where the company has acquired a 55,373 square-meter plot of land. The
Tebbin port will have a capacity of 4.5 million tons per annum and will be
operational by 2010. The second port is in Imbaba, north of Cairo, where the
company has rented a 27,500 square-meter plot of land. The Imbaba port will
have a capacity of one million tons per annum and will be operational by the end
of 2009. The third is in Alexandria, near the Alexandria Port, where the company
has acquired an 81,000 square-meter plot of land. The port is in the design phase
and should also be operational within the next few years (Citadel Capital 2008a).
Citadel Capital has recruited a strong management team of industry experts for
both companies. Management is supported by local and international
consultants including some of Europe's leading experts in river transport, such
as the Netherlands' Royal Haskoning (Citadel Capital 2008a).
Citadel Capital has also engaged in creating other green field companies in the
commercial real-estate sector, manufacturing of glass containers, and oil refining
(Citadel Capital 2008a).
Joint Ventures: The third business model used by private equity firms to initiate
new companies is through joint ventures (JV), which are partnership agreements
between two or more companies to embark on a new business. In many
situations, one of the companies is a multinational corporation that brings a
specific product or manufacturing knowledge to the venture, and the other
partner is a local partner with market knowledge, distribution network, or
privileged market access. Private equity firms join this venture as a provider of
capital and business knowledge.
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OT WiMax is an example of this joint venture model. The company is a result of
a joint venture agreement between Orascom Telecom (OT), a leading
international telecommunications, and Intel Capital, the venture capital arm of
Intel Corporation. The new venture will seek WiMAX (Wireless Interoperability
for Microwave Access) spectrum licenses, establish commercial operations, and
support the deployment of low cost broadband Internet access through WiMAX
networks. Orascom Telecom is an Egyptian-based company with global
operations in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. The company operates
GSM mobile phone networks through a large geographic footprint, which
includes Algeria, Pakistan, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Bangladesh, Zimbabwe and
North Korea, serving a total of more than 80 million subscribers 48 (Orascom
Telecom Holding 2009). Orascom Telecom brings this market access to the joint
venture, where it sees an opportunity to extend its existing GSM voice and data
services into broadband Internet connectivity, using WiMAX technology, and
offering advanced applications and services. Intel Capital is the venture capital
investment arm of Intel Corporation. Intel Capital makes equity investments in
innovative technology startups and companies worldwide, often leveraging
Intel's technologies and capabilities. In this case, Intel Capital will provide the
new venture with access to Intel's significant technical and marketing resources
and capabilities, in addition to capital (Orascom Telecom 2006).
A second example of private equity-backed joint ventures is Centro Egypt. The
joint venture, created in 2008 between Orascom Hotels Holding, Shuaa
Hospitality Fund and Rotana Hotel Management Corporation, will invest in
developing and operating a new budget business hotel chain in Egypt. The
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48 As of March 2009
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venture will start by developing five "affordable, trendy, budget business hotels"
in Cairo and other Egyptian cities, under the brand Centro by Rotana to address
a clear gap in the hotels market in Egypt.
Orascom Hotels Holding is an Egyptian "global town developer specializing in
planning, building and operating integrated, self-sufficient leisure and
residential towns around the world," with current properties and operations in
Egypt, Oman, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Switzerland, Mauritius, and
Morocco, and plans to expand to other countries. The company is also the largest
owner of hotel rooms in Egypt, with 5,800 rooms currently in operation, and a
target of 10,000 rooms by 2010. Orascom's flagship development in Egypt's Red
Sea coast, El-Gouna, began as a simple touristic real estate project, but has since
evolved into a fast-growing fully independent town with a strong infrastructure
and residential population (Orascom Hotels Holding 2009). This new venture
will enable Orascom to diversify its properties beyond touristic village to include
business-oriented hotels (Shuaa Partners 2008).
Shuaa Partners is the private equity arm of Shuaa Capital, a Dubai-based
investment bank. Over the past five years, Shuaa Partners has launched several
private equity funds focusing on investing in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region, including its inaugural fund, Shuaa Partners Fund I, which
closed in 2005 with committed capital of $200 million; Frontier Opportunities
Fund I, which closed in 2007 with committed capital of US$100 million;
Hospitality Fund I, which closed in 2008 with committed capital of $165 million;
and SHUAA Saudi Hospitality Fund I, which closed in 2008 with committed
capital of $240 million. The first three funds are focused on the whole region,
while the last one is focused solely on Saudi Arabia (Shuaa Partners 2009).
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Rotana Hotels Management Corporation is a regional hotels chain operator
founded in 1992 and headquartered in Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates.
Rotana currently manages 67 hotel properties across the Middle East and North
Africa region, including luxury and business budget hotels in Abu Dhabi, Dubai,
Al Ain, Sharjah, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah, Beirut, Kuwait, Syria, Sudan,
Hurgada and Sharm El Sheikh, and new properties under development in
Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kurdistan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and
the United Arab Emirates. Rotana is one of the portfolio companies of Shauaa
Capital and has received significant capital from the private equity fund since
2006. In 2005, Rotana announced the launch of a new hotel concept, "Centro by
Rotana," designed to meet the growing demands of business travelers in the
region. The new concept offers an affordable three-star business-friendly hotel
chain. This new joint venture will focus on developing five Centro hotels in
Egypt.
These three business models - venture capital, green field investments, and joint
ventures - highlight how private equity is initiating new companies in Egypt,
where private equity funds act as both the financier and risk taker. In the case of
venture capital and joint ventures, they act as a catalyst for the initiation of these
ventures by partnering with individual entrepreneurs or other companies. In the
case of green field ventures, they act as the entrepreneur in actually initiating the
new venture. Throughout the past five years, where the private equity model
showed rapid growth, these funds were part of the creation of scores of new
businesses in technology, infrastructure and other industries, with clear
contribution to employment and economic growth. Absence the private equity
model, it is unclear which, if any, of these ventures would have been initiated.
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Table 5.1 Examples of private equity firms initiating new companies
Company
ECC
EBCTA
LADIS
CIT Group
Nile Online
Arab Internet Company
Telcomedia
TIBA-CITE Group
PT Trust
El Rowad
E-Knowledge
Raya Holding (IT services)
OstazOnline
Smart Cards Application
PE Firm/ Fund
EFG Hermes
IT Investments
IT Investments
IT Investments
IT Investments
IT Investments
IT Investments
IT Investments
IT Investments
IT Investments
IT Investments
Injazat Technology Fund
Technology Development
Fund
Technology Development
Fund
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Year Description
1995 First private Cement company in Egypt
1995 Provides software for banks to handle clearing
and transaction settlements between banks
1996 Information system and support provider for
clients in the legal community
1997 M-Commerce solution and services provider.
Provides e-payment solutions
1999 Broadband infra-structure provider
1999 Provides R&D and value-added technology for
ISPs and Internet professionals in Egypt, designed
to compliment Nile Online's services
2000 Audio text and IDR services for the Arab World
2000 Regional distributer of IT products, solutions,
services and enterprise management systems
2000 Online payment and e-commerce platform
provider
2001 Creation of educational software and providing
educational facilities to students and teachers in
Egypt
2001 Creating training tools for developing E-Learning
environments
2003 Investment to develop Raya's domestic and
regional Internet service provider (ISP) business,
mobile phone distribution business, and IT
integration and services business
2004 Developing online educational tools and teaching
aids for the Egyptian market
2005 Implements and manages operations for state-of-
the-art smart card solutions for government
Type
Greenfield
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
agencies
iModel it
Flat World Consulting
Allied Information Technology Services
Timeline Interactive
Research and Development International
(RDI)
OpenCraft
COLTECH
Allied Soft
Advanced Smart Card
National River Transportation Company
Technology Development
Fund
Technology Development
Fund
Technology Development
Fund
Technology Development
Fund
Technology Development
Fund
Technology Development
Fund
Technology Development
Fund
Technology Development
Fund
Technology Development
Fund
Citadel Capital
2005 Enables communication among researchers,
research institutions, publishers, e-learning
companies, and industry in the area of device
modeling for microwave and optical domains.
2005 Provides comprehensive engineering, computer-
aided design (CAD) and 3D Rendering and
Animation for the architectural/ engineering/
construction (AEC) industry
2005 AITS provides business process outsourcing
(BPO) and technology solutions to healthcare
providers, including medical and legal
transcriptions, call center services, medical billing
and coding, BPO training services, and web-
enabled software solutions to manage medical
records
2005 A software development company specializing in
producing high quality games on all major
platforms
2005 Software development house focusing on the
creation of Arabic language technology, both
written and spoken
2005 Providing IT solutions to large corporate clients
2005 Arabic Language search and data analysis
technology solutions
2005 System development firm, specializing in security
and offshore development
2005 Large-scale manufacturer of secure credit/plastic
card
2006 A platform company for investments in
transportation and logistics, focusing on Nile
River transportation
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Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Greenfield
National River Port Management Company
OT WiMax Limited
IdealRatings
ConnectmeTV
Smart Wireless Systems
Egyptian Propylene and Polypropylene
Company
Egyptian Refining Company
Bonyan
GlassWorks
Beltone Retail
Citadel Capital
Intel Capital
Technology Development
Fund
Technology Development
Fund
Technology Development
Fund
Amwaal Al-Khaleej
Citadel Capital
Citadel Capital
Citadel Capital
Beltone Financial
2006 A platform company to develop and manage a
new port network along the Nile River
2006 A joint venture between Orascom Telecom
Holding and Intel Capital, the VC investment arm
of Intel Corp. The new company will support the
deployment of low cost broadband internet access
through WiMAX networks. Intel Capital will also
provide access to the significant technical and
marketing resources of Intel
2006 A service provider for financial institutions to
identify Shariah-compliant instruments globally
and manage the overall Shariah fund management
process
2006 A leading provider of integrated digital media
delivery platforms in the Middle East, including
software and application development, business
management, product positioning, consumer
marketing, sales distribution, operation and
manufacturing
2006 Provider of analog/mixed-signal and RF (Radio-
Frequency) research and design solutions for
ASIC (Application-Specific-Integrated-Circuit)
development in different application segments
2007 Chemical company started by number of regional
investors, expected to go commercial by 2010
2007 New company that will construct, own and
operate a new hydro-cracking facility and
ancillary unit
2007 A specialty real-estate developer focusing on
furniture and home accessories malls
2007 A company set up to invest in the Glass
manufacturing sector through both consolidation
and greenfield projects
2007 Retail company set up to consolidate other retail
brands in region
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Greenfield
Joint Venture
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Venture
Capital
Greenfield
Greenfield
Greenfield
Greenfield
Greenfield
Al- Nouran Trading Corporation
Centro
Beltone Financial
Shuaa Partners
2007 Greenfield investment in sugar manufacturing
complex
2008 A joint venture between Orascom, Shuaa and
Rotana to operate budget business hotels
Sources: Compiled by the author based on private equity firms' websites and annual reports, industry reports, and
financial news websites
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Greenfield
Joint Venture
5.3.2 Consolidating
A large body of literature supports the argument that large-scale, professionally
managed, and nationally-owned companies act as a strong engine for economic
growth (e.g., Chandler 1959, Chandler and Hikino 1997, Amsden 2001). These
companies are able to develop economies of scale in their industries; acquire,
retain, develop and disseminate knowledge - be it technical or managerial
knowledge; generate economic profits and strong cash flows that allow them to
grow; produce competitive products and services that allow them to export or
operate in other countries and regions; and act as growth anchors for their
industry by developing suppliers and feeding industries. Economic historians
like Alfred Chandler (1959, 1990) highlight the role of these companies during
the United States industrialization. Chandler (1959) suggests that "the major
innovation in the American economy between the 1880s and the turn of the
century was the creation of the great corporations in American industry." More
recently, Amsden (2001) highlights the role of these companies in the
industrialization of latecomers - countries that industrialized post World War II
such as China, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil or Turkey.
However, empirical data show that in many industries in developing countries,
the economy is fragmented and dominated by small family-owned business and
the informal sector. For example, analysts estimate that around 82% of small
enterprises in Egypt are informal (El Mahdi 2002). While small and medium
enterprises (SMEs) and the informal sector provide significant employment and
support for the majority of the poor segments of the population, they do not
provide the growth in productivity or knowledge accumulation that supports
rapid industrialization or export-led growth. Large companies tend to be
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recently privatized state-owned enterprises, as well as some multinational
corporations. While some sectors (such as banking, insurance, oil and gas,
telecommunications) which are natural monopolies or government regulated
oligopolies have large companies, the majority of sectors are fragmented. Egypt
is a typical example, where most of the large companies in the economy are
recently-privatized SOE's (e.g., steel, cement, telecommunications), natural
monopolies or oligopolies (e.g., telecommunications, air transport, utilities), or
multinational corporations (e.g., consumer goods). There are a few exceptions of
family owned businesses that managed to grow into large companies or
conglomerates (e.g., Orascom, Oriental Weavers).
Consolidations among companies in a specific sector often take place due to a
variety of reasons, sometimes driven by government policy, and sometimes by
market dynamics. For example, in 2005-2008, the Government of Egypt, with the
support of the World Bank, implemented a banking reform program, with the
purpose of strengthening the domestic banking sector. The program included,
among other measures, forcing consolidation among the smaller banks in Egypt
by raising their minimum capital requirements. Another example of market-
driven consolidation took place when Sainsbury, a British food retailing chain,
entered the Egyptian market in 1999. The food retail distribution market in Egypt
is highly fragmented, and dominated by small mom-and-pop grocery stores.
Sainsbury saw an opportunity to introduce a large supermarket model in Egypt,
and by doing so, forced consolidation in the market as well as the similarly
fragmented supplier base. Sainsbury's excursion was a failure, and the company
decided to pull out of the market in 2001. However, the market witnessed some
consolidation afterwards, with many of the small family-owned businesses
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creating their own supermarket chains, and other global players entering the
market in the following years, such as the French Carrefour chain.
One of the value creation strategies used by private equity firms is a
consolidation strategy, where the private equity company acquires a number of
small companies operating in the same sector or adjacent sectors and
consolidates them into one larger entity. This strategy is particularly attractive in
industries that are highly fragmented and without a dominant player; where a
larger player would realize a competitive advantage; or where there is a need for
large scale investments that cannot be provided by the smaller companies in the
sector. Table 5.2 highlights examples of consolidation transactions conducted in
Egypt, where the private equity firm consolidated several companies to create a
larger economic entity that can realize economies of scale and scope.
One of these examples is Gozour, a consolidation platform company created by
Citadel Capital with committed equity of $257 million. Gozour was established
with the purpose of creating a vertically integrated regional agriculture and
multi-category consumer foods conglomerate with three primary lines of
business: agrifoods and dairy (Gozour Agri), fast-moving consumer goods
(Gozour Foods), and intermediate industries such as wet-corn milling and sugar
processing (Gozour Intermediate). The company has already acquired, fully or
partially, seven agri-businesses: Dina Farms, Rashidi El-Mizan, El-Misriyyeen,
El-Aguizy International, Mom's Foods, the National Company for Maize
Products, and the Egyptian Company for Milk Powder (Citadel Capital 2008a,
Abdel-Razek 2008).
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The first acquisition, Dina Farms, is Egypt's largest private farm with 10,000
feddans49 and several lines of business including agriculture, dairy and meat
production. The company is the largest producer of fresh milk in Egypt with an
annual capacity of 45,000 tons, a key supplier of diverse fruit and vegetable
products both locally and regionally, and the largest supplier of milk to leading
local producers of processed dairy products. In 2007, after the acquisition,
Gozour expanded the company's capacity by acquiring three new milking
stations from a Swedish company and upgrading five of its seven existing
stations - a move that is expected to double the company's milk production
capacity to 72,000 tons per year. The second acquisition was the 120 year old
confectioner Rashidi El-Mizan (REM), Egypt's leading producer of sesame-based
sweet (halawa) and sesame paste (tehina). Since 2000, the company has
undergone deep restructuring under the management of Best Foods and
Unilever; these two multinationals had alternately held stakes in the company till
2003, when Unilever sold its stake to Actis, a private equity firm based in the
United Kingdom. REM's management team is credited for transforming the
company from a small, three-generation-old family business into a regional
player. The third acquisition is El-Misriyyeen, a popular manufacturer of a
variety of cheese products that enjoy strong brand equity on the Egyptian market.
While the company has been in financial distress and in need of capital injection
and further restructuring, it had strong synergies with the rest of the portfolio.
The other acquisitions include NCMP, which produces natural corn-based
sweeteners such as fructose, glucose and sorbitol. NCMP also produces starch
and multi-purpose starch derivatives along with other corn-based products. El-
49 The Feddan is an Egyptian unit of land area, often used in agricultural land. A feddan equals
1.038 acre or 0.42 hectare.
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Aguizy International is a leading grower and exporter of produce, including
grapes, green beans and strawberries. Mom's Foods is a specialty food-products
exporter. Gozour is also in the process of identifying and negotiating other
similar acquisitions (Citadel Capital 2008a, Abdel-Razek 2008). This type of
vertical integration provides the consolidated company with a significant
competitive advantage in controlling the cost of its raw material across the
supply chain, which is becoming increasingly important in a market where the
prices of agricultural commodities are turbulent and continue to rise. It also
provides the company with the opportunity to consolidate its storage and
distribution logistics operations and potentially realize significant cost reduction.
A second example of consolidation strategy is the acquisition and consolidation
of SOLS and SOMICO, two Egyptian downstream steel processing companies,
by Haykala, an Egyptian private equity firm, for an undisclosed amount. The
Sixth of October Light Sections Company (SOLS) was established in 1988 by the
Faltas family. SOLS is a producer of hot rolled angles and steel sections with an
annual production capacity of 100,000 tons. The company's products are
exported to over ten countries in the Middle East and Europe. Sixth of October
for Metallurgical Industries Company (SOMICO) was established in 1996.
SOMICO produces cold rolled coils used in a wide variety of industries such as
automotive and home appliances, with an annual production capacity of 120,000
tons. In addition to consolidating the two companies and improving their
governance, management and operational performance, Haykala is planning to
expand their production capacity and diversify the product mix through new
investments. The private equity firm is injecting $30 million to build a new
galvanizing line producing hot dip galvanized steel sheets with an annual
capacity of 200,000 tons to cater to the undersupplied local and regional markets
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(Daily News Egypt 2008a). This type of horizontal integration, along with the
increased production capacity, provides the consolidated company with better
economies of scale and a competitive advantage, both in the domestic and export
markets.
A third example of consolidation strategy is the acquisition of the Egyptian
American Bank (EAB), and its consolidation with Credit Agricole Egypt and
Calyon Bank, a transaction executed by the private equity firm of El-Mansour &
El-Maghraby Investment and Development (MMID) in 2006. This transaction
highlights a complex history of merging several small banks to create a more
competitive entity that is also a subsidiary of a larger multinational bank.
Credit Agricole is a diversified French bank with over 9,000 branches and 21
million clients in France and global operations in 60 countries. It is the largest
bank in France, second in Europe and fifth in the world in terms of capital. The
bank started its operations in Egypt in 2001 with a series of acquisitions, in
partnership with the local private equity firm MMID. Their first acquisition was
in 2001, where they jointly acquired 94% of Credit International d'Egypte, a local
Egyptian bank joint venture, previously owned by Credit Commercial de France
CCF and the National Bank of Egypt. In 2005, they executed their second
acquisition by acquiring the branch of Credit Lyonnais' in Egypt. While these
acquisitions were small in size, they provided Credit Agricole and MMID with a
launch pad for further growth. This combined entity was consolidated under the
name Calyon Bank. In January 2006, they added a third acquisition of a majority
stake in the Egyptian American Bank, which has a sizable presence in the
Egyptian banking sector. The Egyptian American Bank is the country's third
largest privately-owned retail bank with 36 outlets and a market share of around
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2%50. It serves more than 100,000 retail customers and around 800 institutional
and corporate clients, and employs around 1,200 staff (El-Sirgany 2006).
The combined entity was further consolidated under the name of Credit Agricole
Egypt, with a total equity of $1.6 billion. Credit Agricole Egypt is a joint venture
between Credit Agricole Group, which owns 60%, MMID, which owns 20%, and
other small Egyptian investors. The bank is planning to grow rapidly to become
a leading provider of retail, corporate and investment banking, as well as asset
management and insurance services to the domestic market (El-Sirgany 2006).
This example highlights a complex consolidation of three small/medium
domestic banks into a subsidiary of an international bank, with the support of a
domestic private equity firm. One of the drivers for this banking consolidation is
government policy, which encouraged such consolidation as part of a banking
sector reform program supported by the World Bank.
These transactions show specific examples where private equity firms played a
catalyst role in the consolidation of smaller companies into larger, more
competitive entities. In the first example, Gozour, the private equity firm, first
identified the market opportunity first, then created the platform company, and
then proceeded to execute a series of acquisitions. In the second example, the
private equity firm simultaneously acquired and consolidated two similar size
companies. In the third example, the transaction was driven by Credit Agricole's
interest in entering the Egyptian market and incrementally creating a platform
for this market entry as opportunities arise. In all of these transactions, the
50 Prior to the banking sector reform, the sector was dominated by four large state-owned banks.
Privately-owned banks are predominantly focused on niche markets and have very limited
market share.
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consolidated companies' management teams, along with the private equity firms,
need to invest a significant time and effort in the post-merger management
process, which includes integrating the business processes, supply chain,
distribution networks, management teams, and company culture. The success of
this process is a prerequisite for the new entities realizing their synergies, and
therefore the private equity firms' ability to exit with a good return on
investments.
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Table 5.2 Examples of private equity firms consolidating portfolio companies
Company PE Firm Year Description
ASEC Holding Citadel Capital 2005 Sold of non-core business and bought a number of
subsidiaries in Egypt and region
National Petroleum Company Citadel Capital 2005 A platform company to acquire, operate, develop
and exploit upstream oil and gas assets or
companies in the MENA region (acquired 6
concessions and multiple companies)
Arab Cotton Ginning Amwal Al Khaleej 2006 Consolidated a number of subsidiary companies
through Amwaal AL Arabia Holding Company
Egyptian American Bank MMID 2006 Merged with Credit Agricole in a joint acquisition
Egyptian Fertilizer Company (EFC) Abraaj Capital 2007 Abraaj merged EFC with Orascom Construction
Industry's Fertilizer division
Gozour Citadel Capital 2007 Platform company to consolidate and grow
leading consumer goods brands in agriculture and
dairy, fast-moving consumer goods, and food
intermediates
GlassWorks Citadel Capital 2007 A platform company to invest in glass
manufacturing through both consolidation and
greenfield projects
Rally Energy Group Citadel Capital 2007 Consolidated with NPC, another portfolio
company
Wataniya Eurofund 2008 Company later acquired Baddar, a competitor
SOLS and SOMICO Haykala 2008 Bought and merged two steel companies
Sources: Compiled by the author based on private equity firms' websites, reports, and financial news websites
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5.3.3 Professionalizing
One of the key ways of improving the performance of companies, especially
family-owned businesses, is to transform them into more professionally
managed enterprises. This can be done in several ways, such as (i) hiring a
professional management team with strong skills and experience; (ii) creating the
proper governance mechanisms that provide for strong management
accountability and proper performance incentives; or (iii) modernizing the
company's operations and processes across the different business functions. This
type of transformation is particularly important in two cases: small and medium
family-owned and managed businesses, and recently-privatized state-owned
enterprises (SOE's). In both situations there is limited separation between
ownership and management.
In the case of family-owned businesses, professionalizing the management
becomes important during periods of rapid growth or transition from the
founding generation to the next generations within the family (Hollander and
Elman 1988, Barry 1989, Dyer 1989, Berenbeim 1990, Cromie, Stephenson and
Monteith 1995). In the case of SOE's, changing the corporate governance
structure and professionalizing the management is critical to their transition
from state ownership to private ownership.
Corporate governance, defined as the way by which the relationship between the
owners and managers of a company is organized, is a problem that is as old as
modern Capitalism. In 1776, Adam Smith (1979) identified this problem in The
Wealth of Nations:
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The directors of such [join-stock] companies, however, being the
managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well
be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch
over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider
attention to small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily
give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion
therefore must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the
affairs of such a company.
At the core of corporate governance is the agency problem: How do firms align the
incentives of professional managers with the owners? The nature of the agency
problem depends on the ownership structure, which varies by country. In the US
and the UK, most firms are widely-held by a broad distributed ownership base.
In other countries, especially in emerging markets, most firms are part of family-
owned business groups, where families own large, sometimes controlling, shares
(Morck and Yeung 2002). In the widely-held corporations, the agency problem
becomes an issue of ensuring that professional management performs their
fiduciary duty of acting in the broad interest of public share holders. This is often
achieved through aligning incentives with performance (e.g., linking financial
performance to management compensation). In family businesses, with
concentrated ownership, the agency problem becomes an issue of protecting
minority shareholders' interests (Fama 1980, Schulze et al. 2001, Morck and
Yeung 2002)
In private equity transactions, corporate governance is a critical part of the
transformation. In many of the reviewed transactions in Egypt, the portfolio
companies were family-owned prior to the private equity investment or
acquisition, with little or no board of directors and corporate governance
mechanisms. Part of the private equity transformation is instituting a board of
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directors with proper governance processes and incentives for the management
team. This also takes into consideration the private equity exit strategy. If the exit
strategy is through a trade sale, then the emphasis on governance is usually short
term; if the exit strategy is an IPO, then creating formal corporate governance is
critical to the success of the transaction. While private equity offers concentrated
ownership, similar to the family business situation, the nature of the private
equity firm involvement is short-term by nature, so they do not typically
interfere in the day-to-day management of their portfolio companies, but rather
prefer to engage at the level of frequent (e.g., quarterly) board meetings.
In addition to instituting or changing corporate governance, private equity firms
often replace or augment the management team of their portfolio company,
depending on their value creation strategy. Table 5.3 highlights examples of how
private equity firms helped professionalize the management and governance of
their portfolio companies as a way to increase their value.
One of these examples is ITWorx, an Egyptian-based software professional
services organization, with global clients and operations in North America,
Europe, and the Middle East. The company provides Application Development
Outsourcing services, Enterprise Application Integration, Business Intelligence,
and Portals to Global 2000 companies. ITWorx serves different sectors, including
financial services firms, educational institutions, telecommunication operators,
media companies as well as governmental agencies. The company was started in
1994 by a small group of entrepreneurial software engineers, and has since
grown tremendously to serve an extensive set of clients, including global
corporations like United Technologies, Microsoft, Vodafone, and Mellon Bank.
(ITWorx 2008, 2009) In 2007, ITWorx sales revenues were more than $20 million,
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and the company employed more than 700 software developers and engineers in
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States (Arabian
News 2008).
In January 2008, a consortium of three private equity firms acquired 79% of
ITWorx for an undisclosed amount, in a move to provide the company with
additional liquidity to rapidly grow its operations. The remaining 21% of the
company will continue to be held by founders, management and employees.
ITWorx was also planning to raise a second round of financing of around $8
million in 2008 to expand its local presence in key Middle East markets including
Bahrain and Kuwait, and also to expand into new industry verticals including oil
and gas, construction, and real estate. (ITWorx 2008, 2009, Arabian News 2008)
The first of the three parties that acquired ITWorx is the EuroMena Fund, a
private equity fund dedicated to investing in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region, and managed by Capital Trust Group. The Group was formed
in 1985 by several financial institutions, and then acquired by its own
management in 1996. The Group provides advisory and investment banking
services, and acts as the lead investor or co-investor with other financial
institutions. It initiates, arranges, advises and invests in private equity,
mezzanine debt and real estate. The Group operates in the United States, Europe,
the Middle East and North Africa, and has offices in London, New York and
Beirut (Capital Trust Group 2009). Capital Trust Group is the lead private equity
firm in this transaction. The second investor is Venture Capital Bank (VCBank),
the first dedicated Islamic venture capital bank in the MENA region. VCBank
was established in Bahrain in 2005, with a paid up capital of $165 million, to
provide an investment vehicle for high-growth Islamic-compliant companies
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within the Middle East and North Africa. VCBank is active in four principal
areas: venture capital and business development, private equity, real estate, and
financial advisory (Venture Capital Bank 2009). The third investor is Proparco,
which is the private sector financing arm of the French Development Agency
(Agence Franqaise de Developpement AFD). Proparco was created in 1977 to
advance economic growth, sustainable development and the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) by financing private sector investments in
developing countries through equity, loan and guarantee products (Proparco
2009).
Capital Trust Group, being the lead investor on the transaction, has worked with
ITWorx to professionalize their corporate governance and management in
several ways. First, Gilles de Clerck, a senior manager from the EuroMena Fund,
joined ITWorx's board as the Chairman position. De Clerck has 15 years
experience in business strategy and finance, and is actively involved in ITWorx
at the strategic level. The company also strengthened its finance department by
hiring a new Chief Financial Officer (CFO), who comes with more than 20 years
of experience in accounting, auditing and financial control in various regional
and multinational corporations, as well as other finance staff (Capital Trust
Group 2009). The company also hired three senior marketing professionals to
support its regional expansion in Europe and the Middle East. Finally, ITWorx
maintained the rest of the management team, which includes the company's
founders. In addition to strengthening the management team, the Capital Trust
Group worked with ITWorx to institute stronger governance and reporting
process. For example, they created a management incentive structure allowing
the management team to benefit from the funds' capital gains upon exit, if it
meets a specified performance hurdle rate. The company also set up monthly
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reporting to provide transparency into performance, and started a monthly
meeting for the executive committee to discuss performance, market trends and
outlooks (Capital Trust 2009).
Capital Trust Group identifies its role in professionalizing and facilitating the
transformation of small and medium enterprises, e.g., family business or
entrepreneurial companies such as ITWorx, as an important value creation
strategy. Part of this process is supporting improvements in the company's
human resources practices, financing structure, business model, corporate
governance and reporting. Another part is through active participation at the
board and executive committee level, and maintaining personal relations with
the management team. A third part is providing connections with banks,
potential clients or partners (Capital Trust Group 2009). In doing so, the private
equity firm provides support to their portfolio companies, beyond equity
financing.
A second example is the case of BiscoMisr, which was partially acquired by a
consortium led by Concord International Investments in January 2005 (El-
Saadani 2007). BiscoMisr was established in 1957, and, for over 60 years has been
a leading confectioner and producer of food products and a popular household
brand in Egypt. The company was state-owned, until 1999, where the
government floated 60% of the company in the Egyptian Stock Exchange, and
retained the remaining 40%. This IPO privatization changed the legal status of
the company, and some of its operations. However, while the company was
profitable, the lack of an anchor investor driving change and transformation led
to limited change in performance after privatization (El-Saadani 2007).
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In January 2005, a consortium led by Concord Investments International
acquired a majority stake in the company, including all government shared. The
consortium included the American University Endowment Fund (Karnak) and
the Commercial International Bank (CIB). The consortium acquired 61% of Bisco
Misr. Concord paid LE 156 million ($28 million) for 56% of the company, and the
rest went to the other partners (El-Saadani 2007). Concord Investments
International Group id a New York-based investment management company
focusing on investing in Egypt and the region. Concord manages a large
portfolio of mutual funds focusing on Egyptian equities, and has also has
successfully executed and exited a number of private equity transactions in
Egypt (Concord 2009).
In their effort to turnaround BiscoMisr, Concord hired an experienced
management team led by Samir Sabet, a veteran pharmaceutical executive with
experience in Swiss Pharma and Novartis. The new team planned and executed a
complete transformation and turnaround program to enable the company to
modernize its operations, improve profitability, and grow locally and regionally.
This program covered all areas of the company, including finance, operations,
marketing, sales, distribution, and technology. In the finance area, the company
moved from manual paper-based accounting to a new automated system. The
finance function was expanded to include budgeting and financial control, and
the team was strengthened with new hires. In the operations area, the company
invested in modernizing and expanding its production facilities. In the
marketing area, the company rebranded its products and focused on core
profitable products. In the sales area, they implemented a new client database
and started connecting with retail distributers rather than relying on a handful of
wholesale distributors. This was coupled with the creation of a new
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transportation fleet to distribute their own products. In the technology area,
where the company did not rely on computers in its operations, they created a
whole IT infrastructure from scratch. This included communications
infrastructure between the different locations and spreading the use of
computers in all departments. The company also implemented an Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) system to manage and connect all its operations and
reporting (El-Saadani 2007).
All of these changes required significant change in the skill sets that the
company's employees had. BiscoMisr started by offering 600 of its 2,700 staff
early retirements at the cost of LE 11 million ($2 million), and rehired a similar
number of better skilled employees in their place. They also changed their
compensation structure and provided a performance incentives, higher salaries
and better healthcare coverage. Many employees were working two jobs to
compensate for their meager salaries. They were requested to focus on their
BiscoMisr job, in exchange for higher compensation that is performance based.
This transformation program aiming at professionalizing BiscoMisr's
management, operations, processes and employees is paying off. The company's
product quality profitability and growth rates are all improving (El-Saadani
2007).
While this global financial crisis provided big challenges to private equity firms
as well as their portfolio companies, it also offered some opportunities. Many of
these companies were able to complement and upgrade their portfolio
companies' management teams. Citadel Capital is a good example:
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The past year presented unique opportunities to upgrade management talent at
the Platform Company level. Against that background, we completely
overhauled management at two companies and brought new talent in at others.
In 2009, Citadel Capital engaged top talent across its 19 Platform Companies and
their Portfolio Companies, including one Chairman (Gozour), five Chief
Executive Officers (ASEC Cement, Gozour Agri, Sphinx Glass, Bonyan, ASCOM
Gold), two Chief Operating Officers (Egyptian Refining Company, NOPC /
Rally) and five Chief Financial Officers (ASEC Cement, Sphinx Glass, Bonyan,
NOPC / Rally, TAQA Arabia). (Citadel Capital Annual Report 2008)
These examples highlight how private equity firms are professionalizing their
portfolio companies by strengthening their management capabilities and
instituting corporate governance processes and practices. While these actions
help private equity firms increase the value of these companies, they also
improve the companies' performance and competitiveness over the long term.
This strategy is particularly beneficial in developing countries where the majority
of the companies are family-owned and do not have strong professional
management teams or modern operations. Table 5.3 highlights a number of
examples where private equity firms professionalized their portfolio companies
as a value-creation strategy.
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Table 5.3 Examples of private equity firms professionalizing portfolio companies
Company PE Firm Year Description
Gezira Sheraton EFG Hermes 1999 Installed a new CEO
SODIC EFG Hermes 2002 Instituted a management change
BiscoMisr Concord 2005 Hiring a new experienced management team;
redesigning key processes, including marketing,
production, and distribution; installing new
financial controls, processes and systems; creating
an IT infrastructure and ERP system
ASEC Holding Citadel Capital 2005 Installed a new management team to turnaround
the distressed firm
Egyptian American Bank MMID 2006 New management by merging it with Credit
Agricole's operations
Commercial International Bank Ripplewood 2006 Gained new Board Members that had Fortune 500
experience
National Petroleum Company Citadel Capital 2007 Hired new CEO, Operations Director and created
an Acquisitions Department
Rally Energy Group Citadel Capital 2007 Hired a whole new management team
Nasr Housing Beltone Financial 2007 Provided management direction to improve share
price
ITWorx (IT software development) Capital Trust Group 2008 Hired new sales team for regional expansion,
created corporate governance, new Board of
directors, management incentives, hired new CFO
and strengthened finance
Sources: Compiled by the author based on private equity firms' websites, reports, and financial news websites
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5.3.4 Growing and Globalizing
Growing a business seems like an intuitive goal that all companies would aspire
toward, but that is not always the case. There are three reasons why companies
do not always try to grow their business: (i) lack of will to grow, (ii) lack of skill
to grow, or (iii) lack of capital to grow. The first is a matter of risk aversion,
especially in many small and medium family businesses, where the owners may
be satisfied with the profits generated, and may not be willing to take additional
risk to grow the business. For example, Donckels and Fr6hlich (1991) compare
objectives, values and strategic behavior of family and nonfamily businesses
using observations of 1,132 small and medium enterprises in eight European
countries. They find that family businesses are typically risk averse, inwardly-
focused, and demonstrate a conservative strategic behavior. "[R]isk aversion and
fear of losing control of the business lead many family businesses to seriously
limit their growth potential by not adopting generally accepted financial
management policies" (Donckels and Fr6hlich 1991). This risk averse behavior is
often compounded by the limited skills and human capital, especially in
technical, marketing, or product design areas, and the limited access to capital to
finance the growth opportunities. For example, in Egypt, only 21.1% of firms
have access to long-term bank credit compared to 78.9% that do not have access.
Among the former, larger firms are more likely to have access (41.5%), compared
to medium size (19.1%) and smaller (13.7%) firms51.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 highlight examples of private equity firms growing and
globalizing their portfolio companies. One example is Mo'men, a local chain of
51 Based on our analysis of a 2003 World Bank survey of a random sample of 1,000 Egyptian
companies.
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fast-food outlets, which received investments from Actis, a United Kingdom-
based private equity firm. Mo'men was founded in 1988 by two brothers at a
small sandwich place in the Heliopolis suburb of Cairo, and has since grew to
become one of the largest food chains in Egypt with 36 branches, as well as
presence in Libya and Sudan. The company has expanded to include two other
restaurant chains: a ready-made food label, while also operating its own meat
and poultry production facilities. It also has plans to acquire a domestic coffee
shop chain (Schurgott 2008).
Actis, founded more than 60 years ago, is a UK-based private equity investor
focusing on investing in emerging markets. Actis has 11 offices in emerging
markets and $7.6 billion in assets under management, out of which $1.5 billion
are invested in Africa (Actis 2009). The private equity firm started its operations
in Egypt in 2002 through a local office, and has since completed four transactions
in Egypt. The firm's value-creation strategy is focused on growth: they invest in
"existing, profitable, established businesses," with the objective of growing them
and expanding their operations internationally (Schurgott 2008).
In September 2008, Actis acquired a 28% stake in Mo'men for $48.5 million, with
the goal of providing capital to Mo'men for rapid growth domestically and
regionally. For twenty years, the company was growing organically through
retained earnings. Their negotiations with Actis started in 2006 and took more
than two years to complete. As most family-owned businesses, control over their
company was the key concern. For example, Sherif Elkhouly, the investment
principal for Actis Egypt, comments on his initial interaction with Mo'men:
When I spoke to [Mr. Mo'men] for the first time, the concept of private
equity was completely new to him. It was a closed family-oriented
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business and the thought of having an 'outsider' coming into the
shareholder base was taboo. It took quite a lot of work and explanation of
what Actis is about and why it's in his company's interest to have Actis
alongside them to get a second meeting and to explain more, to show him
what we've done in this sector over the world before and what we've
added to these businesses. It was a process of building trust (Schurgott
2008).
Once the two parties established a trust-based relationship, the discussion shifted
towards the business plan. Mo'men established a five-year business plan, with
specific milestones, projects, and investment requirements. The company plans
to grow its local franchises across the country. They are also planning to expand
their presence through franchising agreements in the region, starting with Sudan,
Libya, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, and following in Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Qatar. They are also expanding its meat and poultry production and
processing and bakery capacity, and looking into establishing other food
processing facilities, including tomato paste, fruit pulp and frozen vegetables.
They are also negotiating with other multinationals to establish a logistics and
supply chain joint venture to support their operations. These actions will enable
Mo'men to operate in a vertically integrated model, and have better control over
their cost structure and supply chain (Schurgott 2008).
For Actis, the value creation strategy for this transaction is through the rapid
growth, both domestically and regionally, of Mo'men. Their contribution to the
transaction comes in the form of the capital injection, as well as the management
support, which comes in various forms. First, Actis provides a strong presence at
the board of directors' level, where they can monitor performance and advise the
company on strategic decisions. Second, they also provide consulting support
through their network of industry experts, and access to other markets through
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their offices across the globe. Beyond that, they do not interfere in the day-to-day
management of the company (Schurgott 2008).
This transition also had significant implications on Mo'men's corporate
governance, which further supports the role of private equity in
professionalizing their portfolio companies, as analyzed in the previous section.
The company had to reorganize its operations and change its legal structure,
moving from an ad hoc organization with some partnerships and some
shareholder companies, to a holding company with multiple business units with
clear boundaries. They had to create a board of directors, assign corporate
management responsibilities, and institute formal governance and reporting
processes. They also had to streamline their tax accounting and settle any
outstanding tax issues (Schurgott 2008).
This example highlights a private equity value creation model that is completely
focused on growth and regional/global expansion. The company had a successful
growth story and a strong management team. The private equity firm did not go
for a majority ownership, but instead accepted a minority share, with control
remaining with the original family owners. Their contribution was to provide
capital as well as business know-how and support during the fast growth
process. In these types of transactions, the private equity exit strategy is more
likely to be through a share sale back to the owners, or an initial public offering,
rather than a trade sale to a multinational or another financial investor.
Another example of private equity growing and globalizing their portfolio
companies is Al-Borg Laboratories, the largest private provider of medical lab
tests in the Middle East, by Abraaj Capital, a Dubai-based private equity firm.
198
;;-;
Al-Borg was founded in 1991, and has since served more than 10 million patients
and conducted more than 29 million medical tests. Al-Borg operates a network of
more than 60 medical labs across Egypt, as well as 14 labs in Saudi Arabia, four
in the United Arab Emirates and one in Qatar. It employs more than a thousand
medical professionals, including specialized lab physicians, experienced
technologists and management staff, and conducts more than five million tests
per year (Abraaj Capital 2008).
Abraaj Capital is a Dubai-based private equity firm that invests in Middle East,
North Africa and South Asia (MENASA) region. The firm has $5 billion of assets
under management in four funds: buyout funds I and II, real estate fund, and
infrastructure and growth capital fund. The firm's investors include pension
funds such as the Qatar Pension Fund and the Kuwaiti Public Institution for
Social Security; international banks such as Deutsche Bank; regional holding
companies such as Al Jaber Group (UAE), Al Qudra Holdings (Abu Dhabi); as
well as wealthy individuals from the GCC countries. (Abraaj Capital 2008)
In May 2008, Abraaj acquired a 76.9% stake in Al-Borg Company for an
estimated $143.7 million; the remaining shares are still publicly traded in the
Egyptian Stock Exchange. The main objective of the transaction is to provide Al-
Borg lab with additional capital and management support to grow its operations
within the region due to three factors. The first factor is the region's
demographics of a young and rapidly growing population with growing income
and demand for quality healthcare. Second, the region is underserved in terms of
medical service; for example, the average lab tests per capital is 2.5 in Egypt and
six in Saudi Arabia, compared to 16 lab tests in Europe and 22 in the United
States. The third factor is the potential for the lab to go beyond Egypt to cover the
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whole region, which it has already started through its presence in three GCC
countries. Providing regional growth requires two critical resources: trained
experienced lab physicians and technicians, which Al-Borg has developed
through ongoing professional training; and significant capital to finance the
acquisition of the required equipment and technology, which requires constant
upgrading every 3-5 years. This transaction provides the lab with access to
capital for its regional growth (Abraaj Capital 2008)
These examples highlight a private equity value creation model based on growth
and regional/global expansion. The companies in each of these examples are
successful and rapidly growing; however, they need additional capital as well as
support in setting their strategic direction, professionalizing management and
gaining market-access, which the private equity firm is able to provide. Table 5.4
provides additional examples where private equity firms grew the operations of
their portfolio companies domestically and regionally or globally as a value-
creation strategy.
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Table 5.4 Examples of private equity firms growing portfolio companies
Company PE Firm Year Description
Lecico EFG Hermes 1996 Investment for increasing capacity and new
production lines
Vodafone Egypt EFG Hermes 1999 Investment allowed for purchase of bandwidth
and telcom license
ACE - CIIC EFG Hermes 2000 Investment allowed for license acquisition
Rashidi El-Mizan Actis 2003 Continue increasing capacity after purchase from
Unilever
Raya Holding (IT services) Injazat Technology Fund 2003 Investment to develop Raya's domestic and
regional Internet service provider (ISP) business,
mobile phone distribution business, and IT
integration and services business
Enjoy Haykala 2005 Potential to increase capacity by 120%
Sokhna Port Company AIG African Infrastructure 2005 Finalising development of port complex
Fund
BiscoMisr Concord 2005 Investing additional LE 80 million ($15 million) to
expanding production facilities, grow local
markets, and implement ERP systems
HoneyWell Haykala 2006 Growing firm in domestic market, with a focus on
turnaround
East Mediterranean Gas Company Ampal 2006 Growth in gas export capacity
Metito Water Treatment Gulf Capital 2006 Growth in water desalination sector
Taqa Citadel Capital 2006 Increased capacity to satisfy domestic
consumption needs
Al Nouran Holding Abraaj Capital 2007 Investment will allow for production of sugar
production facility
Sinai Holding for Marble and Investments Actis 2007 Investment will quadruple quarrying capacity as
well as triple marble capacity
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SEKEM Group
Alexandria Container Terminal
Gozour
Tanweer (Publishing media & distribution)
Beard
Cairo Medical Tower Laboratory
Contact Car Company
Mo'men (fast food chain)
Minapharm
SOLS and SOMICO
Gemeinschaftsbank
MENA Infrastructure Fund
Citadel Capital
Citadel Capital
Beltone Financial
Abraaj Capital, Concord
Amwal Al Khaleej
Actis
BankInvest
Haykala
Sources: Compiled by the author based on private equity
2007 Investment for increase in capacity and
exportation abilities
2007 Investment in growing industry
2007 Platform company to consolidate and grow
leading consumer goods brands in agriculture and
dairy, fast-moving consumer goods, and food
intermediates
2007 Expanding publishing rights and number of stores
nationally and regionally
2007 Investment in international manufacturing
facilities
2008 Rapid expansion, especially as governments in the
region incentivise private-sector participation in
the healthcare sector
2008 Expanded the firm's car financing to include used
cars and insurance, planned entrance into the
mortgage market
2008 Looking for growing number of brands under
management
2008 Growth in Biotech subsidiary
2008 Adding new production lines in steel sheet
production
firms' websites, reports, and financial news websites
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Table 5.5 Examples of private equity firms regionalizing/ globalizing portfolio companies
Company
Raya Holding (IT services)
ASEC Cement
PE Firm
Injazat Technology Fund
Citadel Capital
National Petroleum Company
Research and Development International
(RDI)
OstazOnline
BiscoMisr
Commercial International Bank
Premiere Casing Services
Cairo Medical Tower Laboratory
Mo'men (fast food chain)
ITWorx (IT software development)
Citadel Capital
Technology Development
Fund
Technology Development
Fund
Concord
Ripplewood
Haykala
Abraaj Capital, Concord
Actis
Capital Trust Group
Sources: Compiled by the author based on private equity firms' websites, reports, and financial news websites
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Year Description
2003 Investment to develop Raya's domestic and
regional Internet service provider (ISP) business,
mobile phone distribution business, and IT
integration and services business
2005 Acquired and expanded production and
operations in Algeria, Sudan and Libya
2005 Acquiring 6 upstream oil and gas concessions or
companies in the MENA in Egypt and Sudan;
Pakistan planned
2005 Regional expansion of software company focusing
on the creation of Arabic language software
2005 Regional expansion of online teaching aid online
portal
2005 Expanding to regional markets in Africa and Arab
countries; benefiting from the COMESA free trade
agreement with neighboring African countries
2006 Investment allows for regional growth
2007 Regional expansion into GCC countries
2008 Planning to expand medical lab services
regionally
2008 Expanding fast food chain stores regionally
2008 Assisted the company in expanding regionally
through acquisitions
5.4 Conclusions
Private equity ownership of portfolio companies affects these companies in many
ways, including employment, wages, productivity, performance, growth,
innovation and governance, as demonstrated by many empirical studies
conducted using data sets of completed private transactions in developed
countries. While these studies are hard to replicate due to the recent nature of
private equity transactions in emerging countries, qualitative review of these
transactions show that the nature of the value creation strategies used by private
equity differs from developed countries. By examining these value creation
strategies, we hypothesize that the impact of private equity on their portfolio
companies differs between developed countries and emerging markets.
Specifically, we show that private equity firms have a positive impact on the
companies that they acquire in developing economies because they act as
catalysts for initiating, consolidating, professionalizing, growing and globalizing
their portfolio companies.
Private equity firms initiated or participated in the initiation of a large number of
venture capital-backed startups, joint ventures and green field companies. In
venture capital, the emphasis is on providing capital and management support
to individual entrepreneurs; in joint ventures, the emphasis is on supporting
existing companies as they start a new line of business through a joint venture;
and in green field companies, private equity firms acted as the entrepreneur and
initiated new capital intensive companies. Private equity firms served as
catalysts in consolidating several smaller companies into a larger more
competitive entity using different strategies. In one example, the private equity
firm identified the market opportunity first and created the platform company,
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then proceeded to execute a series of acquisitions; in a second example, the
private equity firm simultaneously acquired and consolidated two similar size
companies; in a third example, the private equity firms worked with a
multinational corporation to facilitate their entry into the Egyptian market
through a series of acquisitions and consolidations. Private equity firms also
professionalized their portfolio companies by strengthening their management
capabilities and instituting corporate governance processes and practices. They
hired new CEO's, marketing executives and finance executives; improved
reporting practices; created new boards or strengthened existing ones; and
provided guidance in business planning for new expansions and growth. These
actions were particularly beneficial in developing countries where the majority of
the companies are family-owned and do not have strong professional
management teams or corporate governance processes. Lastly, private equity
firms increased the value of their portfolio companies through growth and
regional/global expansion. The companies in these examples are successful and
rapidly growing; however, they required additional capital as well as support in
setting their strategic direction, professionalizing management and gaining
market-access, which the private equity firm was able to provide.
* *
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we summarize the research findings; revisit our research
questions and hypotheses; and discuss some policy issues and implications
emerging from this research.
6.1 Summary of Research Findings
In Chapter 2, we examined the private equity industry in emerging markets and
the MENA region, and establish four key points. First, over the past five years,
private equity fund raising in emerging markets has grown exponentially, both
in absolute and relative terms. In 2002, all emerging markets private equity funds
combined raised $3.2 billion, a mere 3.1% of the $102 billion raised by the private
equity industry globally; in 2003 the figure was $3.5 billion, or 3.9% of the global
industry. In 2008, emerging markets private equity fund raising reached a record
$66.5 billion, growing 19 fold from 2003, despite the global financial crisis. This
figure represented 15% of the $445 billion raised by the private equity industry
globally (EMPEA 2009).
The second point is that most private equity funds in emerging markets are
"generalists." Among the 204 funds with closes in 2007, 118 funds managing
$39.1 billion, or 66.2% of the total capital raised, did not have a sectoral focus.
The remaining 69 funds managing $17.1 billion, or 28.9% of the total, were
classified into 9 sectors, with technology, infrastructure and energy as the top
three areas. This reflects the smaller size of emerging markets, where sector
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specialization is harder than in developed countries. The fact that most funds
prefer to be diversified across multiple sectors may also suggest that the source
of value-creation in emerging markets is not deep sectoral knowledge, but rather
generic financial, management and turnaround skills that can be applied to any
sector.
The third point relates to the emerging markets private equity returns. In terms
of three-year returns, emerging markets private equity returns are higher than
developed markets private equity; similar to emerging markets publicly-traded
equities; and significantly higher than developed markets publicly-traded
equities. While these returns show the high potential for emerging markets
private equity investments, they also reflect the risk premium expected by
investments in a higher risk asset.
The fourth point relates to private equity investments in the MENA region,
which are still small, despite the high growth in fund raising. For example, as a
percentage of GDP, private equity investments in the MENA region are -0.3%,
compared to 3.2% in the United States and 0.8% in the European Union, and 0.5%
in emerging markets in Asia (EMPEA 2009a). Within the region, the top three
countries in terms of attracting private equity investments are Egypt, the United
Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
In Chapter 3, we focused on the private equity industry in Egypt, and we
established two key points. The first point is that private equity investments in
Egypt are notably high compared to other emerging markets and the region. We
estimated private equity investments in Egypt over the past five years to be $2.6
billion annually on average, or 1.6% of Egypt's 2008 nominal GDP of $158.3
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Billion (World Fact Book 2009). To understand the importance of these
investments, we compared them to a number of benchmarks. Based on the
average of the past five years, private equity investments in Egypt represent
around 37.8% of the total FDI inflows; 27% of the target private sector
investments in the national investment plan; and 6.8% of the bank credit
extended to private sector companies. They also represent 1.7% of the Egyptian
Stock Exchange market capitalization, compared to 0.85% globally in 2008,
including all developed and developing countries. These benchmarks highlight
the high level of private equity investments in Egypt, both in absolute and
relative terms.
These high levels also raise two questions. First, why are private equity
investments in Egypt higher than the rest of the region as well as other emerging
markets? The second question is whether these higher figures make Egypt an
anomaly, and limit the scope of our findings to this case. These two questions
require more comparative analysis, which needs to be done in future research.
However, it is likely that the findings from this case study would provide good
hypotheses to test in other countries.
The second point in Chapter 3 is that the majority of private equity activities in
Egypt are performed by "home-grown" private equity firms. Over the past 5-10
years, a number of local private equity firms emerged and quickly expanded.
They were mostly founded by experienced professionals, and have managed to
create a competitive advantage for themselves, both domestically and regionally.
These firms played the primary role in growing the industry over the past five
years and are now aggressively expanding regionally. One hypothesis that needs
to be tested in future research is whether the presence of these home-grown
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firms is responsible for the high level of private equity activities compared to
other countries. Through our analysis of these firms, we also hypothesize about
five key competencies that contribute to their competitive advantage, namely:
access to capital, access to deals, deal structuring knowhow, business
transformation and turnaround knowhow, and political access. These five
competencies were present at varying levels in most of the private equity firms
that we examined.
In Chapter 4, we traced the end-to-end activities of the private equity cycle,
including fund initiation and setup, investing, portfolio management and exit. At
each step, we compared the private equity business model between developed
and developing countries to understand how private equity firms are adapting to
the local needs and conditions of developing countries. Our over-arching
hypothesis was that while the private equity model is transferable and useful in
emerging countries, private equity firms adapt to the local peculiarities of doing
business in such emerging markets.
The first phase in the private equity cycle is fund initiation and setup, starting
with setting up the fund legal and governance structure. From a theoretical point
of view, the key issue discussed in the literature involving private equity fund
setup is agency: what is the fund structure that best provides adequate
protections for investors, while providing performance incentives for fund
managers acting on behalf of the investors, along with sufficient decision making
autonomy. In developed markets, private equity funds are setup as limited
partnerships (GP/LP model). However, limited partnerships, as legal entities, are
not available in Egypt and many other emerging markets, especially those with
legal systems based on French civil law. A large number of private equity funds
210
in Egypt are domiciled offshore, which provides investors and fund managers
with more flexibility in designing the fund structure. However, a number of
funds are also incorporated domestically in the form of joint stock companies. In
these situations, they try to contract around some of the legal limitations of joint
stock companies by designing their contracts to simulate some of the features of
the GP/LP fund, such as the management fees. However, one critical limitation of
the joint stock or holding company is that it does not provide for term limits for
the fund, a feature that provides significant protection for investors and a
discipline mechanism for fund managers.
Raising capital is the next step in the fund initiation. In Egypt, anecdotal
evidence from interviews indicates that the majority of private equity capital
comes from local and regional (Arab GCC countries) sources, be they
institutional or family/ individual sources. Additionally, there are some
examples of banks financing private equity firms, and also one case of a
government-sponsored venture capital firm to develop the information
technology industry. However, the participation of large US- and EU-based
institutional investors remains limited.
The second phase in the private equity cycle is investing. In terms of the types of
investments, private equity firms in Egypt are investing heavily in family
businesses. In some transactions, they provide growth capital and acquire a
minority stake in the company, where the family owners continue to maintain
control of their business and use the capital to implement their growth plans; in
other transactions, they acquire a controlling stake in the family business and
implement a turnaround or consolidation program. Private equity firms are also
investing in consolidations, where they are acquiring a number of small and
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medium companies and consolidating them to create larger more competitive
entities. There are also some examples of investing in turnarounds and
privatization. In the case of a turnaround, the focus is usually on improving
management, financial controls and accounting practices. In the case of
privatization, private equity firms are more inclined to invest in large capital
intensive companies in sectors like cement or fertilizers, but shy away from labor
intensive industries such as textiles.
In terms of the sectoral focus of private equity firms in Egypt, the biggest
industry by far in terms of number of transactions is telecommunications and
information technology; however, most of these transactions are venture capital
investments in startups or small companies, with limited capital. In terms of
transaction size, the biggest industry is basic materials, which includes cement,
fertilizers, steel and other similar heavy industries. This sector has the second
largest number of transactions and an average transaction size of more than $1
billion. These transactions include the acquisition, turnaround and sale of ASEC
Cement Holding and the Egyptian Fertilizers Company, both transactions
executed by Citadel Capital, and considered the largest in the MENA region.
Other sectors with large private equity transactions are financial services, oil and
gas, healthcare and pharmaceuticals. This distribution of transactions shows that
the majority of the private equity money is geared towards capital intensive and
highly regulated sectors, with high barriers to entry. In many of these
transactions, private equity firms acquire companies that have operating licenses
in these regulated areas and invest in expanding their capacity and scope of
operations. Noticeably absent from private sector transactions are sectors like
textiles, construction, tourism and retail distribution.
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In terms of deal sourcing, private equity firms in Egypt identify personal and
professional networks as the most common source of potential opportunities,
followed by professional service firms that they work with, which include
investment banks, accounting firms and law firms. For this reason, most
international private equity firms actively operating in Egypt, such as Actis or
the Carlyle Group, maintain a domestic presence. This pattern supports the
argument that it is hard to conduct private equity transactions through remote
offices and brief business trips. International private equity firms that are serious
about doing business in an emerging market need to have a strong local presence
and local staff with knowledge of the country, from a business, legal, political
and culture perspective. This argument is also emphasized through the due
diligence process, which inherently is a situation of informational asymmetry
between the company owners and the private equity investors. This
informational asymmetry is exacerbated in the cases of a non-local private equity
firm. In some case examples examined in Egypt, especially in family businesses,
the due diligence process also included a "transformational" component. The
target company needed to restructure its corporate and legal structure, to
improve its accounting and financial controls, and to settle any outstanding tax
liabilities.
The third stage of the private equity cycle is portfolio management. In terms of
governance, the level of engagement of private equity firms with their portfolio
companies varied widely. In earlier transactions (for example, prior to 2004), a
large number of private equity firms were passive investments, playing the role
of asset managers, similar to investing in publicly traded equities. However, in
the more recent transactions that we reviewed in Egypt (after 2004), the level of
engagement of private equity firms with their portfolio companies varied,
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ranging from being passive investors, to playing supportive roles to the
management, to taking active leading roles. A number of private equity firms
continued with passive investments, mostly providing growth capital to
companies with good management. In some transactions, private equity firms
played an active supportive role, where they helped the portfolio companies
strengthen their management teams or enter new markets. In a third type of
transactions, typically turnarounds or green field investments, they assumed a
leading role in creating and executing the business strategy. One hypothesis,
based on these three models, is that private equity firms that are more actively
engaged with their portfolio firms are able to realize higher returns. While there
is no strong empirical evidence to prove this hypothesis, there are some
anecdotal case examples that may support it. Future research comparing these
three models of engagement using large sets of empirical data may be useful.
The fourth and last stage in the private equity cycle is exit, which may be
conducted through a trade sale, secondary buyout, initial public offering (IPO),
or share buy-back. In Egypt, all of these exit strategies were available to and used
by private equity funds. However, we found that trade sale was the most
common strategy, but there were also cases of secondary buybacks and initial
public offerings.
In Chapter 5, we examined private equity value creation strategies in Egypt
using case examples of their transactions. Private equity ownership of portfolio
companies affects these companies in many ways, including employment, wages,
productivity, performance, growth, innovation and governance, as demonstrated
by many empirical studies conducted using data sets of completed private
transactions in developed countries. While these studies are hard to replicate due
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to the recent nature of private equity transactions in emerging countries,
qualitative review of these transactions show that the nature of the value creation
strategies used by private equity differs from developed countries. By examining
these value creation strategies, we hypothesize that the impact of private equity
on their portfolio companies differs between developed countries and emerging
markets. Specifically, we show that private equity firms have a positive impact
on the companies that they acquire in developing economies because they act as
catalysts for initiating, consolidating, professionalizing, growing and globalizing
their portfolio companies.
Private equity firms initiated or participated in the initiation of a large number of
venture capital-backed startups, joint ventures and green field companies. In
venture capital, the emphasis is on providing capital and management support
to individual entrepreneurs; in joint ventures, the emphasis is on supporting
existing companies as they start a new line of business through a joint venture;
and in green field companies, private equity firms acted as the entrepreneur and
initiated new capital intensive companies. Private equity firms served as
catalysts in consolidating several smaller companies into a larger more
competitive entity using different strategies. In one example, the private equity
firm identified the market opportunity first and created the platform company,
then proceeded to execute a series of acquisitions; in a second example, the
private equity firm simultaneously acquired and consolidated two similar size
companies; in a third example, the private equity firms worked with a
multinational corporation to facilitate their entry into the Egyptian market
through a series of acquisitions and consolidations. Private equity firms also
professionalized their portfolio companies by strengthening their management
capabilities and instituting corporate governance processes and practices. They
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hired new CEO's, marketing executives and finance executives; improved
reporting practices; created new boards or strengthened existing ones; and
provided guidance in business planning for new expansions and growth. These
actions were particularly beneficial in developing countries where the majority of
the companies are family-owned and do not have strong professional
management teams or corporate governance processes. Lastly, private equity
firms increased the value of their portfolio companies through growth and
regional/global expansion. The companies in these examples are successful and
rapidly growing; however, they required additional capital as well as support in
setting their strategic direction, professionalizing management and gaining
market-access, which the private equity firm was able to provide.
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6.2 Revisiting Our Research Questions and Hypotheses
We started this research with two key questions: (i) Why did private equity
activities grow so much and so fast in Egypt?; (ii) What is the impact of private equity
firms on their portfolio companies? And what are the broader economic development
implications for the country? In this section, we review these questions and hypotheses,
and discuss our research findings.
In answering the first research question, why did private equity activities grow so
much and so fast in Egypt, we identified the top driving factors. In addition to all
the global and macroeconomic trends discussed earlier, we attribute the growth
of the private equity industry in Egypt to two key factors. First, the private
equity industry in Egypt is "home-grown" and is dominated by local firms that
relied on a mix of local knowledge and expatriate knowhow. These firms
developed key competencies that provided them with a strong competitive
advantage and enabled their local and regional growth. These competencies
include: access to capital, access to deals, deal structuring knowhow, business
transformation and turnaround knowhow, and political access. We found these
five competencies to be present at varying levels in most of the private equity
firms that we examined.
Second, private equity firms, especially the home-grown ones, are learning and
experimenting. While adopting global best practices in the industry, they also
managed to adapt their business model and practices to the local market needs.
These adaptations spanned the whole private equity investment cycle. For
example, private equity firms adapted to legal limitations in several ways,
including incorporating their funds in offshore locations and using contracts to
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create similar governance structure to the GP/LP model. They also used value
creation strategies, such as initiating new companies, consolidating small
businesses into larger entities, or professionalizing and growing family
businesses. These strategies are consistent with the types of opportunities
available in emerging markets.
The second research question focuses on outcomes: What is the impact of private
equity firms on their portfolio companies? And what are the broader economic
development implications for the country? Based on our analysis of private equity
transactions executed in Egypt over the past five years, we found that private
equity firms have had a positive impact on the companies that they invested in or
acquired because they acted as catalysts for initiating, consolidating, professionalizing,
growing and globalizing these companies, as opposed to focusing on cost and labor
reduction as a way of creating value.
We also found that private equity firms in emerging markets, Egypt being a good
example, are providing a new type of entrepreneurship that is emerging from the
financial sector, as opposed to the traditional entrepreneurship emanating from
industry or technological circles. Throughout our analysis, we found a number of
points that support this argument. First, there are numerous examples of
transactions where the private equity firms are initiating or taking part in the
initiation of new companies, including venture capital-backed startups, green
field investments, and joint ventures. As we review these transactions, we find
that private equity firms do play an entrepreneurial role in these situations,
especially in green field situations. Similarly, in consolidation situations, the
private equity firm is creating a larger, more competitive entity by assembling,
consolidating and growing a number of smaller companies. We see this
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entrepreneurial behavior among private equity firms that pursue an active
engagement model with their portfolio companies, rather than ones that pursue
a passive investment strategy 52. Additionally, most of the private equity
transactions reviewed included a focus on providing growth capital, as well as
the private equity firm supporting the management in their growth activities
through different measures, such as providing contacts to help in opening new
markets, or hiring senior management.
In Chapter 5, we reviewed this hypothesis and found strong evidence towards
the positive impact of private equity firms. However, few open questions remain.
First, our observations are primarily based on the period between 2002 and 2008,
which was a high growth period in Egypt and globally. The 2008/2009 recession
and financial crisis resulted in a halt for most new private equity fund raising
and investments, but the firms remained with their portfolio companies. Many of
these portfolio companies were acquired at high valuations in 2007/2008, and are
not likely to recover to the same levels. It is not clear how private equity firms
will handle this situation, and if it will create any unexpected behaviors to
recover their losses. Second, whether this argument can be extended to other
countries is an open question. Private equity activities in Egypt are higher than
many emerging markets, and the majority of the firms are home grown. It is not
clear how similar/different the situation is in other emerging countries, and if
private equity firms exhibit the same behavior or not.
52 See section 4.5.1 for a discussion of the different engagement models.
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6.3 The Private Equity Model in Emerging Markets
Based on our analysis of private equity firms, funds and transactions in Egypt
and the MENA region, we argue that private equity is an effective model for
investing in emerging markets for institutional investors and high-net-worth
individuals. As more of the global economic growth shifts towards emerging
markets, institutional investors are seeking more exposure to these countries,
and more capital flows are seeking attractive investments within these countries.
However, the vehicles for these investments are limited. Capital markets in many
emerging markets are not broad or deep enough, may not have the liquidity to
support these inflows, and are often overvalued due to speculative demands.
Private equity provides an alternative vehicle for these large investors. Private
equity managers seek opportunities that are not publicly traded yet; they provide
strong governance and accountability to their investors; they maintain an
efficient capital structure; and they can structure their funds to maintain
investors' tax exempt status. For the same reasons, private equity is also an
attractive investment vehicle for the local or regional high-net-worth individuals
and family investors who need to diversify beyond their core business and want
to maintain their investments locally or in the region (which is a growing pattern
in the Middle East).
Throughout our analysis, we found a number of points that support this
argument. First, private equity firms provide investors with privileged access to
transactions because of two reasons. First, private equity firms, through their
extensive network, have access to proprietary transactions that are not available
for other investors, even large institutional investors. Second, in situations of
very large buy-outs, the transaction size creates a barrier to entry to most
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investors. Only large private equity firms are able to create the required consortia
to bid for such opportunities. Citadel Capital and Abraaj Capital have
specifically demonstrated their ability to finance such very large transactions and
profitably exit. This privileged access and barriers to entry provide private equity
investors with opportunities for higher returns.
The second point in support of this hypothesis is that by conducting the deal
sourcing and due diligence process, private equity firms reduce the
informational asymmetries for investors, especially foreign investors with
limited local knowledge. By using professional accounting and auditing firms,
law firms, and other technical experts, private equity firms interviewed indicated
that they conduct a thorough due diligence. They are aware of high-risk areas,
especially around accounting and tax irregularities, and are able to scrutinize
their target investments in a stronger way than most investors.
The third point is that private equity firms provide lower and predictable agency
costs. Investors know that they will provide 20% of their profits to the private
equity fund, and they know that this profit sharing mechanism will provide
good alignment between their interests and the private equity firm's interest.
Private equity firms have an additional incentive to perform as they seek the
same network of investors for new fund and new investments, where creating
and maintaining a strong track record becomes an additional performance
incentive.
The fourth point is that private equity provides a competitive transaction cost,
especially for foreign institutional investors. In Egypt, the cost of investing in
private equity is comparable to investing in publicly-traded equities through an
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investment fund. Additionally, the cost of due diligence and transaction
execution is distributed over a number of investors.
However, we also found few points against our hypothesis. First, private equity
investments are highly illiquid. Once investors commit to the fund, they are
typically locked in until the fund liquidates, which makes this form of
investment more appropriate to long term investors with access to liquidity
elsewhere. This point became visible during the 2008/09 financial crisis, where
several private equity firms could not draw down on their committed capital.
The second issue is that private equity investments require a minimum
investment threshold that makes it only accessible to institutional investors and
high-net-worth investors. It is not accessible to retail investors. While some
private equity firms have chosen to list in stock exchanges, this model is not
widely spread through the industry. In 2008, Citadel Capital considered listing
its shares, but pulled back due to the financial crisis.
One point that is relevant to this hypothesis, but which we have not examined in
this research, is the capital structure in private equity transactions. Private equity
firms in emerging countries are usually not able to leverage their transactions in
the same ways as in developed countries. First, banks are reluctant to extend
unsecured or excessive debt; and second, the cost of debt is typically much
higher in emerging countries, especially those with high levels of inflation like
Egypt. Exploring the capital structure in private equity transactions is a possible
area for future research.
Based on this analysis, and our review of the private equity investment cycle in
Egypt, we see evidence to support the argument that private equity is an
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effective model for investing in emerging markets for institutional investors and
high-net-worth individuals, and we expect to see increasing growth of emerging
markets private equity, despite the global financial problems. However, more
data points are needed to further test and establish this hypothesis. If this
hypothesis stands, we expect private equity investments to increase, and we
expect more funds from US- and EU-based institutional investments. We also
expect a growth in the number of funds, which may dilute the industry returns
both due to the "money chasing deals" phenomenon (Gompers and Lerner 2000),
and also as less capable fund managers join the industry.
However, the real test for this model lies in the next few years. The 2008/2009
recession and financial crisis resulted in the halt of most private equity fund
raising and investing activities. As the economy recovers, would investors return
to investing in private equity funds in emerging markets?
6.4 Policy Issues and Implications
As private equity investments in emerging markets grow, it is important to have
a deeper understanding of their business practices and impact on their portfolio
companies. This understanding would influence a number of government
policies. If the belief prevailed that private equity investments have a positive
impact on the economy, then more would argue for positive government policies
to support and attract private equity activities, similar to what many countries do
to attract foreign direct investments (FDI). If the belief prevailed that these firms
have a negative impact on the economy, then more would argue for stricter
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regulations to limit their activities, similar to what many countries do to limit
speculative "hot money."
Specifically, there are a number of policy issues relating to private equity that
need to be examined. The first issue is regulation. As it stands today, private
equity firms are not regulated as financial institutions. They incorporate locally
as joint stock companies, or offshore as limited partnerships, and they are subject
to corporate laws like any other company. However, as they grow larger and
control more investments and companies, is there a reason to regulate them,
similar to other non-banking financial institutions? The two key arguments in
support of regulation are to provide additional transparency to the regulator and
also to the public; and to limit any unforeseen systemic risks that may emerge
from the industry. However, there does not seem to be a need for regulations to
protect the investors due to the fact that all private equity investors are large
institutional investors or qualified investors who are sophisticated enough to
decide, manage and monitor their investments. This issue is important as the
Government of Egypt just launched a new regulatory body, the Egyptian
financial Services Authority, to regulate non-banking financial institutions,
including insurance, real estate mortgage, or consumer credit cards as well as the
capital market authority.
The second issue is transparency: how much disclosure should governments
require from private equity funds operating in the country, regardless of their
origin or domicile? By nature of being "private," private equity funds are not
required to disclose any information to the public, but rather report to their
investors. However, if private equity firms own, control and manage a sizable
part of the economy, should there be public disclosure requirements? This issue
224
has been controversial in developed countries over the past few years (Walker
2007). If private equity firms are included under a regulatory regime,
transparency should be the top objective.
The third issue is taxation. At the fund level, private equity funds are often
incorporated in offshore tax havens to enable their tax-exempt investors such as
pension funds to benefit from their tax status. However, this issue may be worth
evaluating, especially in countries that have not instituted capital gains tax, such
as Egypt. At the fund partners' level, the same issue exists. The GP/LP private
equity structure considers partner profits as capital gains rather than normal
income, and hence, they fall under a lower tax rate (this is the situation in
countries that allow the GP/LP structure and that have capital gains tax. Over the
past two years, Egypt considered implementing a capital gains tax on profits
from the stock markets, however, the government decided against this policy in
fear of driving down the markets. However, if a capital gains tax becomes an
option in the future, then private equity investments may be included under the
same tax regime. Having transparency into private equity investments would
provide policy makers with information to design smart policies that would not
drive private equity investors away.
The fourth issue is private equity funds legal structure. Most developing
countries do not have the legal infrastructure to support private equity fund
structure (limited partnerships). However, if private equity becomes a common
investment vehicle in Egypt, the government may consider instituting this
structure to attract more funds and further develop the country's financial
services industry.
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The fifth issue relates to using the availability of private equity capital toward
large infrastructure projects using schemes like build-own-transfer (BOT) and
public private partnerships (PPP). If more private equity funding becomes
available, would it be a good policy to attract it to finance large infrastructure
projects? Private equity firms have demonstrated their ability to attract and
mobilize large investments in capital intensive areas, and could be useful in
supporting investments in large infrastructure projects, given the right structure.
One important point to highlight, from an investor perspective: private equity
money is highly illiquid and is tied to long-term investments, unlike "hot money,"
which focuses on speculations and can cause great macroeconomic problems.
Private equity investors, by virtue of investing in illiquid multi-year investments,
provide a vote of confidence in the overall economy and its prospects. Their
interests are aligned with the overall performance and growth of the economy -
they stand to make higher profits if the economy grows faster and if their
portfolio companies grow more profitable. Therefore, it is in the interest of
government to attract this type of capital.
All these are policy issues that need to be examined in light of the growing
private equity presence in Egypt.
*t * *
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APPENDIX 1: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Introduction and research objectives
"Access to finance" is one of the important factors for economic development -
how does the national economy mobilize its savings (as well as foreign
investments) and channel it to new and existing firms. It is a critical part of the
development virtuous circle: efficient channeling of national savings and foreign
money to investments, which in turn builds productive capacity, increases
employment and productivity, and translates into more savings. This is
specifically important in developing countries where there is a huge increase in
population that needs to be matched by a corresponding increase in the
mobilization of capital to provide employment opportunities for the growing
workforce.
The objective of this research is to understand how the emerging Private Equity /
Venture Capital activities influence economic development in Egypt, as an
example of an emerging economy.
We are conducting interviews with all the leading PE/VC funds in Egypt to get
insights on how their funds operate, and to document case studies of specific
portfolio companies. We will as two sets of questions: the first on the fund as a
whole and how it operates; and the second is on specific portfolio companies,
and how operating under a PE/VC fund has affected this company's operations.
Confidentiality: the information provided will be used only in aggregate or
without identifiable reference.
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I. Fund-Level Questions
Fund Background
1. Can you provide a brief background on the fund:
* How and when did it start?
* Who are the founders?
* What is the size of the fund ($, number of investment professionals)
2. When did you execute your first deal? What is the number of deals to-
date? What is the average deal size?
3. What is the composition of the fund management team? (e.g., foreign fund
manager as a partner? Investment bankers? Etc.)
4. What is the source of the fund capital?
5. What is the fund legal structure? (e.g., Law 95/1992, Law 8/1997, or Law
159/1981)
Fund Focus
Do you focus your activities on specific areas of investment, e.g.,
6. Sectors (e.g., oil and gas, real-estate, IT, telecom, tourism, infrastructure,
manufacturing, retail and distribution, etc.)
7. Company size (e.g., small, medium, large)
8. Financing stage (e.g., startup financing, expansion, etc.)
If not focused on startups and small businesses - why? To what extent do
you think the Egyptian market is encouraging for Venture Capital funds?
9. Type of deals (e.g., LBO, turnarounds, VC startups, etc.)
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Investment Process
Can you provide a quick overview of the specific stages of the investment
process, and how you conduct it here? e.g.,
10. Deal leads: how do you identify target companies?
11. What is the due diligence process? Who performs it?
12. What is the investment decision making process? Who gets involved?
What are their criteria?
13. What is the typical holding period for acquired companies?
14. What is the value creation model? (e.g., financial restructuring, new
investments, operational turnaround, management change, etc.)
15. What is the governance model between the fund and the portfolio
company? How much influence do you have in managing the portfolio
company? How do you exert this influence?
16. What is the typical exit strategy? (e.g., stock market, strategic investor
such as multinational corporations, asset sale, etc.)
Government Impact
17. How do you perceive the government role with respect to your fund
operations? Are there any specific government policies that help/impede
your operations (at the deal acquisition, restructuring, and exit stages),
e.g.,
* Bank credit issues when buying companies with significant banking
debt
* Labor issues during restructuring
* Stock market laws or foreign ownership restrictions
244
) L~1 ~__~___~~~~ _ _ ;I__I _ _I__ __II_ ~ _ i~_ii__~~l__l__l__~
II. Deal/Portfolio Company-Level Questions
The objective of this section is to go through some details for one or more of the
portfolio companies that you are or have invested in.
Deal Background
18. What is the size of the portfolio company? (purchase $$)
19. Who was the previous owner? (private, family-owned, state-owned, etc.)
20. Was it a distressed company? Was it a privatized state-owned enterprise?
21. Why did they sell the company? Why did they prefer to sell to a fund
rather than going for bank financing?
22. Did the company have debt financing before you purchased it? Did they
have problems obtaining debt financing from banks?
23. What is the company name (only if this is not confidential information)
and sector?
Governance & Performance Management
24. What changes did you make to the management team? Who are the new
managers, if any? What is their background? How did you select them?
25. What changes did you make to the Board of Directors? Why? Who is
representing the fund on the board of the company?
26. How did you set up the management team? What is the remuneration
structure? What are the performance metrics for?
27. What are the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms? (e.g., quarterly
board meeting, financial reports, etc.)
28. How involved are you as a fund in setting a new strategy for the portfolio
company?
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29. How involved are you as a fund in the day-to-day management of the
portfolio company?
Restructuring
The objective of this section is to understand the type of restructuring that was
performed on this company, e.g.,
30. Did you sell/divest any assets? What were they? (e.g., some factories, real-
estate, etc.)
31. Did you grow or shrink the company?
32. Did you initiate new capital investments in the portfolio company? How
did they finance them?
Exit strategy
33. If you sold the company:
* What was your exit strategy? (e.g., stock market, strategic investor
such as multinational corporations, asset sale, etc.)
* What is the holding period?
* What is the sale price?
34. If you sold the company more than a year ago: How is it currently
performing?
Concluding Thoughts
35. What are your thoughts on how the PE/VC industry is contributing to
economic development in Egypt?
36. Do you think that you - as an industry - are providing a viable alternative
to the limitations of access to financing from the banking sector?
37. Any other thoughts?
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